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IDENTIFYING THE FIRST PERSON 
by
Roblin R. Meeks 
Advisor: Professor David M. Rosenthal
Wide agreement exists that self-ascriptions that one would 
express with the first-person pronoun differ in kind from 
those one would express with other self-designating 
expressions such as proper names and definite descriptions. 
At least some first-person self-ascriptions, many argue, 
are nonaccidental--that is, they involve no self- 
identification, and hence in making them one cannot 
accidentally misidentify the subject of the ascription. I 
examine the support for this claim throughout the 
literature, paying particular attention to Sydney 
Shoemaker's proposal that self-ascriptions are 
nonaccidental in virtue of being immune to error through 
misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. 
According to Shoemaker, such immunity results from the 
special way in which one is introspectively aware of the 
psychological property or state ascribed, a way that leaves 
no room for questions to arise as to whether oneself is its 
bearer. I contend that though it may seem from the point
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of view of consciousness that we are directly and 
immediately aware of the states of our bodies and minds as 
our own, both theoretical and empirical considerations 
strongly suggests that we have no such direct awareness. 
Proprioception and introspection prove in the end to be 
better described as types of informed, conscious self­
interpretation. Taking inspiration from Dennett,
Rosenthal, and Nozick, I offer the naive proposal as an 
alternative that explains all self-ascriptions in terms of 
one's relying upon a battery of commonsense self-specifying 
beliefs to interpret both which state or property one has 
and who has it. As a result, first-person self-ascriptions 
differ from others only in degree and not in kind, and 
self-misidentification always remains a possibility--even 
when self-ascribing properties with the first-person 
pronoun.
- v -
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Chapter I. introduction and First impressions
"I: I is the first letter of the alphabet, the
first word of the language, the first thought of 
the mind, the first object of the affections. In 
grammar it is a pronoun of the first person and 
singular number. Its plural is said to be We, 
but how there can be more than one myself is 
doubtless clearer to the grammarians that it is 
to the author of this incomparable dictionary. 
Conception of two myselves is difficult, but 
fine."
--Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s
Dictionary
Bierce's clever definition nicely captures the intuitive 
sense we have of ourselves as thinkers. The first-person 
is indeed aptly named: Intuitively, thoughts about
ourselves that we express with it or involve its mental 
analogue seem to have a special status. The first person 
seems to lie hidden in some way from the second and third, 
glimpsed by them only second hand in speech or behavior.
And asking how one thinks about oneself sounds at best like 
a joke or a mistake--nothing could be more simple. As 
Beirce suggests, it's almost impossible for one not to be, 
as it were, selfish in thought--not to take oneself as "the 
first object of the affections."
These intuitions about the first person give rise to 
a host of difficult philosophical puzzles. How does one 
self-ascribe states and properties, both mental and
-  1 -
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physical? Intuition suggests that one has privileged 
access to one's mental life, and hence one need only ask 
oneself what one is thinking. But is that intuition 
accurate, and if so, how can we understand this access? Is 
our thinking about ourselves fundamentally different from 
our thinking about others? If we do enjoy some form of 
ascriptive privilege, are one's mental states and 
properties therefore in principle removed from others?
Does consciousness include an ineliminable first-person 
element such that no "objective", third-person scientific 
theory can hope to explain the phenomenon fully and 
satisfactorily?
Historically, philosophers have tended to accept 
first-person privileged access as a fact about our mental 
lives, ultimately putting it to good theoretical use.
Perhaps the best example is that of Descartes, who argues 
that only a first-person judgment can defeat radical 
philosophical skepticism and provide the foundation upon 
which to build secure and certain scientific knowledge. 
Moreover, Descartes held that the mind is transparent to 
itself, and one cannot be in a mental state without also 
being aware that one is in that state.
The traditional problem of other minds and its 
traditional solution provides another illustration of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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philosophical appeal of the first person. Russell, for 
one, followed Mill in arguing that one only ascribes states 
to others indirectly by first observing the causal 
connections between one's own states and one's behavior.
One can then infer that similar observed behavior must be 
the result of similar unobservable mental states.
Privileged access may mean that no one else can directly 
observe one's mental states, but those who endorse the 
argument from analogy believe that this privilege itself 
also offers a solution to the problems it creates.
Many difficulties have been raised for the argument 
from analogy, of course. Critics are quick to point out, 
for example, that relying upon a single case as the basis 
for a large number and range of conclusions is a poor 
inductive strategy. More interesting, however, are the 
challenges to privilege itself. One's assertions about 
one's mental states were thought to be if not infallible 
then at least incorrigible. But in the wake of powerful 
arguments like that given by Wittgenstein and his followers 
against the possibility of a private language, few 
philosophers remain convinced that such absolute privilege 
exists. Most now accept that introspection provides 
reliable though fallible access to one’s mental states.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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One may be an authority with regard to one's mind--but not 
an unassailable one.
My primary interest in the dissertation is not the 
problem of other minds or the privileged access that 
precipitates it. I am puzzled by another type of Cartesian 
privilege that remains widely endorsed, however, one 
lurking in Beirce’s assertion that first-person thoughts 
are the first thoughts of the mind. Again Descartes'
Meditations provides a ready example of this notion. It's
important for Descartes that first philosophy is in the 
first person--it would not suffice for him to conclude via 
the cogito that some subject or other exists (apart from 
God). For the existence of an external world and those who 
might inhabit it can be doubted. Descartes does not worry 
that the evil genius might deceive him into falsely 
thinking that the doubting subject and the subject doubted 
are one and the same. Indeed the cogito only succeeds if
the doubter doubts his own existence, which is why
opponents such as Lichtenberg and Nietzsche object at this 
point that Descartes oversteps his argument by framing his 
conclusion in first-person terms.
This further type of privilege concerns the 
identification of the ascribing subject. However fallible 
one might be about an ascribed state or property, few
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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accept that one can be mistaken about the identity of the 
ascriber when that state or property is ascribed with the 
first-person pronoun or its mental analogue. Though one 
can be wrong about which state one is in, it seems almost a 
truism that one cannot be wrong about who is in that state 
when one is introspectively aware of it.
So widely accepted is this type of first-person 
privilege or a variation of it that it often makes for 
strange bedfellows. Perhaps the most influential modern 
proponent of it is Wittgenstein, who contends that the 
first-person pronoun has a special use--what he calls 'I' 
used as subject--for which it is strictly nonsensical to 
question who is using the term. When 'I' is used in this 
way--as in, e.g., "I have toothache"--Wittgenstein writes 
that "there is no question of recognizing a person" and so 
no room remains for the possibility of misrecognition or 
misidentification (1969, p. 67). To avoid the outright 
Cartesianism intimated by this privilege, Wittgenstein 
claims that speech acts involving 'I' used as subject do 
not serve to pick out or to indicate a speaker. Surface 
grammar notwithstanding, they differ from other uses of the 
first-person pronoun--'11 used as object--in that they are 
tantamount to groans.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Sydney Shoemaker, much influenced by Wittgensteinian, 
in effect lays bare the Cartesian nature of this privilege. 
He agrees with Wittgenstein that certain first-person self­
ascriptions enjoy a special freedom from error with regard 
to identifying the subject, but he wisely does not want to 
deny that 'I' is a referring expression even in these 
cases. The resulting position requires that he argue for 
what he calls weak self-intimation--namely the Cartesian 
notion that when one is in a particular mental state one 
will believe that one is in that state.
Still, this type of privilege proves rather difficult 
to understand. Intuitively, it does seem to us in 
introspection that we are directly and immediately aware of 
both the state introspected and oneself as a single, 
unified subject who is in that state. To introspect a 
thought appears prima facie inseparable from grasping that 
it is to oneself who believes or desires such-and-such. It 
doesn't seem to one that one first observes with one's 
"inner eye" some subject or other who believes such-and- 
such and then concludes that that believing subject is in 
fact oneself. No room for error regarding the 
introspecting subject seems to exist as Wittgenstein 
claims.
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Part of the difficulty in understanding this notion 
of privilege lies in clarifying exactly what kind and 
degree of error of misidentification supposedly cannot 
occur. We have fairly strong intuitions regarding the 
possibility of errors in these cases, but our equally 
strong intuitions about privileged access to our states 
were eventually vitiated. Accordingly, my primary concern 
in the dissertation is the notion of self-identification 
and its role in self-ascription.
Self-identification should not be conflated with 
self-reference, however. I have little to add to the rich 
and extensive literature addressing the semantic properties 
of the first-person pronoun. In the dissertation I rely 
upon that literature mainly to illustrate the important 
distinction between self-reference and self-identification 
and their associated errors. One identifies oneself by 
possessing and expressing, in behavior and speech, beliefs 
about the properties one instantiates. Errors of 
misidentification occur when one refers to an object or 
individual while being disposed to deny that one is doing 
so. Similarly, self-misidentification occurs when one both 
refers to oneself and is disposed to deny that one is doing 
so, and this occurs most often when one self-ascribes a 
state or property with a self-designating expression other
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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than the first-person pronoun. One instantiates myriad 
more properties than one believes one possesses, and one no 
doubt believes that one possesses properties that one 
doesn't in fact instantiate.
The importance of these types of error cannot be 
overstated since they help to reveal the nature of the 
privilege in question. Intuition provides only a rough 
idea of what errors can occur. Accordingly, consonant with 
work in cognitive science, in the discussion to follow I 
rely quite heavily on empirical work primarily from 
cognitive psychology to expand and to sharpen the catalogue 
of ascriptive errors that one is subject to. We learn that 
empirical data provides compelling evidence of a wide 
variety of ascriptive errors that we are prone to even in 
the normal case. And the more extreme cases of abnormal 
mental functioning give us further insight into how we 
think about ourselves. Beirce correctly points out that 
"conception of two myselves is difficult," for example, but 
clinical work regarding psychopathologies such as 
dissociative identity disorder and thought insertion helps 
us to achieve a clearer sense of how the mind views and 
associates its own states. In particular, we see that the 
traditional, intuitive picture of introspection as a direct
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and unmediated awareness of one's own mental states and 
properties does not survive scrutiny.
I believe that this and similar work demonstrates 
that no such privilege regarding the identification of the 
introspecting subject actually obtains and that accounts of 
self-ascription including such privilege cannot accommodate 
the range of ascriptive errors elucidated both within and 
beyond the lab. The challenge, then, is to offer an 
alternative account of self-ascription that is sensitive to 
these errors even at the expense of intuitions we may have
about them. Just as privileged access with regard to one's
own mental states has succumbed to theoretical pressures, I 
believe that this privilege with regard to the
identification of the ascribing subject will also
ultimately not survive our best theory.
The dissertation is divided into four remaining 
chapters as follows.
I devote Chapter II to laying out the specific 
problem of self-identification in detail as it relates to 
our understanding of the self-ascription of properties and 
states. I borrow Roderick Chisholm's formulation of the 
problem in terms of the entailment relations (and important 
lack thereof) between de re, de dicto, and de se oratio 
obliqua belief ascriptions. Chisholm explains these
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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entailments in terms of one's fundamental, unanalyzable 
ability to ascribe properties and to take oneself as an 
intentional object. His account does honor the intuition 
that self-ascriptions canonically expressed with the first- 
person pronoun--those I call nonaccidental--cannot fall 
prey to errors of self-misidentification. But it does not 
succeed equally well in accommodating the commonsense 
errors one seems open to when self-ascribing properties and 
states accidentally or with expressions involving self- 
designating terms other than the first-person pronoun such 
as proper names, definite descriptions, and demonstratives.
Taking inspiration from these commonsense errors, in 
Chapter II I also briefly and broadly introduce my 
preferred alternative account to be developed and defended 
at length--the naive proposal or NP--according to which all 
self-ascriptions draw upon a battery of commonsense self- 
identifying beliefs about such properties as one's name, 
birth date, habits of mind, bodily appearance, etc. Its 
virtues and shortcomings are exactly opposite to those of 
the Chisholmian view--NP easily accounts for self- 
ascriptive accidents but seems unable to speak to our 
intuitions about the ways in which nonaccidental self­
ascriptions appear free from error in an important respect. 
These two diametrically opposed views also provide a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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framework for the discussion to follow, as NP is filled out 
and positioned between them. To succeed, an account of 
self-ascription must address the three problems I raise at 
the end of the chapter: the Misconception Problem, the
Amnesia Objection, and the Asymmetry Problem. Together 
they challenge the necessity and sufficiency of the battery 
requirement at the heart of NP, including how the beliefs 
that constitute it fund nonaccidental self-ascriptions that 
seem to be made without drawing upon any evidence 
whatsoever.
The primary ground of difference between NP and a 
Chisholmian account is the latter's reliance upon the 
assumption that nonaccidental self-ascriptions differ in 
kind from accidental ones in that they involve no self- 
identification and hence cannot fall prey to self- 
misidentification. Accordingly, in Chapter III I attempt 
to sharpen and to motivate this assumption by looking to 
perhaps its most ardent defenders--namely Wittgenstein, 
G.E.M. Anscombe, and Sydney Shoemaker. Shoemaker 
ultimately provides the most compelling case in favor of 
the assumption, arguing that if all self-ascriptions 
involved self-identification then we would be doomed to a 
regress of identification that would preclude an 
explanation of how we are able to ascribe properties and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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states to anything at all. Hence, he concludes that at 
least some self-ascriptions must be "immune to error 
through misidentification relative to the first-person 
pronoun" (hereafter 'IEM', Shoemaker 1968). Since only 
introspection could provide the kind of direct and 
unmediated awareness necessary to preclude errors of 
misidentification, Shoemaker contends that only 
introspective self-ascriptions of psychological states and 
properties prove to be IEM.
Shoemaker's regress argument raises a clear challenge 
to NP, since the requirement that one must possess a 
battery of self-specifying beliefs to self-ascribe 
properties even with the first-person pronoun seems to 
precipitate the regress in question. I therefore pursue 
the regress challenge to NP in Chapter IV, including 
investigating where the regress forces one to retreat to if 
successful. I examine arguments by Gareth Evans and Jose 
Luis Bermudez who argue contrary to Shoemaker that certain 
bodily self-ascriptions are also IEM. However, we see that 
empirical data strongly suggests that self-ascriptions of 
bodily states and properties are indeed subject to errors 
of self-misidentification when one's beliefs about one's 
body are manipulated in the right way, perhaps by a clever 
psychologist.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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If self-ascriptions of bodily properties aren't IEM, 
does Shoemaker's regress inevitably force us to accept the 
Cartesian-friendly alternative that only the self­
ascription of introspected mental states and properties are 
IEM? Shoemaker himself favors this conclusion, of course, 
but in Chapter V I argue that even these ascriptions are 
subject to errors of misidentification. Here again, 
empirical evidence suggests that introspection amounts to a 
form of conscious self-interpretation. One ascribes states 
in virtue of taking the intentional stance towards oneself, 
predicting and explaining one's own states and behavior in 
light of one's battery of self-identifying belief, and as a 
result one can be mistaken about whether one is actually in 
the state that one appears introspectively aware of.
Building upon this data and work by Rosenthal, Dennett, and 
Nozick, I further argue that even in the normal case 
interpretation also extends to the ascribing self. That 
is, just as one is not aware of an "introspected" state in 
a direct and unmediated way that could lead to IEM self- 
ascriptions, one is not directly aware of the introspecting 
self. The battery of self-identifying beliefs that provide 
the basis for introspective interpretation also give rise 
to an interpreted self. Interpreting which state one is in 
is to a certain degree inseparable from positing the self
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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that is interpreted. The regress argument can therefore be 
disarmed, for seen in this way an understanding of self­
ascription need not require accepting the basic premise 
that ascribers have a primitive, privileged awareness of 
themselves.
The fully fleshed version of NP developed by the end 
of Chapter V gives us a way of understanding self- 
ascription in terms of self-identification, one that does 
not appeal to IEM or accept Shoemaker’s regress argument in 
its favor. However, the view does have the rather 
interesting--and to some no doubt unpalatable--theoretical 
consequence that first-person misidentification always 
remains a possibility. That is, one could find oneself in 
the unfortunate position of denying that a token of the 
first-person pronoun or its mental analogue refers to 
oneself, even if that token participates in an 
introspectively conscious self-ascription. Arguably 
clinical data regarding schizophrenics who suffer from 
thought insertion suggest that this does in fact happen.
In the end, however, this consequence illustrates an 
important virtue of NP: The persistent possibility of
self-ascriptive error in both accidental and nonaccidental 
instances shows that they differ only in degree and not in 
kind with regard to self-identification. As a result, we
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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have a much better chance of providing a unified account of 
self-ascription that does not rest upon a mysterious but 
ineliminable assumption about the privileged access one has 
to one's self.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter iz. The Problem of Self-Identification
"I must disappear in order that the search for 
myself be successful."
--Stanley Cavell, The Claim of 
Reason -̂
SI. Introduction
In The Concept of Mind, Gilbert Ryle vividly describes what 
he calls the "'systematic elusiveness' of the concept of
Pronouns like 'you', 'she', and 'we' feel 
quite unmystifying, while 'I' feels 
mystifying. And it feels mystifying, anyhow 
in part, because the more the child tries to 
put his finger on what 'I' stands for, the 
less does he succeed in doing so. He can 
catch only its coat-tails; it itself is 
always and obdurately a pace ahead of its 
coat-tails. Like the shadow of one's own 
head, it will not wait to be jumped on. And 
yet it is never very far ahead; indeed, 
sometimes it seems not to be ahead of the 
pursuer at all. It evades capture by 
lodging itself inside the very muscles of 
the pursuer. It is too near even to be 
within arm's reach. (1949, p. 186)
Ryle's depiction of the mysteriousness of the first 
person vividly captures the difficulty of providing a 
satisfying philosophical account of thoughts we have about 
ourselves that we would normally express with the first- 
person pronoun. The mystery stems in large part from the 
relative ease with which we think about ourselves. However
1 Found on p . 352.
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difficult: it may be to capture the elusive referent of 'I', 
the pronoun pours out of our mouths--nothing seems more 
natural than to ascribe properties to ourselves and to 
worry about our past and future exploits. The sheer number 
of thoughts one has about oneself on any given day must be 
staggering, and in most cases one is trivially aware that 
one is their subject. When I believe that I have lost my 
keys, to find them I do not first go looking for myself.
When asked to explain how we so effortlessly know whom we 
are thinking of, however, we are at a loss as to what to 
say, besides, perhaps, that we just do.
Interestingly, errors do occur on occasion. I have 
had the experience of sitting in a small movie theater and 
thinking that the person whose head is casting a shadow on 
the screen should hunker down only to realize that it was I 
who was obscuring the picture all along. Together, the 
phenomena of first-person thoughts and instances in which 
errors arise raise a host of puzzling questions. How can 
one both be so secure in the subject of some of one's own 
thoughts yet fail to recognize oneself as the subject of 
others? How are we to account for the intuitive difference 
between thoughts one would express with the first-person 
pronoun and those that one would express with other 
referring expressions, and what do those abilities consist
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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in our amount to? What grounds our ability or abilities to 
get a hold of ourselves in thought? Does the self- 
ascription of properties and states differ in kind from the 
ascription of properties and states to others?
Properly addressing these questions requires great 
care, for the power of our intuitions regarding the first 
person greatly outstrips the depth of our understanding of 
it. To bring intuition and understanding into better 
balance, we must first secure a firmer grasp on the 
phenomena we wish to explain beyond its intuitive pull. 
Accordingly, in the next section I examine a set of 
examples of a type often associated with Heri-Nector 
Castafieda and widely appropriated in the literature for a 
host of philosophical purposes. In §3 I then turn to 
Roderick Chisholm's attempt to account for the Castafieda- 
style data in terms of a basic and unanalyzable ability to 
take oneself as an intentional object. Finding that 
solution unsatisfactory but illuminating, I devote §4 to 
elucidating its shortcomings and insights. In §5 I present 
the broad outline of a competing account that considers all 
self-ascriptions as susceptible to self-misidentification.
I conclude this chapter with a challenge to my sketched 
proposal: though it provides a satisfactory explanation of
a large class of thoughts one can have about oneself, it
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fails to capture the way in which first-person contents 
intuitively appear fundamental, both in the particular 
functional role they play in an individual’s cognitive 
economy and the foundational role they play in the 
ascription of properties to oneself and others. 
Ultimately, we will see that demystifying the problem of 
first-person thought hinges upon understanding what it is 
for one to identify oneself.
S2. Framing the Problem: Characterizing First-Person
Thought
One often has thoughts^ about oneself. I, for example, 
regularly believe myself to be hungry, five blocks from 
home, married, reachable by phone or e-mail, 6'5" tall, 
thinking that a certain philosophical puzzle is thorny, and 
so on. I express many of these thoughts with speech acts 
involving the first-person pronoun. For others I appeal to 
various alternative self-designating expressions such as my
2 By thought I mean an occurrent mental state with both a content 
and a mental attitude toward that content (see, e.g. Rosenthal 1993). 
For example, I can hope that it’s raining, fear that it's raining, 
wonder if it's raining, etc. In each case the content--that it's 
raining--remains constant while the mental attitude differs. Though 
the ensuing discussion will focus upon belief, I intend both the 
problem and the subsequent approaches to the problem to extend to other 
propositional attitudes as well (wishing, doubting, wondering, etc.).
I should also mention that, for the most part, I will speak of beliefs 
and thoughts interchangeably, though an important distinction should 
not be overlooked: thoughts are occurrent mental states whereas
beliefs can be (and no doubt are largely) dispositional. This finer 
distinction can be overlooked for present purposes. In any event, this 
characterization of thought relies upon no particular theory of 
content.
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proper name, an appropriate definite description, or a 
demonstrative phrase.
Those thoughts one can have about oneself that one 
would normally express with the first-person pronoun 
ostensibly seem unlike others one can have about oneself, 
since they resist reduction to other types of intentional 
state. We can bring this apparent resistance into a bit 
more relief by looking to a type of belief ascription often 
employed by Castaiieda (1966, 1968, 1969, among others).
Let’s assume that a subject, Vivienne, believes that 
someone has won the New York Lottery. Let's further assume 
that she has long held that, as a rule, lottery winners are 
lucky. As it happens, Vivienne herself is in fact the 
lucky winner.
How are we to ascribe beliefs to her in this case?
It seems that we could plausibly do so in primarily three 
ways:
(1) The winner of the New York Lottery believes that 
(whoever is) the winner of the New York Lottery 
is lucky.
(2) The winner of the New York Lottery believes of 
some person who is the winner of the New York 
Lottery that she is lucky.3
 ̂ Chisholm, whose 1981 discussion I follow in elaborating the 
current example in the text, casts his de re formulation (our [2]) in 
explicitly quantificational terms. He would write (2) as: "There is
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(3) The winner of the New York Lottery believes that 
she, herself [she*4] is lucky.
Grammatical awkwardness aside, (1) is traditionally 
referred to as a case of belief de dicto--a belief where 
the believing relation holds between a subject and a
sentence or proposition.5 (2) is an instance of belief de
re. Here, the subject has a particular object or 
individual in mind of whom she wishes to ascribe luckiness. 
Example (3) represents a case of what is often referred to 
as a belief de se. That is, (3) ascribes to Vivienne the 
belief that she is the winner of the lottery in a way that
an x such chat x is identical with the winner of the New York Lottery 
and x is believed by x to be lucky." My example as worded in the text 
does not differ in import from Chisholm's, I believe, and more closely 
approximates actual folk psychological belief ascriptions.
 ̂ Pronouns with asterisks ('he*', 'she*') as they appear in the
self-consciousness literature function as notational devices originally 
devised by Castafieda in a series of papers (1966, 1968, and 1969 among 
others). The asterisk is intended to indicate the presence of an 
indirect reflexive or what he calls the "quasi-indicator" use of the
pronoun (e.g., 'she*' = 'she, herself'), since English lacks any such
distinct form. However, to avoid the appearance of allegiance, I will 
resist this popular notation in favor of the more pedestrian 'she, 
herself form.
 ̂Quine (1966) would term this form of belief "notional" and 
purportedly de re beliefs "relational". Cf. also Chisholm (1981). 
Sentences and propositions need not be the only belief relata; some 
prefer statements or sentence tokens in the head (Devitt 1984) or out 
of it (Quine 1981). These distinctions need not worry us here. Since 
nothing hinges on the characterization of propositional attitude 
contents (at least at the moment), those who don't want to place much
stock in the de dicto/de re distinction in light of the concerns voiced
by Quine (1966, 1981), Dennett (1987), and Devitt (1984), among others, 
need not bristle at my examples. No great fan of the distinction 
myself, I employ it only to give contour to the unique character of a 
certain class of self-ascriptions and nothing much will hang on them in 
my overall argument.
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makes perspicuous her recognition that she believes 
something about herself.
This last ascription seems to differ from the other 
two in an important respect. Neither (1) nor (2) entails
(3), for (3) can be false while either (1) and (2) are 
true. This is fairly obvious with the de dicto reading 
since, ex hypothesi, in this case Vivienne's belief 
"accidentally" ends up being about her by being about all 
lottery winners, for she believes that lottery winners in 
general are lucky regardless of any current beliefs she may 
have about her own status as a winner. Indeed, the 
parenthetical 'whoever' indicates that she has no 
particular person in mind to whom she ascribes the property 
of being lucky.6 The de re reading allows for a similar 
gap in recognition. In (2), Vivienne could fail to 
recognize that her thought is about herself even in 
thinking of some particular person as the winner: She
could see a news flash on television, and, without
® Cf. Donnellan's (1966) distinction between what he calls 
"attributive" and "referential" types of reference. One could argue 
that the case as I have constructed it is unclear as to whether 
Vivienne thinks that she, herself is the lottery winner. After all, 
perhaps she is the kind of person who takes every opportunity to inform 
others about her good fortune. That is, she may express her request 
for subway tokens as "The winner of the New York Lottery would like 
fifteen dollars on her Metrocard, please." I admit the ambiguity-- 
indeed welcome it--since the key point is that the case can be 
ambiguous, whereas it appears that the de se ascriptions do not permit 
the possibility of her failing to think that she, herself is the 
winner.
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realizing that it is she who is shown walking to the bank, 
Vivienne could think of that person that she is lucky.7 In 
(3), however, the presence of the indirect reflexive 'she 
herself' is intended to make explicit Vivienne's 
recognition that she believes something about herself, 
hence precluding the failure of self-recognition possible 
in both (1) and (2).
We can put the point another way. Since the indirect 
reflexive 'she, herself' in (3) is a pronominal phrase, we 
can ask how a given token of it relates to its antecedent.
It does, of course, depend upon its antecedent for its
designation, for the antecedent signals to whom the belief 
is ascribed. However, merely substituting the expression 
'winner of the New York Lottery' for 'she, herself’ in (3) 
results in:
(4) The winner of the New York Lottery believes that
the winner of the New York Lottery is lucky;
which amounts to (1), or the de dieto reading, and hence 
reopens the possibility of mistakes of self-recognition. 
Substituting other co-designating terms seems to fare no 
better, for replacing 'she, herself' with 'Vivienne', for 
example, results in:
7 Perry terms this possibility a failure of "documentary self- 
recognition" (2000, p. 333). Such examples are legion. Cf. Perry's 
often-quoted "shabby pedagogue" example from Mach (1914), and Lewis’s 
(1983) use of Kaplan's (1989) example of one's pants being on fire.
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(5) The winner of the New York Lottery believes that 
Vivienne is lucky.
But here again, we face the possibility that Vivienne will 
fail to recognize that she is thinking about herself, for 
it seems plausible that she could affirm that Vivienne is 
the lottery winner while denying that she, herself is 
Vivienne. (We need only imagine, for example, that her 
denial results from memory loss following a particularly 
sharp blow to the head.) Moreover, substituting a 
demonstrative--even if reduced to a pointing or referring 
gesture--merely converts (3) to an instance of (2) or 
belief de re, again reintroducing the possibility that she
will think that the winner is someone other than herself.8 
What does it mean to say that (1) and (2) allow for 
the possibility that Vivienne could fail to recognize that 
her thought is about her whereas (3) does not? Describing 
Vivienne's potential for error in (1) and (2) as one of 
misrecognition misdescribes the case a bit. Recognition 
involves, at least in part, re-cognition--namely, a 
previous familiarity with the object recognized. 
'Misidentification' is the more appropriate term, for to
® The failure of substitutivity in cases of beliefs about 
oneself, including the appeal to the 'he, himself’ locution as the 
distinguishing mark of these particular types of examples, was first 
noticed by Geach (1957/1972). As Geach correctly points out, 
substituting coreferential terms outside of the scope of believes-- 
'Vivienne', say, for 'the winner of the New York Lottery' in (3)--will 
not affect its truth-value.
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identify something is to specify or to categorize it 
regardless of its familiarity. In both (1) and (2)
Vivienne could assume that the winner is entirely unknown 
to her.
What, then, does misidentifying oneself amount to?
In tokening each thought ascribed to her, Vivienne succeeds 
in referring to herself, and she therefore has a thought 
about herself. However, she could deny that she refers to 
herself in the case of either (1) or (2). That is, it
seems possible to ascribe to Vivienne the denial of (3) as
well:
(6) The winner of the New York Lottery does not 
believe that she, herself is lucky.9
This possibility of ascribing (1) or (2) and (6) will 
receive a much more detailed treatment in Chapter III, but
for the moment we can glean from these examples that a
subject can misidentify herself if for a given thought that 
she would normally express with some predicate F and some 
self-designating name, definite description, or 
demonstrative phrase a, a subject can assent to "a is F" 
while denying that she, herself is F.^0
9 Alternatively, "The winner of the New York Lottery does not 
believe that she, herself, is the winner of the New York Lottery."
I frame my account of misidentification and the ensuing 
discussion in terms of singular self-ascriptions to keep it as clear
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Basically, we want to capture the key feature of 
cases like (1) and (2)--namely that one can have a thought 
about oneself yet deny that that is the case. With de se 
belief, such a denial has no intuitive plausibility, for 
this amounts to ascribing to a subject the belief that she, 
herself is F along with the denial that she, herself is F. 
Such a subject would obviously harbor explicitly 
contradictory beliefs, bringing either her grasp of English 
or the soundness of her mind into question.
However intuitively implausible a competent subject's 
denial of a first-person self-ascription may seem, ruling 
out the possibility of the fairly common phenomenon of 
self-misidentification illustrated in (1) and (2) risks 
denying data useful for understanding how we think of and 
refer to ourselves. Accordingly, to mark this important 
distinction I will call thoughts and expressions of 
thoughts exemplified in (3) instances of nonaccidental 
self-ascription and those in (1) and (3) instances of 
potentially accidental self-ascription--or simply
accidental self-ascription for the sake of brevity.11 
Cases in which one accidentally self-ascribes a property
and simple as possible, but it is intended to generalize to more 
complex ascriptions involving multiple names and many-place predicates.
11 My terminology is inspired by but not entirely faithful to 
Bermudez (1998).
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seem to allow for a subject to misidentify herself; 
nonaccidental cases do not. The problem of first-person 
thought amounts to explaining this intuitive difference.
S3. Chisholm: The Irreducibility Argument Fundamental
Intentionality
In the last section we characterized the accidental/nonac­
cidental self-ascription distinction in terms of the 
possibility of misidentification. We characterized 
misidentification in terms of a subject's denial that she, 
herself possessed a property that she in fact ascribes to 
herself. So characterized, we further find a strong 
intuitive pull against this possibility in nonaccidental 
cases. Characterizing the distinction in this way, 
however, relies upon an understanding of a subject’s 
believing that she, herself is F.
What is it for a subject to believe that she, herself 
is F? Roderick Chisholm (1981) finds belief ascriptions 
including the indirect reflexive quite puzzling. He is 
most taken by the irreducibility of ascriptions such as (3) 
to those exemplified by (2)--the fact that de se belief 
cannot be explained in terms of de re b e l i e f .  1 2  w e  s a w
The irreducibility conclusion, though popular, is not 
uncontroversial. Boer and Lycan (1980), for one (or rather two), 
disagree. They argue that de se attitudes can be reduced to attitudes 
de re (or "attitudes de their owners," p. 432). We should note,
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(3) false, as demonstrated by instances of 
misidentification. Chisholm believes that this "fact of 
intentionality" provides the raw materials for a solution 
to the problem of intentionality in general, or the problem 
of what makes a belief about a particular person about 
her.
If de se beliefs cannot be reduced to belief de re, 
Chisholm argues, they must therefore constitute a separate 
category of intentional state. Moreover, the puzzles 
arising from such nonaccidental states result from ignoring 
their special status in favor of attempts to reduce them to 
accidental ones. Accordingly, Chisholm suggests that we 
abandon that strategy in favor of its converse: We should
view cases of accidental self-ascription as special 
instances of nonaccidental self-ascription.
Taking nonaccidental self-ascriptions as basic 
involves viewing belief as a relation between a believer 
and a property that is ascribed or attributed to oneself. 
One can attribute properties in two ways, either directly
however, chat they explicitly and unabashedly assume the plausibility 
of de re belief in general. In any event, Boer and Lycan do offer a 
brief but useful summary of the various uses to which this 
irreducibility claim has been put (pp. 429-430).
Chisholm credits this question asked in this way (viz., with 
its particular emphasis) to Wittgenstein (1970). Framing the question 
of how a belief is about an individual in terms of how a word refers 
merely passes on the problem.
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or indirectly. Chisholm defines direct attribution in 
terms of the ’she, herself' locution: For a subject to
directly attribute the property of being F she must believe 
that she, herself is F (1981, p. 28). Indirect attribution 
occurs in cases where one ascribes a property F to an 
object other than oneself. To do so, one directly ascribes 
a property that entails that some object is F, a property 
that uniquely specifies that object by way of some 
particular identifying relation the subject bears to it.
A slight variation on our previous example can 
perhaps lend additional clarity. Imagine that Bart, a 
friend of Vivienne's, has instead won the New York Lottery 
and that Vivienne believes that this is the case. What 
makes Vivienne’s belief that Bart is lucky about Bart, 
under this view, is (a) her standing in a unique, 
identifying relation with him (e.g., the relation of being 
the person who is currently sitting directly to her right 
on the bus); and (b) her indirectly attributing to him the 
property of being lucky. The attribution in (b) is 
indirect because she directly attributes to herself the 
property of sitting to the left of one and only one person 
and a person who is lucky. Hence, all thoughts attributing 
properties to others can be reduced to thoughts attributing 
properties to oneself, making the believing subject "the
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primary object of all belief, and analogously for the other 
intentional attitudes" (Chisholm, 1981, p. 37).
Given this picture, Chisholm's explanation of the 
difference between accidental and nonaccidental thoughts 
about oneself, and of the resulting philosophical 
puzzlement, is quite straightforward. In nonaccidental 
self-ascriptions one directly attributes a property to 
oneself; in accidental cases--cases where one is not aware 
that one is thinking of oneself--one actually indirectly 
attributes a property to oneself without directly 
attributing it (p. 34). In (2), misidentification occurs 
because Vivienne indirectly and accidentally attributes the 
property of luckiness to herself by self-ascribing a 
property under a specifiable relation that in fact picks 
her out, such as the property of watching one and only one 
person on the news and one who is lucky. And in imagining 
possible scenarios of self-misidentification, we are really 
considering indirect ascriptions involving various 
identificatory relations that one would normally bear to 
objects other than oneself.
S4. Revisiting Chisholm's Conclusion
Chisholm's strategy for reaching his conclusion is twofold. 
First, he appeals to intuitions elicited by common examples
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of belief ascriptions to isolate a particular type of 
intentional state as unique. Having limned what he takes 
to be the appropriate data, he then develops an account of 
how one takes oneself as an intentional object--and 
ultimately how one shares an intentional relation with any 
object at all--based upon it. Doing so provides him a way 
of explaining the distinction between accidental and 
nonaccidental self-ascriptions, including the commonsense 
errors of self-misidentification to which we are often 
prone. Let's examine each move more closely, taking the 
second one first.
Chisholm argues that the irreducibility of belief 
ascriptions involving the 'she, herself' locution 
demonstrates that one's ability to take oneself as an 
intentional object is fundamental and not further 
analyzable in terms of any relation one could be said to 
have with oneself. Broadly speaking, he wants to capture 
the notion that since I think and speak about all things 
relative to me, thinking and speaking about myself must be
taken for g r a n t e d .  14 .̂11 beliefs about oneself and others
Lewis (1983) puts forward a quite similar view, differing 
mainly in the details and particularly his reliance upon possible 
worlds. For Lewis, de se beliefs are fundamental because they locate 
oneself within a set of possible worlds and then further spatially and 
temporally within that particular world. Ascribing a property to some 
object or individual involves self-ascribing a property under a world- 
locating description that either captures it's "essence" or the
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therefore reduce to direct ascriptions of properties to 
oneself.15
But if direct attributions of properties must be
taken as given, how are we to understand them? Don’t we
still need to explain how one's attributions of properties
directly to oneself succeed in being about oneself?
Identification is the complement of misidentification, so
perhaps the possibility of self-misidentification indicates
that self-identification succeeds in instances of direct
attribution of properties. Don't we therefore need an
account of how one identifies oneself, including one’s
apprehension of oneself "enabling one to pick out the self
from all other things" (Chisholm 1981, p. 37)?
Chisholm considers this objection mistaken. He
believes that it
confuses direct and indirect attribution.
For it presupposes that, in order to 
attribute a property to myself directly, I 
must be aware of the kind of identifying 
relation I bear to the subject of attribute 
when I attribute something to it indirectly.
(p. 37)
In Chisholm's view, then, properly speaking there is no 
direct self-identification at all, for object
subject's relation of acquaintance with it (p. 155). Fundamentally, 
the relation of acquaintance one has with oneself is one of identity, 
what Lewis calls "a relation of acquaintance par excellence" (p. 156).
jaegwon Kim has characterized this type of view as referential 
or intentional solipsism.
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identification is the product of a specifying relation by 
which one indirectly attributes a property. Requiring that 
one identify oneself to attribute a property directly would 
demand that one be able to specify a relation that picks 
oneself out uniquely, but this conflates the requirements 
for direct and indirect attribution. "For in directly 
attributing a property to oneself," he writes, "one need 
not thereby single out an identifying property of oneself" 
(p. 45) .
What motivation have we for endorsing Chisholm's
strategy of taking the ability to take oneself as an
intentional object as theoretically primitive? He asks and
answers this question himself:
But to the question: "What makes his direct
attribution of a property to himself an 
attribution of a property to him?" there can 
be no answer at all, beyond that of "He just 
does--and that is the end of the matter!"
Do we have here, then, a difficulty that is 
unique to the present theory? It is 
important to see that every theory of 
reference and intentionality is such that, 
at some point, it must provide a similar 
answer: "It just does." (p. 32)
This answer, however, and with it Chisholm's proposal, 
hardly satisfies. After all, we seek an explanation of how 
one thinks of oneself directly, but this is the question to
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which Chisholm rejoins "One just does!"16 We may 
ultimately arrive at a similar conclusion, but we should 
nevertheless exhaust the theoretical options that attempt 
to provide an explanation of this ability. Otherwise, we 
resign ourselves to the position of Ryle's child and to the 
mysteriousness of the first-person.
Moreover, though Chisholm explains the philosophical 
puzzlement surrounding nonaccidental self-ascriptions in 
terms of cases in which one indirectly ascribes a property 
to oneself, he provides very little in the way of an 
explanation as to why one indirectly self-ascribes a 
property. For if one possesses the fundamental ability to 
attribute properties directly, how is self-
misidentification possible at all? In taking nonaccidental 
cases of self-ascription as fundamental, Chisholm needs to 
provide a better account of the accidental cases that 
highlight the intensional behavior of the intentional, 
those that he describes as providing a "kind of criterion 
of the psychological" (p. 25). In the end he offers at 
best a description of accidental and nonaccidental cases 
instead of the explanation we seek.
I should also note that Chisholm likewise assumes one's 
ability to grasp or conceive properties, propositions, and states of 
affairs (p. 28). For the sake of argument I will not take issue with 
this second assumption.
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A further objection looms. When I believe that I am 
lucky, I directly attribute the property of luckiness to 
myself. In doing so, do I thereby believe something true? 
The answer to that question ostensibly depends upon the 
properties I possess. But if the content of the 
attribution is the property of luckiness and the object is 
myself, we seem to have no proposition-like object that has 
truth conditions, and hence the belief can be neither true 
nor false. Anticipating this objection, Chisholm argues 
that we consider direct attributions that one would express 
with the sentence "I aim F" as "used with truth in English 
if and only if its utterer is F" (p. 44, emphasis his).
This is misleading, however. Though Chisholm 
distinguishes between using an expression with truth and 
using it with sincerity (since presumably one often 
believes false things sincerely), truth is not a matter of 
the way in which expressions are used. The truth-value of 
"I am F" does not depend upon how one uses the expression, 
for presumably one uses it to assert something about 
oneself in the same way, if done so sincerely, whether one 
actually is F or not.l^ without a clearer sense of what 
Chisholm means by using an expression with truth or
17 To put the point another way, no speech act has the particular 
illocutionary force of sincerely asserting a falsehood.
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falsity, we have no grasp on how to understand folk- 
psychological explanations of belief in which the notion of 
believing truthfully or falsely plays a significant r o l e . 1 ^ 
As an added difficulty, Chisholm's view generates 
quite complicated explanations of rather commonsense 
exchanges of information between speakers. Suppose 
Vivienne, unsure about her luck, asks Bart, "Did I win the 
lottery?" Bart responds, "Yes, you are the winner." 
According to Chisholm, Bart must interpret Vivienne as 
wondering which property she should ascribe to herself, and 
he must infer from the property she does self-ascribe that 
she asks this of him. To answer, he must indirectly 
ascribe to Vivienne the property of being the lottery 
winner, which means he must directly ascribe to himself a 
property that singles her out for attribution, the property 
of addressing one and only one person sitting next to him 
on the bus, for example (pp. 48-49). Each party must, 
therefore, infer from what the other says of herself or
This problem plagues Lewis's account as well (Lewis 1983).
For him, speech acts of the form "I am F" can represent a subject’s 
locating herself both in logical space, or a set of possible worlds, 
and in space and time within a particular world. Possible worlds 
consist of sets of true propositions, but according to Lewis knowing 
which propositions are true doesn't suffice to locate oneself within a 
world. But if "I am F" were true, then presumably it would serve as a 
world-delimiting proposition on par with any other. Lewis also claims 
that one can have nonpropositional knowledge, but since presumably 
knowledge crucially involves truth, it's not clear what 
nonpropositional knowledge could be.
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himself to her or his own case.19 Intuitively, it seems 
that Vivienne asks something directly of Bart and that Bart 
speaks only of her. Though it may sound quite odd to claim 
that one always speaks and thinks about oneself, whether 
answering one's own questions of the questions of others, 
philosophical accounts of the apparently commonsensical 
often belie the simplicity of appearances. This point is 
not so much an objection as a worry, a consequence to be 
avoided if at all possible.
Perhaps Chisholm's conclusion and its resulting 
mysteriousness can be resisted by reconsidering his account 
of the data of self-ascriptions. The irreducibility of 
beliefs ascribed with the 'she, herself' locution to other 
sorts motivates him to assume that a subject has a 
fundamental ability to take herself as an intentional 
object. Should nonaccidental self-ascriptions fail to 
prove as distinctive as Chisholm suggests, we can avoid 
being forced into his assumption.
Recall that the intuitive pull of regarding 
nonaccidental self-ascriptions as different in kind from 
their accidental counterparts received additional support 
from the entailment relations between (1), (2), and (3).
19 Stalnaker (1981) makes a similar objection to the proposals 
given by Lewis and Perry (1977, 1979).
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Those relations could also be elucidated in terms of the 
ascriptions resulting from substituting co-designating 
terms for 'she, herself' within nonaccidental ascriptions. 
Doing so converts nonaccidental ascriptions into accidental 
ones by opening up the possibility of self- 
misidentification. Hence nonaccidental self-ascriptions 
are different in kind from their accidental counterparts.
But failure of substitutivity in propositional 
attitude contexts presents no particularly new problem or a 
problem unique to nonaccidental self-ascriptions. Frege 
famously introduces the notion of sense to explain how one 
could have distinct and seemingly contradictory beliefs 
about the same referent. One could harbor beliefs about 
both the Morning Star and the Evening Star while lacking 
the belief that the Morning Star is the Evening Star. 
Accordingly, given the truth of:
(7) Vivienne believes that the planet Venus is the 
Morning Star.
we can substitute the co-designating term 'Evening Star' 
for 'Morning Star', which results in
(8) Vivienne believes that the planet Venus is the 
Evening Star.
Though Venus is the Evening Star as well as the Morning 
star, Vivienne might well deny Venus' evening visibility.
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and hence (8) could be false while (7) is true. As with 
(1) and (2), substituting any co-designating term within 
the belief context can alter the truth value of the 
ascription, and this result squares with our expectations 
given the ample evidence of the general opacity of 
propositional attitudes.
Perhaps we can further distinguish the peculiar 
nature of nonaccidental self-ascriptions beyond their 
susceptibility to Frege-style puzzles by moving from oratio 
obliqua belief ascriptions couched in opaque propositional 
attitude contexts to oratio recta belief expressions 
outside such contexts. The pronominal phrase 'she, 
herself' functions grammatically as an indirect reflexive 
pronoun: It is indirect since it is affected by the action
of the propositional attitude verb (believes, wants, hopes, 
etc.) that precedes it, and it is reflexive because it 
includes the reflexive form of the pronoun (ending in '- 
self' or '-selves') whose grammatical job is to refer back 
to the s u b j e c t . 20 The direct reflexive, oratio recta
20 Reflexive pronouns in English traditionally serve as the 
direct object of a reflexive verb. Hence, English, unlike, e.g. Greek, 
has no particular indirect reflexive form. The 'she, herself' 
formulation is an exotic grammatical creature, for it consists of both 
the subject and reflexive (which is an object) form of the third-person 
pronoun. Castafleda (1967) is often credited as the first to notice it, 
calling it (or his notational variant of it) a "quasi-indicator." He 
believes that it serves to refer to the way in which a particular 
subject thinks of herself. Perry (2000) characterizes Castafleda's
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equivalent is the first-person pronoun. With (3) we 
ascribe a belief to Vivienne that she would express as:
(9) I am lucky.
The temptation is to construe self-ascriptions like
(9) as expressing a unique way Vivienne thinks of herself, 
a way in which no other can think of her.21 Ascriptions 
(1) and (2) , in contrast, involve representations of 
Vivienne that we might describe as available to others.
(1) and (2) ascribe beliefs that Vivienne might express as:
(10) V is l u c k y . 22
where 'V' refers to her. Bart can truthfully believe (10) 
as well, but were he to believe (9) he could believe 
something false of himself.
Moving from indirect to direct discourse still 
doesn't succeed in singling out the class of first-person
account of the role of quasi-indicators as senses that refer to senses- 
-that is, a third-person term with a sense that refers to a sense that 
can only be grasped in a first-person way. He further describes 
Castafleda's goal as attempting to make a distinction between sense and 
meaning. I am unsure what to make of or how to understand this latter 
explanation. See also Anscombe (1975).
21 Castafleda, for one, draws this conclusion, arguing that "more 
generally, no first-person proposition is identical with any third- 
person proposition, if both are in oratio recta" (1966/1994, p. 163, 
emphasis in original).
22 gy condensing (1) and (2) into (7) we obscure the distinction 
between de dicto and de re belief; still, we do preserve the property 
they share that initially interested us--namely, that they both allowed 
room for Vivienne to misidentify who her beliefs were about since, 
intuitively, she might deny that she, herself is lucky by denying that 
she, herself is V.
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thoughts as unique, however. Here again, we run afoul of 
substitutivity. Though (9) when thought or said by 
Vivienne and (10) have the same truth-conditions, 
intuitively Vivienne could believe either one while denying 
the other. Even if Vivienne does believe that she, herself 
is the lottery winner, if she does not believe that she is 
V, then she won't believe that V is lucky. Similarly, 
though Vivienne may believe that V is the lucky winner, she 
may not believe that she, herself is V and thus may not 
token the belief that she would express with (9). This is 
no different from Vivienne's believing what she would 
express with
(11) The planet Venus is the Morning Star, 
while denying
(12) The planet Venus is the Evening Star.
though they share truth conditions.
Nevertheless, looking at a subject's beliefs in terms 
of their direct discourse expressions does seem to offer a 
way to distinguish nonaccidental self-ascriptions from 
others. The belief that Vivienne would express with (10) 
exemplifies a range of cases where misidentification is 
still possible--that is, where, intuitively, a subject can 
have the belief yet fail to recognize that she is its
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subject. This indicates that tokening a belief that one 
would express with a self-designating expression such as a 
proper name or definite description isn't sufficient for 
one to identify oneself as the subject of the 
d e s c r i p t i o n . 23 Tokening a self-ascription that one would 
express with the first-person pronoun does seem sufficient 
for self-identification. No room appears to remain for one 
to deny that one thereby ascribes a property to oneself.
But what lies behind this appearance? After all, we 
do often seem to succeed in identifying ourselves as the 
subject of potentially accidental self-ascriptions.
Perhaps that success has much in common with nonaccidental 
instances. Does thinking about oneself "in a first-person 
way" in fact differ from other ways in which one thinks 
about oneself, and does the impossibility of self- 
misidentification imply that self-ascriptions made with the 
first-person pronoun or its mental analogue involve no 
self-identification whatsoever?
23 in fact, often as the description becomes more precise, it 
appears that the chance of misidentification increases. Vivienne could 
be a geneticist, routinely handling several detailed DNA maps. It 
clearly seems possible that she could believe on the basis of a 
particular DNA map that a certain person has committed a crime while 
not believing that she, herself is a criminal, even thought the DNA map 
is her own.
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SS. An Alternative: The Naive Proposal of Self-
Identification introduced
In the last section we saw that Chisholm argues from the 
entailment relations between nonaccidental self-ascriptions 
like (3) and accidental ones like (1) and (2), to the 
irreducibility of de se belief to either belief de re or de 
dicto. Irreducibility warrants taking de se belief as 
basic and defining all other forms in terms of it. But 
Chisholm teaches us, perhaps inadvertently as far as he is 
concerned, that the interesting cases of self-thoughts are 
those in which misidentification of oneself is possible, 
the ones in which one has a thought that predicates a 
property of oneself but one could readily deny that one has 
it.
Let's focus, then, on just singular accidental self- 
ascriptions in which misidentification does occur. At the 
risk of naivete, I recommend endorsing--at least initially- 
-a fairly simple proposal: Accidental ascriptions occur
when one succeeds in referring to oneself but fails to 
identify oneself as the referent. The belief that Vivienne 
would express with
(10) V is lucky.
is just such a case of self-reference without self- 
identification, for the accident my terminology is intended
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to capture is her accidental reference to herself. In 
contrast, Vivienne's use of 'I' to self-ascribe the 
property of being lucky as in
(9) I am lucky.
indicates that she intends to refer to herself. Since she 
has succeeded in "getting a hold of herself in thought," as 
it were, referential accidents don't seem to present a 
worry.
But what does it mean for one to intend to refer to 
oneself or to "get a hold of oneself in thought"?
Ascribing a property to something requires picking that 
thing out in some way. In the case of self-ascriptions, 
the object to be picked out is, of course, oneself. 
Accordingly, nonaccidental cases of self-ascription are 
those in which one has succeeded in picking oneself out, 
and accidental cases involving self-misidentification are 
those in which this picking out has gone awry in some way.
To be a little more specific, as we saw above the thought 
expressed by (10) could escape Vivienne's recognition as 
applicable to her because she fails to recognize 'V' as 
specifying her--that is, she fails to believe that she can 
be referred to with the expression 'V', either by herself 
or by others.
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In looking for Che kind of information capable of 
grounding such self-identification, a fairly 
uncontroversial source stands ready to hand. Like each of 
us, I currently possess many commonsense identificatory 
beliefs about myself, including my name, the names of my 
parents, my birth date, my height, weight, and eye color, 
my Social Security number, my current address, my 
tendencies of mood and habits of mind, my political 
convictions, the state of my bodily needs, and so on.
Roughly speaking, such beliefs are those I would offer when 
considering the question "Who am I?". Perhaps none of 
these beliefs alone allows me to pick myself out, but in 
conjunction (or disjunction) they can serve as a means by 
which I can "get a hold of myself in thought" with a high 
degree of precision. Ascriptive accidents occur when a 
subject's battery lacks certain beliefs or contains false 
ones.24
Picking out an object or individual, at least in the 
identificatory sense I'm using it here, should not be 
confused with referring to it. As Kripke (1980) teaches 
us, a speaker or thinker can refer to something even if she
24 The view I begin with here and fill out in more detail later 
shares many similarities with the view put forward by Rosenthal (2003) 
and Dennett (1991). We shall give these views the attention they 
deserve in Chapter V.
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possesses little or no specifying information about it.25 
One's beliefs about oneself, in contrast, taken together do 
identify oneself. And one's self-specifying beliefs have 
implications for the inferences one makes and the actions 
that one performs. For Vivienne to identify herself as the 
winner of the New York lottery simply is for her to be 
disposed to token particular thoughts and to act in ways 
appropriate to lottery-winners, including checking and re­
checking the numbers on her ticket, cashing it in, telling 
her acquaintances about her good fortune, hiring an 
accountant, etc. Had she not believed that she was the 
winner of the lottery--had she not identified herself in 
that way--the reward due her would have gone unclaimed by 
her. Descriptive beliefs constitute a self-identifying 
battery just in case they interact with other intentional 
states, particularly desiderative ones, to produce self- 
specifying behavior.
The naive proposal--hereafter NP--explains 
nonaccidental self-ascriptions in the same way. One's 
first-person self-ascriptions also draw upon one's battery 
of descriptive information to identify their subject.
25 Kripke (1980) makes the point in a compelling way with his 
famous Gddel/Schmidt example (pp. 83-91) . The upshot is that when one 
erroneously associates a description with the name of an individual 
other than the one who satisfies it intuitively one still refers to the 
bearer of the name.
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Indeed the truth of (9) depends upon Vivienne herself 
tokening it, whereas anyone can truthfully token (10). But 
this disparity follows from the grammatical role of 'I '—  
one cannot help but refer to oneself in tokening thoughts 
or speech acts involving the first-person pronoun or its 
mental analogue. We have seen, however, that self- 
reference is dissociable from self-identification. And the 
disparities between (9) and (10) that we may want to 
explain in terms of asymmetries in first- and third-person 
access can instead be attributed to the richness of 
descriptions appealed to. With ’V' Vivienne has but one 
description in play ("the bearer of the initial 'V'" or 
perhaps "the person called 'V'"). With 'I', however, she 
can draw upon her entire battery, including the rule that 
the English word 'I' refers to the thinker or speaker of 
the thought or speech act in which it or its mental 
analogue appears. One's battery of descriptive information 
about oneself will always be richer than that possessed by 
another, for, as it were, one spends significantly more 
time with oneself than anyone else. Moreover, just as no 
two subjects have identical histories, no two subjects have 
identical batteries. This does not mean, however, that one 
is automatically familiar with all the ways in which one
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can pick oneself out--indeed, one is no doubt acquainted 
with very few of them.
Like accidental self-ascriptions, nonaccidental 
thoughts about oneself expressed with the first-person 
pronoun in effect reveal the description or descriptions 
one currently believes to be true of oneself. 'I' (in 
Vivienne's mouth) and 'V' each refer to the same thing, but 
they provide different ways of identifying that referent. 
Hence, on this simple proposal, both successful accidental 
and nonaccidental self-ascriptions are possible in virtue 
of one's being able to specify the referent of a given 
ascription token, whether they involve the pronoun 'I' or 
some other self-designating expression. Specifying the 
referent amounts to being able to pick it out, and one 
picks oneself out via a battery of descriptions that serve 
to identify oneself uniquely.
Accordingly, the puzzling apparent distinction 
between accidental and nonaccidental self-ascriptions 
indeed proves to be only apparent. One applies one's 
ability to identify a referent in both cases, with the 
difference a matter of descriptive resources that can be 
brought to bear in each case. This is to say that 
nonaccidental and accidental self-ascriptions--and hence
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first- and third-person intentional states--differ only in 
degree and not in kind.
Ryle (1949) puts forward a quite similar view of
self-ascription to dispel the myth of privileged access, or
the view that "minds possess powers of apprehending their
own states and operations superior to those they possess of
apprehending facts of the external world" (p. 154). He
argues that we come to know and to believe things about
ourselves in much the same way that we come to know and to
believe things about others. Self-knowledge results not
from some powerful "inner awareness" which makes the mind
transparent to itself but instead from considering
ourselves in retrospect, by "catching" ourselves engaged in
moods, thoughts, or behaviors and through mulling over past
events in our autobiographies. Though it may seem that one
can’t catch another cursing, say, in the same way that one
can catch another doing so, Ryle contends that
the differences are differences of degree, 
not of kind. The superiority of the 
speaker's knowledge of what he is doing over 
that of the listener does not indicate that 
he has Privileged Access to facts of a type 
inevitably inaccessible to the listener, but 
only that he is in a very good position to 
know what the listener is often in a very 
poor position to know. The turns taken by a 
man's conversation do not startle or perplex 
his wife as much as they had surprised and 
puzzled his fiancee, nor do close colleagues 
have to explain themselves to each other as
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much as they have to explain themselves to 
their new pupils. (p. 17 9)
However, persuasive Ryle's arguments may be, the 
privilege he wishes to deny the first person differs from 
the one we have been considering. For even if we were to 
agree with Ryle that one can have false beliefs about 
oneself, we still have the intuition that one can't be 
wrong about who thinks such-and-such or instantiates such- 
and-such properties when one nonaccidentally self-ascribes 
those thoughts and properties. First-person self- 
ascriptions might still enjoy a type of privileged 
identification. To put it into Ryle's own terms, a man's 
wife might indeed be less perplexed by her husband’s turn 
of phrase than his fiancee, but it sounds strange to say 
that she's more sure now than before whether it is she, 
herself who awaits her turn to continue the conversation.
Nevertheless, NP honors the spirit of Ryle's proposal 
and thus inherits its desirable features. First, since it 
demystifies first-person self-reference by dissolving any 
hard and fast boundary between accidental and nonaccidental 
self-ascriptions--and, hence, ascriptions to other selves 
and nonselves alike--it does not have the metaphysical 
implications haunting views that take nonaccidental 
ascriptions to be fundamental. As a result, it could
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easily prove commensurate with other physicalist 
commitments and square nicely with a complete description 
of the physical world in objective, third-person terms. As 
a further advantage, it appears more resistant to nagging, 
traditional skeptical problems such as the problem of other 
minds. For if self-ascriptions were fundamentally like 
other-ascriptions, we would be more resistant to granting 
that the first person stands in an epistemically privileged 
position from which to self-ascribe states and properties.
In Ryle's words, in denying a difference in kind between 
the first and third person "we lose the bitters with the 
sweets of Solipsism" (1949, p. 156), no longer forced to 
regard each individual mind as a "metaphysical 
enclosure."26
Perhaps most importantly, this proposal provides a 
unified account of thoughts about oneself that can easily 
harmonize with accounts of thoughts in general. In 
particular it assigns no special status to nonaccidental 
self-ascriptions. This makes good theoretical sense, since 
any physicalist account of the mental lives of thinkers 
will need to explain how mental states interact causally 
with environmental stimuli and other states to produce and 
to predict behavior. Unified accounts do not face the
I borrow this last wonderful phrase from Cavell (1976).
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added difficulty of explaining the interaction of states 
with fundamentally different p r o p e r t i e s .27
S6. Objections to NP
Whatever the benefits of NP, it faces several troubling 
objections. First, it must confront what Qassim Cassam 
(1997) calls the Misconception Problem (p. 127).28 j may 
indeed possess a certain amount of descriptive information 
that I take to be self-specifying, but that information may 
in fact not specify me uniquely or at all. No doubt we all 
harbor at least a few false beliefs, and it would be the 
height of hubris for one to hold that none of them 
contributes to one’s personal self-conception. I could, 
for example, believe that I am the son of Bertrand Russell,
27 Lewis (1983) motivates his own account of properties as the 
uniform objects of propositional attitudes largely because such 
uniformity facilitates a description of the causal interactions of the 
attitudes (p. 134) . Strictly speaking, both Chisholm and Lewis do 
present unified views--all thoughts are ultimately self-thoughts.
2® See his 1997, p. 127. There he offers a similar objection to 
views that take the fundamental nature of self-consciousness to consist 
of a conception of oneself as located, shaped, and solid. As Cassam 
presents it, one can succeed in thinking first-personally even though 
one believes that one is fundamentally a Cartesian immaterial 
substance, despite the fact that one is actually a physical object in 
the world among others. In other words, one could harbor radically 
mistaken beliefs about what sort of thing one is yet still be able to 
successfully know which thing she is. Cassam takes this problem as a 
strong motivation for the view that first-person thought is made 
possible by an intuitive awareness that one is a physical object among 
other physical objects.
This objection also shares more than a passing resemblance to one 
given by Kripke (1980) against descriptive theories of names such as 
Russell's and Frege's. If reference can succeed despite one’s 
associating incorrect or anemic descriptions with it, names must not 
then refer in virtue of their descriptive content.
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whereas in fact I have no philosophical lineage to speak 
of. Still, even in thinking of myself in this false way I 
nonaccidentally self-ascribe the property of being 
Russell's son, and we can imagine that my behavior bears 
out this identification as well. It's difficult to see how 
I can pick myself out with non-self-specifying tools.
A second, similar objection arises. Imagine that 
Vivienne has a doppelgSnger inhabiting a remote alternative 
world exactly like her own. Twin Vivienne, or "Twivienne", 
identifies herself exactly as Vivienne would since she 
associates with herself a battery of descriptive 
information about herself consisting of beliefs that are 
identical to Vivienne's in every way. If Vivienne believes 
herself to have brown hair, Twivienne does as well; if 
Vivienne thinks of herself as an independent thinker, so 
does Twivienne, etc. They each therefore engage in the 
same inferences and actions resulting from their 
identificatory beliefs. How would one know--even, as it 
were, "from the inside"--whether one was Vivienne or 
Twivienne? NP seems unable to supply an answer, and hence 
it seems that however rich one's battery of self- 
identifying belief it isn't sufficient for one to pick 
oneself out uniquely. In contrast, agreeing with Chisholm 
that "each of us has a kind of privileged access to
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himself" associated with the use of the first-person 
pronoun obviates this difficulty, since Vivienne and 
Twivienne will each have privileged access only to herself 
(1981, p. 43).29
NP predicts, quite counterintuitively, that if this 
battery of descriptions were to be lost, one would no 
longer be able to think first personally. Let us imagine 
that following a particularly sharp blow to the head, 
Vivienne suffers acute memory loss. She can no longer 
recall her name, Social Security number, favorite ice-cream 
flavor, the names of her mother and father, whether she 
tends to vote Democrat or Republican, and so on. Under NP, 
the information that she has had violently removed from her 
memory qualifies as self-specifying information that would 
normally be given in response to the question that she 
would express as "Who am I?". It seems perfectly 
acceptable to suppose that she can no longer identify 
herself as a Republican, Vivienne, or 322-41-9989.
However, intuitively it seems that she would remain able to
29 This objection has much in common with Nagel's (1986) puzzle 
that the thought "I am TN" (in his case) is anything but trivial even 
given a complete objective description of all aspects of and 
individuals in the world from no particular point of view. Nagel 
worries that this “centerless" conception of the world seems to leave 
out "the fact that one of those persons, TN, is the locus of my 
consciousness, the point of view from which I observe and act on the 
world" (p. 56). However seductive Nagel's puzzle may initially seem, 
its pull quickly dissipates once one attempts to make sense of it, as 
Cassam nicely notes (1997, p.20).
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think that she doesn't know who she, herself is or that she 
has forgotten her own name. Though Vivienne lacks much 
factual self-identifying and self-specifying information-- 
perhaps she lacks all of it--it nevertheless seems 
intuitive that she would have no difficulty in 
distinguishing the search for her identity from that of,
say, her mother's.30 Hence, a battery of self-specifying 
beliefs does not seem necessary for one to nonaccidentally 
self-ascribe certain properties.
Finally, the proposal faces what we might call the 
Asymmetry Problem. In denying a difference in kind between 
accidental and nonaccidental self-ascriptions, NP seems 
ill-equipped to explain the intuitive difference between 
the bases of self-ascription. Few contemporary 
philosophers endorse the claim that first-person avowals 
are infallible, but just as few would deny that they are 
made on the basis of evidence. Indeed, NP attributes the 
apparent iron-clad security against self-misidentification 
that nonaccidental ascriptions enjoy as a result of one's 
possessing a wealth of identificatory information about 
oneself. But this is to say that nonaccidental self-
30 cf. Descartes' order of operations in the Second Meditation.
He first deduces that he is--"I am, I exist"--and then proceeds to 
investigate what he is. Since the latter amounts to cataloguing one’s 
properties, such self-knowledge seems unnecessary for at least a range 
of first-person tokens.
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ascriptions are made on the basis of more evidence than 
accidental ones. This consequence runs counter to our 
intuitions, for as Davidson (2001) points out, we seem to 
rely on no evidence whatsoever when making such self- 
ascriptions. Asymmetry in evidence base between accidental 
and nonaccidental self-ascriptions may be illusory; 
nevertheless NP will have to explain--or perhaps explain 
away--this asymmetry.
Hence, the view that all of one's self-ascriptions 
depend in some way or other upon one's ability to pick 
oneself out by way of an identifying description or battery 
of descriptions faces great challenges. Together the 
Misconception Problem, the Amnesia Objection, and the 
Asymmetry Problem propel us toward the conclusion that we 
must possess some fundamental "self-ascriptive ability," an 
ability to think about ourselves that must precede or 
ground our ability to deploy descriptive information and to 
permit its acquisition as Chisholm believed. Resisting 
this tempting conclusion will require disarming these 
objections and addressing our deep intuitions regarding 
nonaccidental self-ascriptions.
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S7. Conclusion
The larger question before us, then, is the relationship 
between ascriptions one makes with the first-person pronoun 
and all others. Ascribing a property F to any object or 
individual a amounts to tokening a thought that one would 
express with the sentence type "a is F," where 'a' 
designates the object and ’F' is a predicate that denotes 
some property. Self-ascriptions are those in which 'a' 
refers to the tokener of the thought or speech act, and 
nonaccidental self-ascriptions of the purportedly special 
sort have the form "I am F". What remains to be seen is 
whether nonaccidental self-ascriptions are a subset of the 
class of singular ascriptions more generally--including 
accidental self-ascriptions employing self-designating 
subject terms other than ’I'--or whether, as Chisholm and 
others contend, ascriptions of the form "a is F" 
fundamentally depend on nonaccidental ones.
Solving this puzzle requires investigating the degree 
to which self-identification is involved in both accidental 
and nonaccidental self-ascriptions of properties. Thus 
far, we have traced the two extremes of possible answers.
The first is the view put forward by Chisholm that one 
possesses the ability to self-ascribe properties without 
any need for self-identification. At the opposite pole
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lies NP that explains all self-ascriptions in terms of the 
success or failure of identifying oneself. The former 
seems to run afoul of accidental self-ascriptions, 
affording no real explanation as to why we sometimes think 
about ourselves yet deny that we do. In contrast, the 
latter excels at explaining misidentification but seems 
unable to account for intuitions regarding the 
impossibility of misidentification in nonaccidental cases.
In the chapters to follow, I apply the lessons 
learned at these extremes to develop an account that 
occupies a tenable middle ground between them. To continue 
the dialectical progress towards this goal, in the next 
chapter I take up the strongest arguments for the claim 
that one does not--indeed cannot need to--identify oneself 
in order to nonaccidentally self-ascribe properties with 
the first-person pronoun. The challenge to one like myself 
who finds such arguments unconvincing is to explain how 
misidentification remains a possibility, however remote, in 
nonaccidental cases. I contend that an account able to 
provide such an explanation stands the best chance of 
constructing a trap sufficient to draw out and to catch the 
mysterious and elusive 'I'.
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Chapter III. Assessing Ascriptive Accidents: 
Guaranteed Reference and Imnunity to Error Through
Misidentification
"We who are self-possessed
own nothing. Even our names
get up in the night and run away."
--Richard Shelton, Journal of 
Return
"I am not sure which of us it is that's writing 
this page."
--Jorge Luis Borges, "Borges and 
I"1
SI. Introduction
As we saw in Chapter II, understanding the various ways in 
which one ascribes properties to oneself requires securing 
a grasp on the nature of both accidental and nonaccidental 
self-ascriptions. We examined two types of proposal that 
explain self-ascription in terms of the need for self- 
identification and the corresponding potential for self- 
misidentification that each permits in nonaccidental cases. 
The first, represented by Chisholm, embraces the claim that 
a subject possesses a basic and unanalyzable ability to
1 The Shelton is from Selected Poems, 1969-1981, p. 1 and rather
elegantly captures the sentiments of Wittgenstein, Anscombe, and
Shoemaker discussed in this chapter. The Borges passage comes from
Collected Fictions, p. 324. Interestingly, this final line to the
story--"No se cual de los dos escribe esta pagina"--has also been 
translated as "I don't know which of us wrote this" (Selected Poems, p. 
93). The translation quoted in the body above proves more interesting 
to the issues at hand since we find the writer currently amidst doubt 
concerning his identity, whereas the past-tense version permits the 
more pedestrian possibility of a faulty memory.
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take herself as an intentional object. Only accidental 
self-ascriptions and ascriptions of properties to objects 
and individuals other than oneself involve what Chisholm 
calls indirect attribution, or predications that require a 
subject to be able to provide an identifying relation that 
uniquely specifies a particular object. In directly 
attributing or nonaccidentally ascribing properties a 
subject need not identify herself at all, and since 
misidentification can only result from a failure of 
identification, self-misidentification is in principle 
impossible in these c a s e s .^
We considered a second view, which we dubbed the 
naive proposal or NP. On this picture, all self-ascription 
involves self-identification, and self-identification 
depends upon one's possessing and deploying a battery of 
fairly commonplace self-specifying descriptive information. 
It follows that self-misidentification remains a 
possibility with all thoughts one can have about oneself,
2 As discussed in the previous chapter, Lewis (1983) makes a 
similar assumption, though implicitly. He claims that one 
nonaccidentally ascribes properties to oneself under a relation of 
identity (what he calls a "relation of acquaintance par excellence," p. 
156). Presumably, this identity would be expressed along the lines of 
"the thing identical with me that is F ... ." Though relations need
not be linguistic items (or even linguistically expressible) for Lewis,
I do need some prior grasp of 'me' to complete the relation. Hence, 
just like Chisholm, Lewis thinks that since oneself anchors all 
attitudes one holds towards objects— oneself always occupies one 
position in any intentional relation to anything at all--the attitude 
one holds towards oneself must be taken for granted.
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and hence nonaccidental and accidental self-ascriptions 
differ at most in degree but not in kind.
Each proposal has its strengths and weaknesses. 
According to Chisholm, one simply cannot misidentify 
oneself in nonaccidentally self-ascribing properties, and 
this seems to square with many of our pretheoretic 
intuitions regarding self-ascriptions--especially those 
that one would express with the first-person pronoun. But 
Chisholm's assumption that one simply has the ability to 
take oneself as an intentional object courts controversy.
We have yet to understand what this assumption actually 
amounts to with any clarity, and we have yet to see what 
argumentative support can be marshaled on its behalf apart 
from its intuitive pull. Proponents also need to address 
its prima facie inability to satisfactorily explain actual 
errors of identification that typify accidental cases, and 
do so in a way that does not preclude a unified account of 
how mental states in general interact causally with 
environmental stimuli and with each other to produce, to 
predict, and to explain behavior.
NP faces its own set of challenges. It easily 
accounts for ascriptive accidents--mistakes of self- 
identification occur when one denies that a particular 
predication applies to oneself when it indeed does, and one
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
62
slips into error because of a failure to believe that one 
can be referred to or picked out in a particular way. And 
since it explains the difference between accidental and 
nonaccidental self-ascriptions in terms of the amount of 
self-specifying information brought to bear in a particular 
case, it offers no impediment to a unified account of 
property ascriptions in general. Nevertheless, it rightly 
earns the epithet "naive" because in its present form it 
offers little insight into the connection between 
identification and ascription. As a result it lies open to 
objections concerning the type and degree of identifying 
information one needs about oneself to self-ascribe 
properties nonaccidentally, offending our pretheoretic 
intuitions regarding the ways in which we can err in 
thinking about ourselves in the first person. Any serious 
account of self-ascription must address the presence and 
force of these intuitions, even if the best theory 
ultimately vacates many if not all of them. In addition, 
the proposal's viability hinges upon its latent power to 
provide a much more thorough account of the relationship 
between self-identification in the battery sense and one's 
ability to self-ascribe properties generally.
The assumption regarding the impossibility of self- 
misidentification forms the primary ground of difference
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between the two proposals. We cannot fully appreciate the 
strengths and weaknesses of each proposal, then, without 
elucidating both exactly what it means to say that one 
simply cannot misidentify oneself in certain cases, and why 
anyone would want to say it. Accordingly, I begin in §§2 
and 3 with the contributions of Wittgenstein and G. E. M. 
Anscombe respectively to this subject. They each contend 
that it makes no sense to doubt the identity of the subject 
of certain self-ascriptions, even if it ultimately entails 
denying that 'I' functions as a referring expression in 
some if not all of its uses. Since in the end they 
inadequately illuminate the assumption that interests us 
here, I devote §4 to the subtle position of Sydney 
Shoemaker. Much like Chisholm, he argues that we must 
consider at least some self-ascriptions foundational and 
immune to errors of misidentification to explain how a 
subject could succeed or fail to identify anything at all, 
herself included. Though Shoemaker presents perhaps the 
most compelling case in favor of adopting Chisholm's 
position--one that seems to provide many of the theoretical 
desiderata outlined above while avoiding many of the 
associated difficulties--we see in §5 that he cannot 
accommodate many of the actual ascriptive errors that can 
befall subjects. In the end, we attain a clearer sense of
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the ways in which NP must mature before it can successfully 
explain how we think about ourselves.
S2. Wittgenstein's 'I': First-Person Pronoun Used as
Subject and Object
Wittgenstein's remarks concerning the self and the first- 
person, though quite influential, consist of some of his 
most elliptical and recondite work. Nevertheless, he does 
consider why one might think that nonaccidental self­
ascriptions differ in kind from accidental ones. In brief, 
Wittgenstein maintains that whereas one can doubt who 
exactly is the subject of an accidental self-ascription, it 
is strictly nonsensical for one to call the subject of 
one’s nonaccidental self-ascription into question.
Questions about the identity of a particular subject could 
only arise if such self-ascriptions required a subject to 
identify herself in some way. Consequently, he concludes 
that nonaccidental self-ascriptions are distinct from all 
others in that the first-person pronoun used to express 
them does not serve to pick out or to signify a particular 
ascribing subject.
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In the Blue B o o k ,3 Wittgenstein distinguishes between
what he calls 'I' or 'my' used as object and 'I' or ’my'
used as subject (hereafter I0 and Is respectively). He maps
the distinction in the following way:
Examples of [I0] are these: "My arm is
broken," "I have grown six inches," "I have 
a bump on my forehead," "The wind blows my 
hair about." Examples of [Is] are: "I see
so-and-so," "I hear so-and-so," "I try to 
lift my arm," "I think it will rain,” "I 
have toothache." One can point to the 
difference between these two categories by 
saying: The cases of the first category
involve the recognition of a particular 
person, and there is in these cases the 
possibility of an error, or as I should 
rather put it: The possibility of an error
has been provided for. The possibility of 
failing to score has been provided for in a 
pin game. On the other hand, it is not one 
of the hazards of the game that the balls 
should fail to come up if I have put a penny 
in the slot. It is possible that, say in an 
accident, I should feel a pain in my arm, 
see a broken arm at my side, and think it is 
mine, when really it is my neighbor's. And 
I could, looking into a mirror, mistake a 
bump on his forehead for one on mine. On 
the other hand, there is no question of 
recognizing a person when I say I have 
toothache. To ask "are you sure that it's 
you who have pains?" would be nonsensical.
Now, when in this case no error is possible, 
it is because the move which we might be 
inclined to think of as an error, a "bad 
move", is no move of the game at all.
(1969, pp. 66-67, emphasis his throughout)
3 A caveat: the Blue Book consists of Wittgenstein's notes
written in English and dictated to his students in 1933-34. And though 
he did send a copy of it to Russell, Rush Rhees reminds us that 
Wittgenstein did not consider it as work he intended to publish (see 
1958, p . v).
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Instances of Is differ fundamentally from cases of I0( then, 
in that with the former no room exists for errors of self- 
misidentification. Misidentification is precluded because 
Is involves no recognition of any subject, and hence 
questions that one would normally ask to fix the 
identification of the subject in I0 or third-person cases 
prove nonsensical.4
To put the point another way, recall that we 
characterized self-misidentification in the previous 
chapter as one's willingness assent to "a is F, 1 where a is 
a self-designating expression, while being disposed to deny 
that oneself is F. In these terms, Wittgenstein denies 
that it even makes sense to consider whether a subject 
could deny that she is F while willing to assent to a 
thought that she would express with the form "Is am F." The 
"hazard" does remain, however, that a subject can mistake 
another for oneself in making self-ascriptions with I0-- 
Wittgenstein does consider this a possible "move of the 
game" of self-ascription--and thus one can indeed wonder in 
those instances who exactly is F.
4 Ac the risk of sounding pejorative, it does strike me as quite 
interesting that the list of examples Wittgenstein gives of ’I’ used as 
subject line up rather neatly with Descartes' description of himself as 
a thinking thing in second Meditation: "A thing that doubts,
understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also 
imagines and has sensory perceptions" (1984, p. 19).
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Wittgenstein's Is/I0 distinction divides prima facie 
according to ascriptions that depend upon bodily 
observation and recognition, and those that do not. 
Accordingly, one is understandably tempted to conclude that 
the different uses of 'I' have distinct referents. On the 
strength of Wittgenstein's examples given above, ls seems 
restricted to the realm of the mental, indicating that it 
must refer to something like a Cartesian ego or self. 
Ascriptions involving I0 are quite often bodily ascriptions, 
and the first-person pronoun used in this way appears to 
indicate or to single out the body the predicate is applied 
to, a body that may or may not be one's own. But this 
seems to imply that Is refers to something conceivably 
independent of one's body, to something that can stake
claim to it or that determines which body is one's own.5
However tempting this inference may be, Wittgenstein
cautions against drawing it. Instead, he claims that the
unique feature of Is indicates that it does not function as
a referring expression at all:
And now this way of stating our idea 
suggests itself: that it is as impossible
that in making the statement "I have
5 Wittgenstein himself recognizes the pull of this construal. In 
"Notes for Lectures on ’Private Experience' and 'Sense Data’" (1993) he 
writes that “[i]t seems that I can trace my identity, quite independent 
of the identity of my body. And the idea is suggested that I trace the 
identity of something dwelling in a body, the identity of my mind" (p. 
270) .
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toothache" I should have mistaken another 
person for myself, as it is to moan with 
pain by mistake, having mistaken someone 
else for me. To say, "I have pain" is no 
more a statement about a particular person 
than moaning is. ... The mouth which says 
'I ' or the hand which is raised to indicate 
that it is I who wish to speak, or I who 
have toothache, does not thereby point to 
anything. If, on the other hand, I wish to 
indicate the place of my pain, I point. And 
here again remember the difference between 
pointing to the painful spot without being 
led by the eye and on the other hand 
pointing to a scar on my body after looking 
for it. ("That’s where I was vaccinated.")- 
-The man who cries out with pain, or says 
that he has pain, doesn't choose the mouth 
which says it. (1969, pp. 67-68; emphasis 
his throughout)®
For Wittgenstein, then, referential expressions--much like 
pointing or gesturing, which are "led by the eye"--indicate 
or pick out their referents ostensibly by way of some 
observational link between subject and referent.
Ascriptions involving I0 do depend upon observation and are 
therefore subject to routine observational error and to the 
correlative mistakes of empty or misguided reference.
Those made with Is, however, cannot fall into error, and
® Again quoting from the Lectures (1993) : "There is no
difference, for me, between I and this •, and for me the word 'I' is 
not a signal calling attention to a place or a person" (p. 269). The 
arrow stands for a demonstrative gesture.
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hence no reference or "picking out" must occur in such 
cases.7
Wittgenstein's resistance to Cartesian pressures may 
be admirable, but his alternative picture has several 
unwelcome consequences. Perhaps most strikingly, 
Wittgenstein's own examples seem to weigh against him, for 
raising one's hand to indicate a desire to speak does seem 
like a paradigm case of one's "pointing to" or indicating 
oneself. And in telling my doctor about my pain I 
certainly want her to be quite clear about which one of us
7 On several occasions, Wittgenstein attempts to clarify his 
claim regarding Is (and what he often refers to as "how much truth there 
is in solipsism" [Tractatus 5.62]) by drawing am analogy between the 
physical eye and the distal visual field. The physical eye is not a 
constituent of the distal visual field but instead determines its 
boundaries. To describe what one sees one describes what's seen, and 
one's physical eye, since unseen, does not enter into this description. 
Similarly, Wittgenstein claims, the subject is not part of the world it 
limits: "A description of a sensation does not contain a description
of a sense-organ, nor, therefore, of a person," and "Just as no 
[physical] eye is involved in seeing, so no Ego is involved in thinking 
or in having toothache" (1993, p. 100). When one experiences pain, 
one simply describes the pain as "it hurts"--no subject enters into 
such a description.
But this analogy confuses more than clarifies. Wittgenstein says 
little that is decipherable about what he means by "subject", and it's 
not at all clear how the analogy lines up generally. Presumably the 
subject corresponds to the physical eye, but what corresponds to the 
objects that make up the distal visual field? At times (Tractatus 
5.631, e.g.) the compliment looks to be the physical world, but at 
others (e.g., 1993, p. 100) he seems to be concerned with what he calls 
"primary experiences." Most importantly, though, the analogy simply 
expresses Wittgenstein's conviction that no self-indication occurs with 
I3. We have no reason to find the analogy applicable, and hence it 
provides no additional argumentative support. Gunderson (1970) also 
persuasively argues that even granting the applicability of the 
analogy, it does not license the radical conclusion Wittgenstein draws. 
For an extended discussion of Wittgenstein’s treatment of solipsism, 
see Pears (1987).
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distinguish myself from others to receive it.
But Wittgenstein wants to deny exactly this, that the 
first-person pronoun as it appears in ascriptions such as 
"I am in pain" serves to single out a particular person.
His reasoning for this conclusion parallels his treatment 
of what he calls "Moore's paradox" (1975, Part II, p. 190). 
Moore's-paradox sentences are those that have the general
form "p but I don't believe that p."® Such sentences prove 
paradoxical because, as Moore (1942) himself noted, they 
seem absurd but not contradictory. One cannot say anything 
by asserting them, but--at least prima facie--they can be 
true.®
Wittgenstein finds these sentences particularly
puzzling because they seem to evince a peculiar feature of
first-person utterances. In Part II of the Investigations,
Wittgenstein writes:
Think of the expression "I say ....", for 
example in "I say it will rain today", which 
simply comes to the same thing as the 
assertion "It will ....". "He says it will
® These sentences are not limited to belief statements; analogues 
can be readily constructed for each of the attitudes--e.g., "Wish you 
were here, but I don't miss you," "Goats will be here shortly, but I 
don't expect any," and so on.
9 Controversy exists as to whether such statements are in fact 
outright contradictions. See, e.g., Adler (2002) and Shoemaker (1996).
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. . . . " means approximately "He believes it 
will ---(1970, p. 1 92 ) 1 ®
Since they do have roughly the same performance conditions, 
one can and often does use either "It's going to rain” or 
"I think that it’s going to rain" to convey one's 
meteorological convictions, for "the statement 'I believe 
it's going to rain' has a meaning like, that is to say a
use like, 'It's going to rain'..." (1970, p. 190). If the
meaning of a speech act were exhausted by the conditions 
for its use, then one might well conclude, as Wittgenstein 
does, that utterances of "p" and "I believe that p" have 
the same meaning and that assertions of mental attitude 
such as 'I believe', 'I expect', 'I wish', etc. are "merely 
ornamental pleonasms" (Rosenthal, 1986a, p. 156).
Similarly, the conditions of use for verbal and non­
verbal expressions of pain overlap, and Wittgenstein 
regards the first-person pronoun as ornamental in these 
cases as well. In §404 of the Investigations Wittgenstein
echoes his remarks from the Blue Book quoted earlier:
"When I say 'I am in pain', I do not point 
to a person who is in pain, since in a 
certain sense I have no idea who is." And 
this can be given a justification. For the
main point is: I did not say that such-and-
such a person was in pain, but "I a m  "
Now in saying this I don’t name any person.
Just as I don't name anyone when I groan
Cf. "Moore's Notes," pp. 99-101.
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with pain. Though someone else sees who is
in pain from the groaning....
Groans aren't speech acts; one doesn't use them to say 
anything about anyone. If one's utterances of "I am in 
pain" were indeed used like groans, they would not qualify 
as self-ascriptions at all and would not specify a subject 
of predication as Wittgenstein claims. Another may respond 
to one's groans or verbal expressions of pain and run to 
one's aid, but she does so not because one tells her of 
one's pain.
Paul Horwich (personal communication) recommends 
against reading Wittgenstein as literally equating ls 
utterances with groans. As evidence, he points to 
Wittgenstein's apparent response to that very accusation in 
§244 of the Investigations: "'So you are saying that the
word "pain" really means crying?'--On the contrary: the
verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not 
describe it." But this remark simply provides additional 
evidence in favor of the point. If verbal expressions of 
pain do replace crying, presumably they do so in terms of 
their use--that is, budding English speakers learn to utter 
"I am in pain” on roughly the same occasions when they 
would have groaned in pain. And as we saw above, 
Wittgenstein holds that groans don't specify a particular
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subject, which means that their verbal replacements must 
not do so either. Such expressions presumably don't mean 
crying because, as surrogate groans, they don't "mean" at 
all.11
However, in assimilating groans and verbal 
expressions of pain involving Is, as well as utterances of 
”p" and "I believe that p", Wittgenstein runs together a 
crucial distinction. As David Rosenthal (1986a, 1993,
1995, 2002) has noted, Wittgenstein conflates expressing 
and reporting mental states. A particular speech act 
expresses a mental state just in case it has the same 
propositional content as that state and its illocutionary 
force corresponds to the state's mental attitude. When I 
assert, for example:
(11) Goats like grass
I express my belief that goats like grass, and
(12) Goats will be here shortly
expresses my expectation regarding the imminent arrival of 
goats.
11 Even reading the passage as charitably as possible, in 
accepting the impossibility of misidentifying oneself when 'I' is used 
as subject, Wittgenstein seems to set up a false dilemma. He only 
allows for explanations of this feature of Is in terms of having one’s 
Cartesian ego as its referent or in terms of its not being a 
referential expression at all--no middle ground exists where instances 
of Is could refer to something other than a Cartesian ego.
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I can also convey my thoughts by reporting them. In 
asserting
(13) I believe that goats like grass
I report my belief about goats, and in asserting
(14) I anticipate that goats will be here shortly
I report my expectation.12 jn neither case do the reports
have the same propositional content as the state they 
report--I use them to say something not about goats per se 
but about what thoughts I have about them. And whereas
(12) has the illocutionary force of expectation, the report 
of that expectation, like all reports, has the force of an 
assertion.
On this picture, the air of mystery surrounding 
Moore's-paradox sentences results from a unique combination 
of performance conditions and truth conditions. Such 
sentences have no coherent performance conditions, for in 
asserting them one would both express a particular thought 
and deny that one had it. The two conjuncts do differ in 
truth conditions, however, and the content of the sentence 
as a whole is therefore not contradictory. Rosenthal 
writes:
Reports are themselves expressions of mental states, and 
reports of those states add another level of propositional attitude-- 
e.g., "I believe that I believe that goats like grass." All reports 
are expressions, but not vice versa.
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To explain the divergence manifest in 
Moore's paradox between truth conditions and 
conditions for the coherent performance of 
speech acts, we must distinguish expressing 
mental states from reporting that one is in 
them. ... If expression were not distinct 
from reporting, the first conjunct would 
both express and report one's belief, 
whereas the second conjunct would still deny 
that any such belief exists. So on this 
construal the sentence would be 
contradictory which it plainly is not. 
Accordingly, a correct explanation of 
Moore's paradox is impossible unless we 
recognize that reporting a mental state is 
distinct from expressing it. (1986a, p.
155)
The truth of (11) depends upon the gastronomic preferences 
of goats, whereas the truth of (13) depends upon the state 
of my beliefs. It might be the case that I don't believe 
that goats like grass when in fact they do, but any attempt 
I might make to assert
(15) Goats like grass but I don't believe that they do
fails as a speech act.
If, as Wittgenstein claims, assertions such as "I am 
in pain" were of a piece with groans or interjections such 
as "Ouch!", Moore's paradox would be contradictory as well 
as absurd. For if mental state expressions and their 
reports were indeed indistinguishable, their truth 
conditions would be identical as well, leaving Moore's- 
paradox sentences tantamount to sentences of the form "p
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and not p." As we saw above, however, the truth conditions 
of the two conjuncts do clearly differ, and only by 
respecting this difference can we capture the peculiar 
features of Moore's paradox.
The difficulties run deeper. Exclamations of pain 
such as "Ouch!" or groans do not have truth conditions at 
all; they have no propositional content and don’t purport 
to predicate properties of anything. Yet when I assert "I 
am in pain," I seem to say something truth evaluable, true 
just in case I am in pain and false otherwise. If 
assertions like "I am in pain" were equivalent to "Ouch!", 
in expressing the former I have said nothing that is either 
true or false. This in turn means that certain states and 
their corresponding speech acts cannot fund the expected 
logical entailments. Speech acts such as "He is in pain" 
license the inference that someone is in pain, but for 
Wittgenstein those involving Is such as "I am in pain" do 
not. Likewise, one could not literally deny the truth of 
another’s first-person assertion that she is pain. This 
should strike us as strange, especially given that the 
puzzle of distinguishing nonaccidental from accidental
^  Wittgenstein could argue that since moans have no truth 
conditions, Moore's paradox sentences are not strictly contradictory. 
Thorny issues regarding expressing and reporting sensory states do lie 
in wait here, but suffice it to say that Moore's paradox-sentences are 
not contradictory because they can be true. See Rosenthal (1993).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7 7
self-ascriptions proved initially troubling because 
thoughts and their corresponding speech acts such as "I am 
in pain" and "R.M. is in pain" share truth conditions but 
have divergent entailment relations.
In addition, more complex but fairly commonsense 
reports of beliefs that appear to draw upon both uses of 
'I' become utterly mysterious. Consider
(16) I believe that I have grown six inches.
How are we to understand (16)? The second token of 'I' 
used to report my belief regarding my growth spurt is I0.
The utterance as a whole, in contrast, represents an 
instance of Is. But presumably groans cannot report self- 
ascriptions that have truth-conditions, which means that 
logical relations are lost here as well. We normally take
(16) to entail assertions such as
(17) I believe that someone has grown six inches
and
(18) He believes that he has grown six inches
said of me by another. Though the surface grammar of an 
utterance may differ markedly from its deeper structure, 
denying the validity of inferences from first-person 
ascriptions to their existentially generalized counterparts 
forces us to give up too much.
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In light of this rich evidence, why doesn't 
Wittgenstein sign on to the expressing/reporting 
distinction and thereby avoid the fairly drastic 
consequences that follow from ignoring it? Rosenthal 
(1986a) diagnoses Wittgenstein's error as resulting from 
his appreciation of the use of a particular speech act at 
the expense of its truth conditions.14 For "if we take the 
use of linguistic expressions as central to their semantic 
character, it will be difficult not to assimilate reporting 
mental states to expressing them" (Rosenthal 1986a, p.
156) .
No doubt this consideration largely explains his 
conflation. Still, confusing use and truth-conditions dose 
not fully explain Wittgenstein's denial that Is specifies 
the ascribing subject. For if expressions and reports do 
have roughly the same use, and therefore roughly the same 
meaning, why not think that "It's raining" or "Ouch!" 
actually reports one's mental state--that in uttering 
either one specifies a subject who has a belief about the 
weather or who has pain, as one does with the speech act ’I 
believe that it's raining" or "I am in pain" traditionally 
construed? Wittgenstein seems alive to this question:
14 Cf. Investigations §43: " For a large class of cases--though
not for all--in which we employ the word — anlng it can be defined 
thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language game."
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Consider the misbegotten sentence "It may 
be raining, but it isn't".
And here one should be on one's guard 
against saying that "It may be raining" 
really means "I think it'll be raining."
For why not the other way round, why should 
not the latter mean the former? (1970, II, 
p. 192)
If "It's raining" and "I believe that it's raining" do 
roughly share performance conditions, what decides which 
should be regimented as the other?
We're never explicitly told why we should be on our 
guard, but another concern probably contributes to the 
conclusion that reports are actually expressions in 
grammatical disguise: Moore's paradox only arises for
first-person, present-tense sentences.15 Sentences such as 
"Goats like grass but I didn't believe it" or "Goats like 
grass but he doesn't believe it" are not contradictory and 
can be coherently asserted. Asserting "g" expresses the 
mental attitude one takes towards a content, but in 
reporting that thought one not only asserts which mental 
attitude one takes, one also specifies who takes it.
Absurdity results in Moore’s-paradox cases in large part 
because in asserting them one would both express one's
Wittgenstein himself points out that tense plays a role in the 
puzzle: "the statement 'I believe it's going to rain' has a meaning
like, that is to say a use like, 'It's going to rain', but the meaning 
of 'I believed then that it was going to rain', is not like that of 'It 
did rain then'" (1970, p. 190).
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attitude towards a content and deny that oneself was the 
thinker or speaker who holds that very attitude towards 
that very content.
Taken together, Wittgenstein's convictions regarding 
meaning and the possibility of first-person self- 
misidentification lead to his troubling account of 
nonaccidental self-ascription. For, according to 
Wittgenstein, errors of identification can always occur in 
specifying or picking out an object. Consequently, if 
either expressions or reports were used to specify who 
exactly believes, hopes, or expects such-and-such, that 
specification could go awry as it can when one, say, 
mistakes another's reflection for one's own in a crowded 
mirror. But Wittgenstein maintains that ascriptions 
involving Is preclude errors of self-misidentification, 
which means that tokens of Is--including those figuring in 
mental state reports--must not be used to specify anyone. 
Similar use may encourage conflating expressions and 
reports, but the impossibility of self-misidentification 
dictates that utterances involving Is should be regimented 
as expressions in which the expressing subject does not
16 Descartes’ cogito provides an additional example. The 
sentence "I don't exist" was true and will be true again when indexed 
to me, but it has no conditions of assertability. Asserting it defeats 
it as a speech act.
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enter into their content, regardless of their surface 
grammar. The subject thus becomes a casualty of the 
expressing/reporting conflation--it is made to disappear 
altogether so that it cannot be missed. ^
Whatever one may think about the importance of use in 
determining the proper regimentation of linguistic 
expressions and the illustrative powers of Moore's paradox, 
claims about the impossibility of self-misidentification 
need further support. Without surface grammar to guide us, 
how are we to tell whether 'I' is used as subject or as 
object on a particular occasion? The most natural way to 
draw the distinction between nonaccidental and accidental 
self-ascriptions is, as Chisholm suggests, according to 
those that one would express with the first-person pronoun 
or indirect reflexive and those that one would express with 
other self-designating expressions or the ordinary 
reflexive. Wittgenstein effectively denies that self- 
ascriptions wear their natures on their grammatical 
sleeves, however, and maintaining a stark contrast between 
accidental and nonaccidental self-ascriptions requires some 
relatively clear means of making out the two categories.
17 Cf. his similar argument (1970, §246, pp. 221-222) that one 
cannot truly be said to possess self-knowledge since one can't know 
anything without the possibility of not knowing and it doesn't make 
sense for one to doubt, e.g., whether one is in pain.
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Drawing the distinction as Wittgenstein does by- 
limiting self-ascriptions that preclude errors of self- 
misidentif ication to those ascribing mental states and 
properties is controversial. Gareth Evans (1982), for 
example, finds that certain bodily ascriptions also leave 
no room for questions regarding to whom a property is 
ascribed. One's kinesthetic and proprioceptive system 
provides a stream of information regarding the state of 
one's body, the position of limbs, skin and joint tension, 
bodily feedback during motion, etc.1® Evans argues that 
kinaesthetic and proprioceptive information gained about 
one's body via these systems in the normal way "appears to 
give rise to judgments which are immune to error though 
misidentification" (p. 220). Just as it makes no sense to 
ask "Some is in pain, but is it I?", questions such as 
"Someone's legs are crossed, but is it my legs that are 
crossed?" or "Someone is hot and sticky, but is it I who am 
hot and sticky?" are equally out of place. Similarly, Jose 
Luis Bermudez (1998) argues that proprioception provides 
information about the state of one's body and only one's 
body. Questions regarding whose body is proprioceptively 
perceived cannot arise, for "[i]t follows from the simple
For a more extensive list of the informational systems that 
constitute somatic proprioception, see the general introduction to 
Bermudez, Marcel, and Eilan (1995), pp. 13-15.
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fact that I somatically proprioceive particular bodily 
properties and introspect particular psychological 
properties that those bodily and psychological properties 
are my own" (Bermudez 1998, p. 147).
These arguments have their own opponents, of course, 
and we will revisit their finer points in the following 
chapter. But for the moment we should note that this 
difference of opinion emphasizes an important shortcoming 
in Wittgenstein's discussion. He provides no substantive 
reason for accepting the impossibility of self- 
misidentif ication in the cases he favors. Perhaps certain 
self-ascriptions of one sort or another do not "leave room" 
for one to misidentify oneself, but he gives us no 
principled way to regiment self-ascription tokens as either 
accidental or nonaccidental apart from any intuitions we 
may have about which ones are subject to the relevant sort 
of error. But our present task is to elucidate and to make 
sense of those very intuitions and to get clearer about 
what exactly is the relevant sort of error. What we need 
is insight into what Wittgenstein and others mean by the 
claim that one simply cannot mistake another for oneself in 
certain cases and how that claim figures into one's ability 
to self-ascribe properties.
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S3. Nonaccidental Self-Ascriptions and Guaranteed Self- 
Reference
G. E. M. Anscombe's (1975) influential discussion of the 
first person holds promise for elucidating the elusive 
assumption regarding self-misidentification so central to 
Wittgenstein's picture of self-ascription. She also 
subscribes to the view that 'I' isn't used to specify or to 
refer to a subject, arguing that, like other familiar 
statements involving purely grammatical placeholders, 
tokens of the first-person pronoun in nonaccidental self­
ascriptions are expletive words, or words that "fill a 
syntactic gap but make no contribution to the sense of the 
sentence" (Katz 1988, p. 119). In asserting "It's 
raining," for example, I say something true or false 
according to current weather conditions, but the truth of 
my assertion doesn't seem to depend upon the reference of 
'it'. Similarly, she holds that one's utterances of "I am 
in pain" actually say something similar to "It hurts,” 
which is true or false according to my current pain state. 
'It' here does not even purport to refer. As a result, 
first-person self-ascriptions amount to "unmediated 
conceptions (knowledge or belief, true or false) of states 
motions, etc., of this object here..." (Anscombe 1975, p.
62) .
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Anscombe's overall strategy for reaching this 
conclusion resembles Wittgenstein's in many respects. She 
too argues that one can speak of or refer to oneself while 
failing to realize that one is doing so. Uses of 'I', 
however, could have nothing less than guaranteed reference 
if they did in fact refer. Since no referring expression 
could secure this strong a referential guarantee, the 
first-person pronoun either requires a special kind of 
permanent and persisting referent such as a Cartesian ego 
or it must not serve to refer at all. Choosing the former 
option leads to a host of historically intractable 
problems. Hence, Anscombe concludes that we should take 
the latter, Wittgensteinian one in which n,i' is neither a 
name nor another kind of expression whose logical role is 
to make a reference, at all" (1975, p. 60, emphasis hers).
The premise that interests us here is the middle one- 
-namely, that the first-person pronoun could have nothing 
less than guaranteed reference if it were to refer at all. 
Anscombe claims that this guarantee must be two-fold: the
referent of 'I' must exist and it must be the thing that 
the speaker using it intends to refer to. That is, the 
speaker cannot "take the wrong object to be the object he 
means by •i ,n (1975, p. 57).
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Anscombe elucidates what she sees as the difference
between these types of guarantee by imagining a name that
functions referentially similarly to ’I'--should ’I ’ refer-
-in that it is an expression each speaker uses to refer
only to herself. She writes:
Imagine a society in which everyone is 
labeled with two names. One appears on 
their backs and at the top of their chests, 
and these names, which their bearers cannot 
see, are various: 'B' to 'Z' let us say.
The other, 'A', is stamped on the inside of 
their wrists, and is the same for everyone.
In making reports on people's actions 
everyone uses the names on their chests or 
backs if he can see these names or is used
to seeing them. Everyone also learns to
respond to utterance of the name on his own 
chest and back in the sort of way and 
circumstances in which we tend to respond to 
utterance of our names. Reports on one's 
own actions, which one gives straight off 
from observation, are made using the name on 
the wrist. Such reports are made, not on 
the basis of observation alone, but also on
that of inference and testimony or on other
information. B, for example, derives 
conclusions expressed by sentences with 'A' 
as subject, from other people’s statements 
using 'B' as subject. (197 5, p. 49)
Anscombe’s 'A'-users uses of 'A' are guaranteed to refer in 
the first sense in that no self-ascription involving 'A' 
could occur without an 'A'-user to token it. However, an 
'A'-user might mistake another's wrist for her own and 
ascribe a property with 'A' as subject on that basis. Uses
of 'A' therefore fail to be guaranteed in the second sense.
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Some peculiarities in this example are worth noting. 
As she describes it, 'A'-users ascribe properties to 
themselves using sentences including 'A' as subject 
grounded in observation, inference, or "other information". 
Self-ascriptions based on one's own actions are given 
"straight off from observation ... using the name on the 
wrist," which seems to imply that 'A'-users must witness 
some bit of bodily behavior, locate the name on the wrist 
that falls under their observation in a "characteristically 
limited and also characteristically privileged" way (p.
49), and then ascribe the relevant p r o p e r t y . 1 9 she does 
allow that an 'A'-user can eventually learn that others 
refer to her by the unique name tattooed on her back and
chest "in the sort of way and circumstances in which we
tend to respond to utterance of our names." Anscombe's 
speakers can also infer from an interlocutor's use of these 
names to a self-ascription made with 'A'.
What Anscombe does not seem to leave room for is any
"direct" self-ascription with 'A' free from observation or
conscious inference. But presumably whatever capacities 
her speakers possess that allow them to respond to 
utterances of their unique names as we do to ours should 
equip them with the ability to self-ascribe with 'A'
19 O'Brien (1994) is similarly puzzled by Anscombe's example.
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without observing wrists of any sort or without consciously 
inferring that they are identical to the individual being 
referred to. Perhaps when someone calls out "Roblin is 
wanted in the kitchen" from the next room I must appeal to- 
-or at least must be disposed to appeal to--my belief that 
I am Roblin in order to infer that I am wanted in the 
kitchen. Nevertheless, such an inference certainly need 
not be conscious. Similarly, one can self-ascribe 
properties with utterances of one's name without 
consciously working through the inference that one is the 
referent of the name. It's "automatic", we're inclined to 
say about our own case. If 'A'-users are indeed supposed 
to share our ability to respond to our given names, not all 
of their self-ascriptions need involve conscious inference. 
We must be on our guard against questions being begged.
Leaving the peculiarities of her example aside for 
the moment, Anscombe claims that one notable difference 
between 'A' and 'I' is that unlike uses of 'I', uses of 'A' 
do not express self-consciousness on the part of their 
users. We should resist the temptation to unpack self- 
consciousness as consciousness of a self, however, either 
as a particular thing or as a unique presentation of 
oneself to oneself. Anscombe believes that thinking of 
self-consciousness in this way is "strictly nonsensical,"
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for it raises the insoluble problem of how to guarantee 
that one has got hold of the right self when using the 
first-person pronoun. Instead, she argues that the only- 
sensible understanding of self-consciousness is 
"consciousness that such-and-such holds of oneself" where 
'oneself' is the indirect reflexive (1975, p. 51). As the 
indirect reflexive, ’oneself'--like 'himself'--gives us no 
added traction on the question of self-reference since it 
is nothing other than the indirect equivalent of 11 '. We 
only end up back where we began.
The main dissimilarity between the two expressions,
one adumbrated above in Anscombe's characterization of
self-consciousness, is that uses of 'I' are guaranteed
against referential errors. She intends her 'A'-user
example to demonstrate that no proper name can provide the
relevant senses of referential guarantee necessary to
capture the features unique to uses of 'I'. She writes:
It seems clear that, if 'I' is a "referring 
expression" at all, it has both kinds of 
guaranteed reference. The object an 'I'- 
user means by it must exist so long as he is 
using 'I', nor can he take the wrong object 
to be the object he means by 'I'. (The 
bishop may take the lady's knee for his, but 
could he take the lady herself to be 
himself?)" (1975, p. 57)
Though the grammatical role of the first-person pronoun may 
make it look like a referential expression, if it were a
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sort of name like 'A', then a speaker using 'I' could in 
fact be mistaken about its referent. But as much as the 
bishop might like to take the lady for himself, one's uses 
of 'I' do not seem to allow for that possibility.
Not only do names fall short of supplying the 
additional level of guarantee, Anscombe believes that no 
referring expression can meet this demand. She argues that 
definite descriptions and demonstratives, like names, refer 
in virtue of a speaker's possessing a conception associated 
with the term that "latches onto" a particular object. No 
conception seems able to guard against one's taking another 
object to be oneself; one always seems able to refer to 
something other than what one takes oneself to be referring 
to.
If guaranteed reference cannot be explained in terms 
of how 'I' refers via some conception, perhaps it can be 
accounted for in terms of what it refers to. It seems that 
only a Cartesian ego could ground one's use of 'I', for it 
alone is the kind of thing that is, as Anscombe puts it, 
"freshly defined with each use of 1 i,n and that "always 
remained in view so long as something was being taken to be 
I" (1975, p. 57). One's body, for example, need not be 
constantly "present" or "in view" to one. Intuitively it 
seems that one could find oneself in a state of sensory
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
91
deprivation--cut off from all exteroceptive and 
proprioceptive sensory information about one's body--yet 
still be able to think first-person thoughts. Given that 
one's body cannot sufficiently guarantee first-person 
reference, 'I' refers only if "Descartes was right about 
what the referent was" (Anscombe, 1975, p. 58).
Like Wittgenstein, Anscombe inveighs against adopting
Cartesian metaphysics and the intractable problems it gives
rise to. Even apart from its traditional problems such as
the interaction between mind and body, if one's use of 'I'
stood for one's immaterial soul, we would still face the
problem of whether all of one's uses of 'I' referred to the
same thing. We therefore find ourselves driven towards the
Wittgensteinian conclusion that 'I' doesn't refer:
Getting hold of the wrong object is 
excluded, and that makes us think that 
getting hold of the right object is 
guaranteed. But the reason is that there is 
no getting hold of an object at all. With 
names, or denoting expressions (in Russell’s 
sense), there are two things to grasp: the
kind of use and what to apply them to from 
time to time. With 'I' there is only the 
use. (p. 59)
We cannot avail ourselves of any type of referring 
expression to explain nonaccidental self-ascriptions, and 
we certainly do not want to rely upon Cartesian immaterial 
substances. Having exhausted our best attempts at
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construing the first-person pronoun as a referring 
expression, we arrive via reductio at the conclusion that 
"'I' is neither a name nor another kind of expression whose 
logical role is make a reference, at all" (1975, p. 60) .
Ironically, Anscombe assures us that the many 
difficult philosophical problems traditionally associated 
with the first person can be avoided altogether if we 
abandon the Cartesian assumption that ’I' must be a 
referring expression. Her conclusion that the first-person 
pronoun isn't an expression of singular designation, 
however, engenders its own disputes that seem equally 
likely to be "self-perpetuating, endless, irresoluble" 
(Anscombe 1975, p. 60). Cartesian metaphysics may be 
troubling, but its offenses against our philosophical 
sensibilities may well be matched by Anscombe's 
alternative.
One major offense is against English grammar. The 
first-person pronoun may not be a type of name, but 
Anscombe errs in her argument that considering it a pronoun 
tells us little about its referential status. To use the 
example Anscombe herself gives, 'he' in the sentence "If 
anyone says that, he is a fool" behaves like a variable and 
not a term of singular designation. However, as Jerrold 
Katz observes, 'I' does not function analogously in any of
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its uses. Substituting 'I' for 'he' in the sentence above 
returns "If anyone says that, I am a fool," which does in 
fact denote a particular speaker. According to Katz, 
Anscombe's own example demonstrates that "'I' does not 
function via an anaphoric link back to a quantified 
subject, but initiates reference on its own" (1988, p.
123) .
Grammatical evidence can also be marshaled against 
the general position that 'I' is an expletive word.20 
Certain syntactic constructions do permit an expletive 
reading of the subject placeholder such as
(16) It is wet.
Others, however, require that 'it' be a referential term, 
such as
(17) It is pleased to be wet
for 'it' must be the subject of both 'is pleased' and 'is 
wet'. By analogy, the first-person pronoun in sentences 
such as
Georg Christoph Lichtenberg is perhaps best known for this 
view as an objection to Descartes’ cogito, that "I think" should be 
understood as "It thinks." Geach (1957) and Strawson (1959, pp. 99- 
100) agree, though they both think that we do use 'I' in a referential 
capacity when we communicate our self-ascriptions to others. Nietzsche 
(1966), as one might expect, goes one step further, claiming that even 
in limiting the cogito to the "subjectless* "It thinks" already 
involves an interpretation forced by the demands of grammar. 
Wittgenstein thought favorably of Lichtenberg's view as well (see 1993,
pp. 100-101) .
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(18) I am pleased to be wet
must also be referential for the same reason. Similarly,
conjunctions involving pro-forms such as 'too' and 'so'
observe syntactic equivalence in the subject position when 
the conjuncts share a verb phrase (Katz, 1988, p. 126) .
The 'it' in a sentence such as
(19) Steve is wet and it is too
must be read referentially since 'it' borrows 'wet' from
the first conjunct and so must be syntactically equivalent 
to the referential term 'Steve'. If 'I' always functioned 
as an expletive word, sentences of the form
(20) Steve is wet and I am too
would violate subject equivalence. (20) doesn't violate 
equivalence, indicating that 'I' is as referential as 
'Steve'.21
Performatives provide additional pressure against an 
expletive interpretation of 'I'. Performatives are 
illocutionary acts executed with utterances employing 
certain verbs of illocutionary force, and they are 
generally framed in first-person singular present tense 
(Austin 1962, Vendler 1972). One can promise to play 
horseshoes on Friday, for example, with the statement "I
21 This paragraph, like the one before it, draws heavily upon 
Katz (1988), Chapter VIII.
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promise to play horseshoes on Friday." Its second- and 
third-person variants, however, do not perform particular 
acts but rather report t h e m . 22 jn arbitrating a disputed 
weekend schedule I might assert that "He promises to play 
horseshoes on Friday." But in doing so I have not thereby 
committed myself to any activities. And the subject term 
in the sentence "It promises to play horseshoes on Friday” 
can only have a referential reading. This isn't surprising 
given that performatives are illocutionary acts, and acts 
require agents to perform them.
We raised a similar tense and person objection in 
connection with Moore's paradox in the last section, and it 
applies with equal force here as well. If with 'I* "there 
is only the use" as Anscombe says, and it is not used to
22 Things are a bit more complicated, of course. First-person 
performatives phrased in tenses other than the present usually have the 
illocutionary force of a reports. I do not make a promise by stating 
"I have promised to play horseshoes." An exception is future tense-- 
'will' combined with the first-person often serves as a route to 
commitment as in "I will dump the trash." Future progressive 
statements such as "I will be arriving on the D train" likewise involve 
commitment, but they don't fit neatly into the performative category 
because they don't necessarily single out a moment at which an 
illocutionary act occurs. Arguably, an exception exists to the first- 
person rule of performatives as well. 'Shall' as used in legal 
documents imposes a duty upon the named party, regardless of person, as 
in "Tenant shall pay landlord upon occupation of premises." But in 
these cases the third person serves the specifically referential 
purpose of specifying exactly which party is committed. Performatives 
can also be made in the first-person plural, as when a team confidently 
offers "We swear we will do better next game." Both of these latter 
examples require further elucidation, but the main point in the text 
stands that at least certain performatives such as promising require 
specifying who has promised. See Vendler (1972) for a detailed 
discussion of these issues.
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ascribe properties to a particular subject, then Moore's- 
paradox sentences become outright contradictions. Anscombe 
has little to say about how we should handle what she calls 
"Cartesianly preferred" thoughts such as thinking or 
experiencing (1975, p. 63), but presumably 'I' does not 
refer to a subject in those cases as well. This means that 
Moore's-paradox sentences of the form "p but I don't 
believe that p" amount to "p but not p," a result which 
effectively closes off any plausible avenue of explanation 
of the paradoxical but not contradictory character of such 
sentences. As we saw above, a satisfactory account 
requires respecting their first-person, present-tense 
nature.
Questions regarding the logical relations supported 
by first-person ascriptions help to evince a few more of 
the perplexities lurking in Anscombe's positive account. 
Anscombe wisely doesn’t want to deny that these ascriptions 
are truth evaluable. In her view the thought that one 
would express with "I am standing" is true or false 
according to whether "this object here" or "this thing 
here" is standing. Presumably these equivalents entail 
that something is standing and can be contradicted by the 
claim that nothing is standing. Does "I am standing" 
uttered by Anscombe entail "She is standing" uttered of her
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by another? Again, presumably--one can correctly infer 
that "He is dangerous" from another's warning that "This 
suspect here is dangerous." No special problems of 
entailment arise with demonstrative statements in general.
This straightforward reading won't do, however. 
Cashing out first-person ascriptions in terms of 
equivalents phrased with demonstratives can at best 
approximate what Anscombe wants to capture about the first 
person. After all, she claims that one's utterance of "I 
am this thing here" is not an identity (1975, p. 61). More 
importantly, she herself argues that 'I' cannot be 
assimilated to demonstratives--they are referential 
expressions that require a conception by which they reach 
out to their referents, and for that reason they always 
remain subject to referential errors. Accordingly, one may 
be wrong about which object the demonstrative phrase "this 
object here" picks out. Demonstrative equivalents might be 
best understood as describing the conditions under which a 
first-person ascription is verified, whereas self­
ascriptions themselves are "unmediated conceptions 
(knowledge or belief, true or false) of states, motions, 
etc., of this object here..." (1975, p. 62).
Whatever grip we may have on what "unmediated 
conceptions" are exactly and how they can be true or false
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sensory deprivation. She imagines a case in which one 
receives no sensory information whatsoever about one's 
body, and one is unable to speak. She finds it intuitive 
that one could still think first-person thoughts in this 
case, perhaps telling oneself "I won't let this happen 
again!” One could even doubt whether one had a body, 
entertaining the possibility that "there is then nothing 
that I am" (1975, p. 62).
How are we to understand "I won't let this happen 
again!" or how it could occur to one to think "There is 
nothing that I am"? One's ideas of actions and the like 
survive sensory deprivation, Anscombe believes, so 
apparently one could still think about moving and acting. 
But if "I won't let this happen again!" is to be understood 
as "this object here won't let this happen again," and 
sensory deprivation prevents 'this object’ from latching 
onto anything as Anscombe admits, we reach a muddle. As 
Kenny (1984) nicely puts it, "if I no longer have a body, 
then I no longer exist, as Professor Anscombe explicitly 
concedes. And if I do not exist, then I cannot be making 
resolves either" (p. 85).23
22 Kenny (1984) objects that Anscombe's reconstrual of first- 
person ascriptions as "this object here of whose action this idea of
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We can avoid the vexing suite of problems caused by 
Anscombe's no-reference view by resisting her radical 
conclusion. Her argument in favor of it depends upon the 
premise that a competent user of the first-person pronoun 
cannot "take the wrong object to be the object he means by 
’I ’" (1975, p. 57), if it were to refer at all. We can
disarm her argument by showing this premise to be 
unacceptable or explainable in other terms that do not 
conflict with the possibility of first-person reference.
We first need to be clear as to just what kind of
error this condition proscribes. Anscombe considers it a
referential guarantee, so presumably one cannot erroneously
refer to another in attempting to self-ascribe properties
with the first-person pronoun. As she describes it,
referential errors result from mistakes of identification,
which simply cannot occur with competent uses of the first-
person pronoun. 'A'-users can apparently fall into this
sort of error when self-ascribing properties with 'A':
Of course, a man B may sometimes make a 
mistake through seeing the name 'A' on the 
wrist of a man whose other name is after all 
not inaccessible to B in the special way in 
which his own name ('B') is. (1975, p. 49)
action is an idea ..." relies upon private ostensive definition to 
individuate ideas. He considers this error, made explicit by her 
discussion of sensory deprivation, as clear evidence of "the power of 
Cartesian ideas to survive and flourish in the most hostile of 
climates" (p. 78).
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As a result, "the 'A'-user would not be immune to mistaken 
identification of someone else as 'A'" (1975, p. 57).
Let's consider an ’A'-user's error in a bit more 
detail. C's wrist (let's say) falls under B's observation 
in the "characteristically special way” that B's wrist 
normally does. B then reports "A is F" on that basis, but 
she is mistaken--C is in fact F and B is not. How do we 
sort out the reference here? Does B ’s use of 'A' refer to 
C? Has B said something false of herself or true of C? 
Anscombe would certainly agree that B has mistakenly 
identified who or what was F in this case, for she has 
taken another to be herself. But does this 
misidentification lead B to refer to someone other than 
herself?
Though she never speaks to this question directly, 
Anscombe apparently would accept that B has said something 
true of C and that misreference does occur in cases of 
misidentification in general--the guarantee we want to 
explain is a referential guarantee after all. This doesn't 
seem to square with the purpose of her 'A'-user example, 
however. The example purports to answer the question "is 
it really true that 'I' is only not called a proper name 
because everyone uses it only to refer to himself?" (1975, 
p. 49, emphasis mine). The term 'A' is supposedly "a clear
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case of just such a name." But if 'A'-users can 
misidentify the subject of an ascription, and if 
misidentification leads to misreference, then 'A' simply 
isn't a term only used by a speaker to refer to herself.
It can be used to refer to someone else.
Perhaps that is Anscombe's point, that no referring 
term could play such a role. In setting up her example she 
avoids characterizing the performance conditions for 'A' in 
terms that suggest any sort of self-recognition on behalf 
of 'A'-users. Though she defines 'A' as the term used to 
"report on one's own actions," we are told that an 'A‘- 
report is "one's own" only insofar as it issues, for 
example, "from the mouth of B on the actions of B" (1975, 
p. 49, emphasis mine). And whereas reports from B made 
with 'A' are "prima facie verified by ascertaining whether 
B did it..." (p. 49), instances of misidentification
require that we go beneath the face of things to determine 
truth and falsity.
Uses of 'I' differ fundamentally in that they do not 
allow for a similar gap between the reporting mouth and the 
subject whose states and actions are reported. Anscombe 
writes:
If you are a speaker who says 'I', you do 
not find out what is saying 'I'. You do not 
for example look to see what apparatus the
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noise comes out of and assume that that is 
the sayer; or frame the hypothesis of 
something connected with it that is the 
sayer. If that were in question, you could 
doubt whether anything was saying '1 1 . As, 
indeed, you can doubt whether anything is 
saying it out loud. (1975, p. 56)
'A'-users must do exactly this--they must look to see who 
(or what) is behaving in such-and-such a way, and then 
ascribe properties on the basis of that observation. 
Accordingly, B can erroneously utter "A is F" upon 
observing C's wrist, effectively issuing a report from the 
mouth of B on the actions of C. Since B reports C's action 
instead of her own, she says something true about C and not 
something false about herself. Such are the consequences 
of referential terms corrupted by misidentification. Uses 
of 'I', in contrast, do not seem to rely upon any sort of 
observation. The speaker or thinker who uses 'I' is not in 
the same position as the hearer. When one hears an 
utterance involving the first-person pronoun, a question 
can arise as to who is the speaker or thinker. Such doubts 
about one's own use of 'I' does not seem possible.
But this description is just as true of one's common 
uses of one's own name. When I refer to myself as Roblin,
I do not "look to see what apparatus the noise comes out 
of" and assume that that is Roblin. We can imagine cases 
in which I fail to recognize that I am Roblin, but we can
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just as easily imagine cases in which I do. And in those 
cases, I don't consciously appeal to the premise or 
hypothesis that I am Roblin. Perhaps I do indeed make a 
nonconscious inference involving that premise, but even in 
that case it will seem to me that my being Roblin is 
unmediated and nonobservationa1, and that doubts about who 
is saying 'Roblin' cannot arise.
More importantly, there is a sense in which one can 
mistake the object meant by 'I' yet still succeed in 
referring to oneself. Consider the errors Wittgenstein 
appeals to to motivate the difference between iQ and Is, 
ones which bear a striking resemblance to those possible 
with uses of 'A' that Anscombe has in mind. To take one 
example, he imagines that I look into a mirror and mistake 
another's bumpy forehead for my own. If I then assert "I 
have a bumpy forehead," I say something false about myself 
even in mistaking another for myself. I do mean to refer 
to the person whose forehead is bumpy, but I believe that 
that person is m y s e l f . 24 -j- functions as a token
reflexive, and competent uses of it always refer back to 
their tokeners. If 'A' is to mirror the uses of 'I', an 
'A'-user who ascribes a property with 'A' in virtue of
24 Taschek (1985) offers a similar example that involves 
mistaking a photograph of smother to be a picture of oneself.
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mistaking another's wrist for her own nevertheless self- 
ascribes that property, albeit falsely. To be like 'I',
'A' must serve as a dedicated device of reflexive reference 
even in cases of misidentification.
Self-reference with the first-person pronoun even 
survives radical error about who one is. Imagine that I 
have come to believe that I am Freud and that a large range 
of my behavior is supported my delusion. If asked who I am 
I respond that I am Freud, and I refuse to answer to anyone 
who does not address me by that name. I incessantly 
attempt to analyze the dreams of those around me, and I am 
quick to assert that Civilization and Its Discontents was 
some of my best work. Needless to say, I am not Freud.
Even in this extreme case of misidentification my first- 
person expressions of false Freud beliefs such as "I 
invented psychoanalysis" say something false about me and 
not something true about the actual Freud. Moreover, I do 
intend my use of the first-person pronoun to refer to 
Freud, and when hear others speak of Freud I believe that 
they are speaking of me. I am wrong both about who I am 
and who exactly is Freud.
Anscombe's referential guarantee, and with it her 
larger conclusion that 'I' isn't a referring expression, 
doesn't hold up under scrutiny. Still, she does seem to be
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correct in. appealing to the language of guarantee to 
describe uses of the first-person pronoun. Cases such as 
those discussed above indicate that we must make take a 
more nuanced approach to misidentification. Rosenthal 
(2003) agrees, arguing that we need to distinguish between 
identifying who it is that is F and whether it is I who is 
F. Though one may indeed be mistaken about who or what one 
is--which names and descriptions properly pick one out and 
which properties one instantiates--one nevertheless seems 
quite secure in one's belief about whether it is oneself 
who believes himself to be, for example, Freud.
We have a fairly good grasp of what it means for one 
to identify who it is that is F--one does so in virtue of 
possessing and deploying a battery of descriptive 
information about who is F. The latter half of the 
distinction, however, remains mysterious. Accordingly, 
Wittgenstein and Anscombe have brought us closer to the 
understanding we seek regarding the claim that 
misidentification is impossible in making certain self­
ascriptions. We now face two interrelated questions: 
Specifically, what does it mean to say that I cannot be 
mistaken whether it is I who is F, and what does this 
special kind of freedom from error have to do with 
reference to oneself?
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S4. Immunity to Error Through Miaidentification Relative 
to the First-Person Pronoun
Our overarching goal in this chapter is to understand and
to evaluate the claim that one cannot misidentify oneself
when making nonaccidental self-ascriptions. Wittgenstein
and Anscombe rely upon this assumption to argue that in few
of its uses does the first-person pronoun specify oneself.
If 'I' were to refer, the argument goes, then uses of the
first-person pronoun could not be guaranteed against
misidentification. Since one cannot mistake another for
oneself when using 'I', such uses must not be referential.
However, we saw that Wittgenstein offered little insight as
to why we should accept this key claim and that Anscombe
erred in thinking that misidentifying oneself, at least in
one form, is incompatible with self-reference.
Nevertheless, we have come a step closer to meeting 
our larger goal in that we can now more precisely formulate 
the freedom from misidentification that certain self- 
ascriptions seem to enjoy: One can indeed be wrong about
who one is, but even when mistaken in this way one still 
can't wrong about whether or not it is oneself who has a 
particular property.
How are we to understand this apparent freedom from 
misidentification, and how does it relate to whether the
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first-person pronoun is used to refer to oneself? Sydney 
Shoemaker attempts to explain this freedom in a way that 
does not preclude 'I' from being a referring expression.
He believes that Wittgenstein has succeeded in singling out 
a puzzling class of self-ascriptions in need of a special 
account--namely, those made with Is. To understand the 
mysteriousness of the first person that Wittgenstein and 
Anscombe are sensitive to that "underlies the perennial 
attractiveness of such unacceptable views about the self 
and self-reference" is not to agree with them, however 
(1968, p. 556).25 For "nothing seems clearer than that in 
all first-person statements... the word 'I' functions as a 
singular term or singular referring expression" (1968, p. 
555). Their mistake lies in thinking that self-reference 
is incompatible with the impossibility of self- 
misidentification. If they were in fact incompatible, 
Shoemaker claims that we would be at a loss to explain how 
a subject can ascribe properties generally and refer to 
anything at all.
25 shoemaker (1963) admits the pull of this temptation himself: 
"It can easily seem that in the actual making of first-person 
statements, or at any rate of first-person 'experience' or 
'psychological' statements, the notion that the word 'I' refers to 
something plays no part at all; for me to be entitled to say 'I see 
that it is raining' it seems no more necessary that I should observe, 
or be able to identify, something designated by the word 'I' than that 
I should observe, or be able to identify, something designated by the 
world 'it'" (p. 10). Succumbing to this temptation, he goes on to say, 
ignores the fact that others make first-person statements and 
effectively thrusts one into solipsism.
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For Shoemaker, as for Wittgenstein and Anscombe, in
making certain self-ascriptions one cannot be wrong about
whether the subject to which a property is ascribed is
oneself. Only self-ascriptions that Wittgenstein considers
involving Is have this peculiar property, and Shoemaker
marks them with the somewhat unwieldy terminology as
"immune to error through misidentification relative to the
first-person pronoun" (Shoemaker 1968, p. 556; hereafter
'IEM'). All others--those Wittgenstein would consider made
with I0 as well as those involving self-designating
expressions other than 'I'--allow for the possibility that
the subject mistakes which object possesses the property in
question. He writes:
to say that a statement "a is <£" is subject 
to error through misidentification relative 
to the term 'a' means that the following is 
possible: the speaker knows some particular
thing to be £>, but makes the mistake of 
asserting "a is | " because, and only 
because, he mistakenly thinks that the thing 
he knows to be <£ is what 'a' refers to.
(1968, p. 557)
Essentially, Shoemaker wants to capture the intuition that 
certain ways of thinking about oneself simply don't allow 
for questions to arise about who is doing the thinking. In 
thinking the thought I would normally express by uttering 
"I am angry," for example, it seems that I cannot in 
principle be mistaken about who exactly is angry, for in
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feeling angry I cannot find myself in the awkward position 
of knowing that someone is angry without knowing that it is 
I who is angry. Feeling angry is inseparable from feeling 
myself to be angry.
My ascribing anger to myself in virtue of feeling 
angry is important. For Shoemaker, the distinction between 
self-ascriptions that are IEM and those that aren't does 
not consist in the content of the ascription as 
Wittgenstein and Anscombe believe but rather the way in 
which the property ascribed is known to be instantiated. 
Ascriptions of anger to oneself as well as to others employ 
the same predicate and share a subject-predicate structure. 
And since the first-person pronoun does refer reflexively, 
they are true if and only if the tokener is indeed angry.
One ascribes anger to others on the basis of observations 
of their verbal and nonverbal behavior, but one does not 
normally self-ascribe psychological properties on this 
basis. Predicates that one self-ascribes without needing 
to observe one's own behavior "are precisely those the 
self-ascription of which is immune to error through 
misidentification" (1968, p. 562).
IEM captures this ascriptive asymmetry without 
disturbing a commitment to the referentiality of 'I'. 
Shoemaker writes:
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My use of the word 'I' as the subject of my 
statement is not due to my having identified 
as myself something of which I know, or 
believe, or wish to say, that the predicate 
of my statement applies to it. (1968, p.
558)
The first-person pronoun as it is used in nonaccidental 
self-ascriptions does refer to oneself, but this reference 
does not involve self-identification. The relevant ways in 
which one knows or believes oneself to have a certain 
property determine whether a self-ascription is IEM, and 
these ways of knowing are those that do not involve one’s 
identifying oneself at all.
Why think that any self-ascriptions must be I EM? If
self-ascribing properties always depended upon identifying
something as oneself, Shoemaker (1968, 1986, 1996) argues,
we would fall into an infinite regress. He vividly
illustrates the point by way of a scene first introduced by
the Marx Brothers but now commonly quoted in cartoons,
films, and television shows:
Recall the episode in the Marx Brothers 
movie "Duck Soup" in which Groucho begins to 
suspect, correctly as it turns out, that 
instead of seeing himself in a mirror he is 
seeing, through an empty mirror frame, a 
double (Harpo, in fact) who is agilely aping 
his actions. Groucho goes through all sorts 
of antics in an attempt to fake out and 
expose the suspected double. Suppose, 
contrary to the film script, that it really 
was himself Groucho was seeing in the 
mirror, and that he became satisfied of this
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by seeing that the man in the mirror was 
performing the very same shenanigans that he 
himself was performing. Plainly, in order 
to identify the man in the mirror as himself 
in this way, Groucho had to know that he 
himself was performing those movements, 
i.e., had to know what he could express by 
saying "I am moving in the ways I see that 
man moving." To avoid infinite regress, we 
must allow that at some point Groucho had 
first-person knowledge that did not rest on 
an identification. In general,
identification-based2  ̂ first-person 
knowledge must be grounded in first-person 
knowledge that is not identification-based; 
and the making of introspective judgments is 
one of the main cases in which this occurs.
(1996, p. 211)
To identify something as oneself, one has to know at least 
some of the properties one possesses in order to determine 
whether it is oneself. If knowledge of these identifying 
properties themselves resulted from an identification- 
dependent process, one would need to have still prior 
knowledge of those properties used in that process, and so 
on. Identification must give out, it seems, before one's
ability to ascribe properties to oneself.27
26 in more recent work, he has abandoned his 1968 terminology in 
favor of Evans's coinage, calling the self-ascriptions in question 
"identification free" (Evans 1982, pp. 179-182; Shoemaker 1994, pp. 
196-197). Since Shoemaker's original terminology has become fairly 
standard in the literature (and since Evans does not consider the same 
thoughts immune from misidentification), I will use the original phrase 
to avoid possible confusion. For a recent exploration of the various 
kinds of immunity, and especially some interesting distinctions between 
Shoemaker and Evans on IEM, see Pryor (1999) .
27 I should note that while this is clearly the main argument he 
marshals in support of IEM, Shoemaker often writes as though it is
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Halting the regress in this way has the consequence-- 
one Shoemaker readily embraces--that IEM self-ascriptions 
have a kind of priority over all others.28 Thoughts that I 
would express with IQ such as "I have a bump on my forehead" 
are subject to error as Wittgenstein believed, since I 
could mistake another's bruised forehead in a mirror for 
mine. In this case, my ascription amounts to asserting 
that my forehead has a bump, but in saying which forehead 
is mine I must employ Is--e.g., my forehead belongs to my 
body, and my body is the body whose head moves when I move 
my head (Shoemaker 1968, p. 657) . The success of Is seems 
to be required even in IQ cases where errors results. 
Accordingly, behind one's uses of 'I' as object, and, 
ultimately, all referential terms, lie self-ascriptions 
that are IEM. Shoemaker concludes that ”[t]here is, I 
think, an important sense in which each person's system of 
reference has that person himself as its anchoring 
point...” (p. 567).29
simply a datum, or at least an entirely separable claim, that certain 
uses of 'I' are IEM. See, e.g., 1968, p. 561.
2 8 This type of argument has attracted attention and approbation 
from philosophers writing in the Continental tradition. Sartre (1968) 
and more explicitly Henrich (1971) appeal to similar considerations. 
For a nice discussion of the current and growing points of contact 
between the two traditions see Zahavi (2000).
29 This consequence brings Shoemaker into close agreement with 
Chisholm and Lewis, discussed in the previous chapter.
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These arguments suggest a particular picture of
introspection as well as an explanation for the traditional
puzzles that surround it. Hume famously denies that
introspection reveals a subject, arguing that that in
"gazing inward" he finds only perceptions and no perceiver:
For my part, when I enter most intimately 
into what I call myself, I always stumble on 
some particular perception or other, of heat 
or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, 
pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself 
at any time without a perception, and never 
can observe any thing but the perception.
(1978, p. 252)
The word 'observe' in the last clause holds the key to 
dissolving Hume's puzzlement, argues Shoemaker, since 
observation is fundamentally tied to identification. But 
psychological self-ascriptions are IEM, which means that 
introspection involves no self-identification.30
Still, Hume does seem right to think that in 
introspecting one's states of mind one does not "stumble" 
onto oneself as one does often stumble onto others. 
Shoemaker contends that IEM allows us to explain Hume's 
insight. Perception of physical objects provides 
identification information about the objects perceived.
Evans (1982, pp. 232-233) makes a similar point in that a 
subject can know that he stands before a house simply by observing the 
house. Though the corresponding thought (what he "envisages, or 
judges") that he would express as "I am in front of a house" amounts to 
a claim about two spatially related objects, "what he sees does not"
(p. 232). We will return to Evans' claim in the next chapter.
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Upon seeing my apartment building I learn that it has a 
limestone fagade, for example, and this is the type of 
information that I can use to pick it out on other 
occasions. But this is also the kind of information that 
can lead me to misidentify another building as the one I 
live in. Similarly, I can glean identification information 
about myself perceptually, as when I look in the mirror to 
evaluate the bumpiness of my forehead and discover that my 
shirt is covered with lint. If introspection were a kind 
of perception, however, then just as I could be mistaken 
about whose shirt was linty I could be mistaken about 
whether it is I who is angry or believe that p. But since 
I cannot misidentify myself when ascribing psychological 
properties, introspection must not be a form of perception. 
We do not need to literally "look inward" via some "inner 
sense" to ascribe psychological properties to whatever 
subject we "see" lurking there.31
If introspection is not a type of perception, how 
should we understand it? Shoemaker favors a view in which 
mental facts are largely "self-intimating" in a weak sense- 
-namely, that there exists "a conceptual, constitutive
For a nice discussion of such "elusiveness" see the 
introduction to Cassam (1994) and Chapter 2 of Cassam (1997). See also 
Kant's similar conclusion that the noumenal self is in principle 
unknowable (1965) . Wittgenstein (1961) offers a more abstruse 
elusiveness claim.
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connection between the existence of certain sorts of mental 
entities and their introspective accessibility..." (1996, 
p. 225) . For minded creatures like us, introspective 
access to our mental states is a product of their 
constitutive causal relations. Our "wiring" is such that 
when one is in a certain mental state, in the right 
circumstances a belief will be produced to the effect that 
one believes that one is in that state. The right 
circumstances here include possessing a self concept and 
the relevant mental-state concepts, and one will need to 
reflect upon one's beliefs. When these conditions obtain, 
Shoemaker argues that one has highly reliable introspective 
access to one's mental states and properties.
However reliable our introspective judgments may be, 
empirical work in psychology (along with the sizeable 
libraries of testimony offered by many novelists and 
playwrights) strongly suggests that we do make mistakes 
about our mental facts. The often-quoted work of Nisbett 
and Wilson (1977), for example, indicates that subjects do 
confabulate reasons for their actions according to widely 
held causal theories about the relations between intention 
and action. And those susceptible to post-hypnotic 
suggestion often invent impossible intentions to
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rationalize their suggested b e h a v i o r . 32 por this reason, 
the self-intimation Shoemaker has in mind does not amount 
to the transparency of the mental often associated with 
D e s c a r t e s . 33 if the mind were transparent to itself, all 
mental states would be conscious, and one could not be in a
state without it being known to oneself. One would
therefore be infallible and incorrigible regarding one's 
own states, and few will now accept this "super-certainty."
Still, even weak self-intimation is a controversial 
claim, and Shoemaker offers an extremely clever argument in 
support of it. He reasons that if mental facts were not at 
least weakly self-intimating, then one could believe that p 
while failing to believe that one believes that p. 
Accordingly, it would be conceptually coherent to imagine a 
" s e l f - b l i n d " 3 4  creature that resembled a blindsight
subject's particular lack of self-awareness. After having
suffered lesions to the area of the visual cortex called 
VI, certain subjects deny having any visual experience of 
objects presented in certain regions of their visual field. 
Nevertheless, they can correctly answer questions regarding
32 For an extensive and interesting examination of some of the 
ways in which we fool ourselves, see Wegner (2002).
33 See, e.g.. Meditation II.
34 it's curious that Shoemaker chooses to describe his imaginary 
subject as "self-blind" given his rejection of a perceptual model of 
introspection. Perhaps this slip just stands as evidence of the 
intuitive power of the perceptual model.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
117
what they "saw" presented in their scotoma or blind spot 
when forced to guess at levels significantly better than 
chance--hence the term 'blindsight35 similarly,
Shoemaker imagines a self-blind creature to be one that has 
cognitive and conceptual capacities similar to our own but 
completely lacks first-person access to her own beliefs.
As a result, she can self-ascribe properties only on the 
basis of third-person evidence, including observations of 
her own behavior or the state of her body.
Does the possibility of a self-blind subject make 
sense? Could one self-ascribe mental states only in virtue 
of having characteristically third-person access to one's 
own states? Shoemaker argues that such a creature is in 
fact conceptually incoherent. He believes that any 
creature that possesses our level of rationality and 
intelligence, along with a conceptual lexicon that equals 
ours, will "behave in ways that provide the best possible 
evidence that she is aware of her own beliefs and desires 
to the same extent that a normal person would be, and so is 
not self-blind" with regard to intentional states (1996, p. 
236). In the case of believing that p, both the normal and
Weiskrantz (1986) is the locus classicus for the presentation 
and discussion of this phenomenon. See also Weiskrantz (1997). He 
attributes the origin of the term to a hasty response to a hasty 
question regarding the title of a seminar held in 1973 (p. 19).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 1 8
putatively self-blind person will be disposed to behave 
similarly. When asked "Do you believe that g?" rationality 
dictates that they both respond affirmatively to that 
question just in case they would answer the question "Is it 
true that g?" in the same way (assuming that they both 
possess the concept of belief). Each will conclude that 
because p is true, it would be rational to act as if she 
believes that p is true to maximize the possibility of 
meeting her goals. Goal maximization also often includes 
drawing upon the assistance of other believers of p, which 
in turn means attempting to make others believe that one 
believes that p. Subjects characteristically encourage 
others to believe that they believe that p by asserting, 
among other things, "I believe that p." Hence, normal and 
putatively self-blind subjects will be disposed to behave 
identically in all the relevant ways.
We can put the point another way. Consider, once 
again, Moore's-paradox sentences. At first blush, a self- 
blind creature seems like a prime candidate to have and 
even to express a belief with Moore's-paradox content, 
since all available evidence could point to p ’s being true 
while the preponderance of her behavioral evidence could 
indicate her not believing that p. Thus, it seems that she 
could quite easily find herself in the position of
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believing what she would express as "p but I don't believe 
it."36 BUt here again rationality dictates that sentences 
of this form cannot be coherently asserted or assented to 
for the same reason. Shoemaker argues that one would only 
assent to "I believe that p" when one would assent to p, 
and since this is a matter of concepts and their rational 
deployment, a self-blind creature will be able to recognize 
their absurdity.37 Hence both the normal and self-blind 
subject will behave identically in all the relevant ways.
And as we saw above, Moore's-paradox sentences only arise 
when the reporting conjunct is framed in the first-person, 
present tense. Since a self-blind subject will show the 
right sensitivity to tense and person on conceptual 
grounds, it follows that self-blindness is conceptually 
impossible. Any subject who can self-ascribe mental 
properties in a third-person way can also do so first- 
personally simply in virtue of possessing the requisite 
conceptual and intellectual capacities that we ourselves 
possess.
I owe this way of putting the point to Rosenthal (1995) .
Though he does think that the (mental) assent conditions for p 
entail those of one's believing that one believes that p, Shoemaker 
doesn't think the converse holds (1996, p. 78).
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S5. Making Sanaa of ZEM
In Shoemaker's hands, IEM proves to be a powerful 
explanatory tool. It provides a ready means of 
distinguishing nonaccidental self-ascriptions from 
accidental ones in a way that agrees with many of our 
intuitions about their differences. One's self-ascriptions 
of psychological properties are immune to errors of 
misidentification when one is aware of those properties in 
a particular way. As we might expect, introspection serves 
as a source of this type of awareness, arising out of the 
causal relations between one’s states, their inputs, and 
their outputs that are constitutive of one's mental 
economy. Broadly speaking, according to Shoemaker, for a 
creature like us to believe that £ is for her to be aware 
that she believes that p. One's first-order states are 
quite literally self-intimating--one cannot be in them 
without being aware that it is oneself who is in them--and 
hence no room remains for questions regarding whether 
oneself is the subject of psychological self-ascriptions. 
Nevertheless, Shoemaker’s explanation as to how at least 
some of one's self-ascriptions involving 'I' are immune to 
error through misidentification does not conflict with the 
first-person pronoun functioning as a referring expression. 
Indeed, if we were not able to refer to ourselves in this
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way it appears that reference to anything at all would not 
be possible.
The neatly unified picture he presents faces its own
difficulties, however. Let's reconsider the blindsight-
self-blindness analogy as a ready wedge back into
Shoemaker's argument for weak self-intimation of mental
states. Self-blind subjects begin as imagined analogs to
blindsight patients but are eventually ruled out on
conceptual grounds. But blindsight patients do not dwell
solely in the imaginations of clever philosophers and have
been empirically studied for a number of years now. The
fascinating feature of such subjects is that they claim not
to "see" what is presented in their scotoma, yet they are
able to respond correctly to questions regarding that
stimuli when forced to guess. Weiskrantz (1997) describes
some of the reactions by blindsight subjects to requests
for guesses regarding "unseen" objects:
Many subjects, and no doubt experimenters 
alike, find it embarrassing to pretend that 
they can guess about something that they 
cannot see. Indeed, some subjects refuse 
point blank. I have had a patient tell me, 
when encouraged to guess in the same way 
that one would back a horse, "I do not 
gamble!" Another patient insisted, "my 
brain is just not set up for guessing!"
Another said, "I know it's 50-50 of one or 
the other. But I can't guess." (p. 66)
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This kind of resistance is telling. Blindsight subjects 
may answer questions correctly when forced to guess what 
they "saw", but without prompting they have no sense that 
they have even acquired visual information that can be 
drawn upon by guessing. As Weiskrantz's anecdotes 
indicate, the guessing prompted by the examiner seems 
totally arbitrary to the subject to the point where 
hazarding a guess at all seems pointless.
How does the position in which a blindsight subject 
finds herself compare to that of someone who is self-blind? 
Shoemaker argues that possessing conceptual and 
intellectual capacities like ours rules out the possibility 
of a creature who could self-ascribe psychological 
properties and states in a third-person way but not do so 
in a first-person way. If asked "Do you believe that p?" a 
self-blind subject will answer in the same way as she would 
to the question "Is it true that p?", as would a normal 
"self-sighted" subject. But what if a self-blind subject 
is not asked whether she believes that p? Presumably her 
situation would be quite similar to that of her blindsight 
analog in that she might not even realize that she has come 
to believe that p--she wouldn't have a sense as to when or 
what to ask about her own beliefs even in light of her own
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behavioral e v i d e n c e . 38 It seems reasonable to suppose that 
questions as to whether she believes that g will seem 
totally arbitrary to her in a way uncharacteristic of what 
we think of as first-person access.
Of course, Shoemaker could regard the analogy with 
blindsight as merely a suggestive starting point for his 
self-blindness argument and not one that runs to any 
appreciable depth. Nevertheless, conceptual connections by 
themselves do not guarantee first-person access to one’s 
own mental states. Moore's paradox sentences, for example, 
wouldn't be absurd to the self-blind subject on purely 
conceptual grounds. For according to Rosenthal's account 
favored above, Moore's-paradox sentences are absurd speech 
acts--they have no coherent performance conditions, but 
their contents can be true. This means that for a self- 
blind creature to recognize the absurdity of these 
sentences, she would have to grasp that the performance 
conditions for saying "g" and saying "I believe that g" are
I should note that Dennett (1991) considers the intriguing 
possibility that a blindsight subject might learn to use whatever 
feedback available to eventually become *self-cueing"--so much so that 
she no longer needs the experiment to force a choice. He goes on to 
wonder whether such a "self-cueing" subject would then become conscious 
of the visual stimuli presented in her scotoma. Though he thinks that 
intuition doesn't favor any outcome, ha does think that it’s reasonable 
to suppose that such a subject might eventually become consciously 
aware of these experiences. Weiskrantz (1997), however, thinks that 
this possibility is quite remote given that blindsight patients who 
have been subjects of study have been through thousands of trials with 
no appreciable change in conscious awareness of visual stimuli.
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basically equivalent. But such a grasp does not fall out 
of possessing the concepts of believing and saying.
Rosenthal (1995) argues that our beliefs about the 
connection between believing and saying participate in a 
"folk theory so well-entrenched as to constitute commonly 
shared background knowledge" (p. 327). Accordingly, a 
self-blind creature's conclusion as to the absurdity of a 
particular Moore's-paradox sentence "would be mediated by a 
conscious inference that relies on the relevant folk- 
theoretic connection" (p. 327). Self-ascriptions made in a 
characteristically first-person way involve no conscious 
inferences; hence, however necessary conceptual capacities 
may be for first-person access to one's mental states, they 
do not prove sufficient. Self-blindness cannot be ruled 
out on purely conceptual grounds.
Still, the failure of the self-blindness argument 
does not directly impact Shoemaker’s claim that at least 
some self-ascriptions must be IEM. His regress argument in 
support of that conclusion stands independently of an 
account of self-awareness that results in self-ascriptions 
that are IEM. Though we risk no conceptual incoherence in 
imagining a creature that believes that p without believing 
that she believes that p, it still might be a contingent 
fact about creatures like us that certain forms of
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awareness of mental states preclude the possibility of 
being mistaken about whether oneself is in those states. 
Holding onto IEM despite the lack of a conceptual 
connection between mental states and their reports results 
in a still weaker self-intimation claim, but one germane to 
our central question regarding the importance of self- 
identification to self-ascriptions of various sorts.
As James Pryor (1999) has noted, Shoemaker's 
characterizations of IEM involve an ambiguity in the notion 
of misidentification. According to the passage quoted 
above from his 1968 paper, Shoemaker defines the 
possibility of error through misidentification relative to 
a subject term as hinging upon an assumption that a 
particular object known to be F is identical to the object 
that a particular subject term refers to.39 The belief 
that a is F can fall into error relative to the term 'a' in 
that one could know of some object x that it is F and 
believe that x is identical to a. For example, upon seeing 
a woman enter the room in uniform I assert "Marianne is a 
sergeant." Though I correctly identify the woman’s rank, I  
have mistaken this sergeant for my friend Marianne. 
Similarly, I could see some particular person reflected in 
a mirror sporting a broken arm and, mistakenly thinking
39 Cf. Evans (1982), pp. 180-181.
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that he is myself, token the belief that I have a broken 
arm. Pryor calls this type of misidentification "de re 
misidentification" because it consists in believing a 
singular proposition about a particular object (1999, p. 
274). Roughly speaking, instances of de re 
misidentification can be described as failed attempts at 
reidentification.
Though this reading of misidentification conforms to 
the letter of Shoemaker's 1968 definition, Pryor is right 
to point out that it doesn't quite capture the 
Wittgensteinian spirit of the IEM condition clearly in 
evidence in the Groucho Marx passage above from his 1993 
Royce Lectures. The error Shoemaker considers there 
encourages a more general reading of misidentification, one 
Pryor terms "which-object-misidentification" or "wh- 
misidentification" (1999, p. 281). Suppose that I hear a 
car alarm going off in front of my building. When I reach 
the street I see several unfamiliar cars with flashing 
lights and blinking hazards. Looking around, I assert "The 
black SUV is making all the noise" when in fact the 
triggered alarm belongs to the station wagon next to it.
My error results from my conclusion regarding which car is 
responsible and not from any beliefs I have about the 
identity of a specific car. In this case I knew something
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to be F but ultimately erred in my conclusion as to which 
thing is F.
The distinction between de re and wh- 
misidentification can also account for our treatment of the 
case of radically mistaken identity raised in the previous 
section. We described my delusional belief that I am Freud 
as a case in which I am mistaken about who I am and who is 
Freud. Pryor would describe this mistake in terms of de re 
misidentification, for I erroneously believe of some thing 
(myself) that it is identical with a familiar object 
(Freud). However, we agreed, following Rosenthal, that 
even in this extreme case it seems that I can't be wrong 
about whether I believe that I am Freud. This is to say 
that my belief is immune to wh-misidentification since it 
seems that I can't be wrong about which object believes 
himself to be Freud.
Pryor further argues that wh-misidentification is the 
more interesting and basic notion, for wh-misidentification 
entails de re misidentification but not vice versa. If my 
belief that a is F is immune to wh-misidentification, then 
I cannot know that something is F while being mistaken 
about which thing is a. This means that my belief is also 
immune to de re misidentification, for it doesn't rely upon 
prior knowledge that a particular object a is F along with
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the belief that some familiar object is identical with a.
But my belief regarding the noisy car involved no 
reidentification of a familiar object, and hence it is also 
immune to de re misidentification. The example was offered 
as an paradigm of wh-misidentification, however, which 
means that "immunity to de re misidentification, when based 
on certain grounds, does not entail immunity to wh- 
misidentif ication, when based on those grounds" (Pryor,
1999, p. 286).
Like Shoemaker, Pryor holds that all introspective 
beliefs about one's mental state are immune to both de re 
and wh-misidentification,4Q and both Shoemaker and Pryor 
describe these beliefs in terms of what one knows about 
oneself. But even self-ascriptions that are immune to wh- 
misidentif ication don't enjoy freedom from error tout 
court. Shoemaker himself cautions that Wittgenstein's l0/Is 
distinction--and therefore his non-IEM/IEM distinction as 
well--should not be confused with the
corrigible/incorrigible distinction (1968, p. 556).41 One 
can apparently be wrong about the property ascribed even 
when one cannot be wrong about which individual is the
Pace the remote possibility of what Shoemaker (1970) calls 
"quasi-memory", which Pryor describes as an example of beliefs that are 
identification free but still subject to wh-misidentification.
41 Presumably Shoemaker would also agree that IEM is not 
tantamount to infallibility.
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subject of the ascription. I could hear sounds in the 
distance and token the thought that I would express as "I 
hear a woodpecker" when in fact it was a series of 
gunshots. Though my belief is false, the conditions for 
immunity to wh-misidentification are satisfied: My
auditory experience of hearing the gunshots grounds my 
belief that someone heard a woodpecker, but those same 
grounds leave no room for mistakes regarding which subject 
heard the noise. But if one can indeed be mistaken about 
which property one instantiates--even if one cannot be 
mistaken about which person instantiates it--one cannot be 
properly said to possess knowledge.
Bermudez (1998) likewise finds talk of knowledge ill- 
suited to capture the special status of nonaccidental self­
ascriptions that Shoemaker intends to seize upon. He 
writes:
The category of first-person contents being 
picked out is not defined by its subject 
matter or by any points of grammar. What 
demarcates the class of judgments and 
beliefs that are immune to error through 
misidentification is the evidence base from 
which they are derived, or the information 
on which they are based.... (p. 6)
What matters is the connection between particular evidence 
bases that serve as sources of self-awareness and the self­
ascriptions that those sources support. Not all evidence
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bases support self-ascriptions that are IEM, and not all 
IEM self-ascriptions are true. The question remains as to 
which evidence bases fund self-ascriptions that can be 
immune in this particular w a y . ^ 2
We can perhaps make a bit more sense of this
connection proponents of IEM have in mind by returning to
the account of misidentification introduced in the previous 
chapter. According to that view, a subject misidentifies 
herself when she would assent to "a is F" but would deny 
that she, herself is F when 'a' does in fact refer to her. 
IEM does settle nicely into this formulation since the 
denial definitive of misidentification relies upon an 
component that is ostensibly IEM--namely, that a subject 
would deny that "I, myself am a" is true in her mouth.43 
Following Pryor's lead, a subject wh-misidentifies herself 
when she would assent to "Something is F" but would deny
that "I am F" is true in her mouth apart from any
antecedent beliefs she might have about herself. In either
42 pryor does conduce his discussion of immunity to 
misidentification in terms of grounds that justify a particular belief. 
However, it's clear that he’s interested in characterizing self- 
knowledge. He suggests, for example, that we have a firm enough grasp 
of the way in which justification leads to knowledge despite the 
Gettier Problem (p. 281).
^  This should not be confused with a subject's denying that "I 
am F" is true in her mouth since she could very well think that she is 
F while thinking that a is not. The intermediate case is one in which 
she denies that "I am F" because she would deny the truth of "I am a" 
in her mouth.
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case it seems that self-misidentification can occur only 
when one already has the capability to self-ascribe 
psychological properties, and this is just what Shoemaker's 
regress argument in favor of IEM leads us to expect.
16. Conclusion
We began this chapter in search of reason to think that 
nonaccidental self-ascriptions are just those that in 
principle preclude a subject's misidentifying herself. We 
found a candidate reason in Shoemaker's argument--inspired 
by Wittgenstein's remarks on the uses of the first-person 
pronoun and sharpened by Pryor's observations regarding the 
ambiguity of misidentification--that at least certain self­
ascriptions must be IEM or we face an infinite regress that 
threatens any explanation of how we are able to self- 
ascribe properties at all.
As a result, the primary objections raised against NP 
introduced at the end of Chapter II can now be stated more 
clearly. Recall that according to NP all self-ascription 
depends upon self-identification, and self-identification 
consists in possessing and deploying a battery of 
information about oneself consisting of a wide range of 
self-specifying beliefs. One manifests one's ability to 
identify oneself in the inferences one draws and the
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behavior one engages in, including what one is willing to 
assent to and to deny. Misidentification occurs when a 
subject falsely believes that some description does or does 
not apply to her, occasions where her battery contains 
critical false beliefs or lacks the relevant true ones.
This proposal ran headlong into the objections that such a 
battery of information seemed neither necessary nor 
sufficient for nonaccidental self-ascription. Intuition 
suggests that should one suffer even a severe episode of 
amnesia one could still self-ascribe properties with the 
first-person pronoun. It also seems intuitively possible 
for one to possess a rather comprehensive collection of 
beliefs that are in fact about oneself yet fail to 
recognize which person that collection picks out.
In effect, a proponent of NP denies that any self- 
ascription is IEM. But requiring that one's battery of 
identificatory information fund all of one's self- 
ascriptions seems to lead to a vicious regress of 
identification. Accordingly, NP must explain how such a 
view of self-ascription either involves at most a harmless 
regress or halts it altogether in a rather banal way 
acceptable to those who, like myself, do not believe that 
accidental and nonaccidental self-ascriptions differ in 
kind.
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The persuasive power of regress arguments is directly 
proportional to the clarity of their starting points, 
however, for we can settle where they must end only after 
we understand where and how they begin. Accordingly, to 
address the regress challenge that Shoemaker raises, in the 
next chapter we begin with the argument’s beginning and end 
with its ending.
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Chapter IV. The Body and Its Owner:
Immunity and The Sel£-Ascription of Bodily Properties
"Would that you dared to believe yourselves-- 
yourselves and your entrails. Whoever does not 
believe himself always lies."
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra -̂
§1. Introduction
In Chapter III we pursued clarification of and support for 
the claim that nonaccidental self-ascriptions do not permit 
the possibility of self-misidentification. We found that 
the Wittgensteinian conclusion that certain uses of the 
first-person pronoun do not pick out their users leads to 
troubling logical consequences and precludes a satisfactory 
explanation of Moore’s paradox. We then considered 
Shoemaker's related alternative that certain self- 
ascriptions are nonaccidental in virtue of being immune to 
error through misidentification relative to the first- 
person pronoun (IEM). A subject cannot misidentify herself 
in nonaccidentally self-ascribing properties, according to 
Shoemaker, because in making them she does not identify 
herself at all. He argues that at least some self­
ascriptions must be immune to this sort of error, for if 
all self-ascriptions were subject to errors of 
misidentification then all self-ascriptions would be 
1 Nietzsche (1954), p. 235.
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identification dependent. And if all ascriptions did 
involve some form of self-identification, it seems that a 
vicious regress results--one that undermines any 
explanation of how we are able to ascribe properties to 
anything at all.
Shoemaker's regress argument presents a formidable 
challenge to NP. After all, the proposal lies directly in 
its path: The battery requirement at its heart specifies
that all self-ascriptions depend in some way or other upon 
a collection of self-specifying beliefs, and this 
requirement seems to precipitate just such a regress of 
identification. Accordingly, for NP to offer a serious 
alternative to Shoemaker's Wittgensteinian and Cartesian 
account of self-ascription, the connection between 
nonaccidental self-ascription and the battery must be 
fleshed out.
To better understand what NP must account for, we 
need a better grip on exactly which self-ascriptions are 
IEM and therefore nonaccidental. If we follow Shoemaker's 
argument out, where do we regress to? Shoemaker himself 
concludes that only certain first-person psychological 
self-ascriptions based upon introspection could stop the 
regress. Are all bodily self-ascriptions therefore 
accidental and open to the possibility of
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misidentification? If so, must we settle for a Cartesian- 
friendly account of nonaccidental self-ascriptions?
These profoundly puzzling questions will occupy and 
propel us throughout this chapter. I begin with §2 and an 
attempt to elucidate where Shoemaker's regress argument 
begins and ends, including what he believes it shows about 
which self-ascriptions remain vulnerable to self- 
misidentification and which do not. I do so in part by 
looking a bit more closely at Groucho's dilemma introduced 
in the previous chapter. In §§3-4 I consider the 
possibility that the regress may end elsewhere by examining 
arguments given by Gareth Evans and Jose Luis Bermudez 
respectively that certain bodily self-ascriptions can also 
be IEM, but they prove unsustainable. I devote §5 to a 
discussion of some empirical work suggesting that bodily 
self-ascriptions--even those made on the basis of normally 
functioning senses--are indeed subject to errors of 
misidentification. In §6, I argue that NP can accommodate 
the empirical data and explain our sense of body ownership 
in terms of one's body image that arises out of one’s 
battery of self-specifying beliefs. Finally, this 
explanation provides shape and direction for an explanation 
of nonaccidental psychological self-ascriptions undertaken 
in the next and final chapter: The self-ascription of
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bodily properties at best only seems nonaccidental, but 
errors of ownership cannot be ruled out. How things seem 
rarely settles how things are, but NP must speak to both.
S2. Understanding the Regresst Beginnings and Endings
We can view Shoemaker1s regress argument as having both 
positive and negative implications. If sound, its negative 
impact is fairly obvious: Identification must come to an
end before one's ability to self-ascribe properties; hence, 
accounts like NP that explicate all instances of self­
ascription in terms of one's ability to identify oneself 
attempt the impossible.
The positive implications are a little less clear, 
however. Even those who find the argument compelling--and 
who agree that at least some self-ascriptions must be IEM-- 
do not believe that the motivation for launching the 
regress clearly determines where it must end. Differences 
arise as to whether only psychological self-ascriptions can 
be IEM or whether certain self-ascriptions of bodily 
properties must also preclude self-misidentification.
To help sort out this dispute, we first need to 
understand the regress itself. Broadly speaking, if an 
ascription of the form "a is F" depends upon 
identification, it can be regimented as a conjunction of






Figure 1. Regress of Identification
the beliefs "b is F" and "a = b."2 if the ascription of 
property F to presented individual b is itself 
identification dependent, it too can be regimented as the 
conjunction of "c is F” and "b = c." And so on, as in 
Figure 1 above.
In its simplicity, however, the above picture 
emphasizes the generative role of the property ascription 
and underplays the role of the identificatory beliefs in 
perpetuating the regress. The identification component ("a 
= b") and the identification inference in which it figures 
are in fact to blame. An individual a is familiar to one 
because one possesses a battery of a-specifying beliefs {a 
is Gi, a is G2, . . .a is Gn) . Accordingly, to ascribe the
2 The identity sign should be read as numerical ("identical 
with") and not qualitative identity ("identical to").
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property F to a familiar individual a in a way that
involves identifying it, one must believe that a has some
set of properties {Gi,...Gn}. One must also believe that 
some object b instantiates F as well as {G:, . . . Gr.} (or some 
significant proper subset thereof). One identifies b as a 
in virtue of the overlap between a- and b-specifying 
beliefs, and since one believes both that b is F and that a
is identical with b, one concludes that a is f J  To
explain the ascription "b is F" in terms of an 
identification of b with another familiar individual c, it 
seems that one would also need a battery of c-specifying 
beliefs to identify b with c. No end of identification 
seems to be in sight. Batteries of belief make 
identification possible, but they apparently must be 
acquired in some way that itself does not involve 
identification.
We can trigger the regress in a more concrete way by 
first asking how one comes to believe that some individual 
other than oneself is F. Suppose that I meet Vivienne at 
Grand Central Terminal and discover that she has dyed her 
hair red. How do I do this? I don't merely believe that 
some individual or other has red hair, I must pick Vivienne 
out from the crowd. If she is already familiar to me, I
3 This chain of inferences need not be conscious.
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have a wealth of useful information to draw upon to do so.
I immediately look for women of a certain hair color, 
height, dress, age, etc., and I pay particular attention to 
women standing in specific locations in Grand Central
looking like they might be waiting for someone.̂  My 
beliefs needn't be exhaustive or entirely accurate--indeed 
in this case one of my identifying beliefs about her is 
false. Still, I believe that Vivienne has certain 
properties, and I look for some individual who possesses 
most if not all of those properties.5 in scanning the flow 
of people, I see someone who resembles Vivienne in many 
ways apart from hair color, and I conclude that the red- 
haired woman is Vivienne. If I'm correct, we head off for 
lunch. Of course, my antecedent beliefs about Vivienne may 
lead me to mistake similarly featured individuals for her; 
with identification comes the possibility of 
misidentification. Nevertheless, it goes almost without
 ̂ Face recognition is arguably a different story. The wonderful 
and extensive work on this capacity strongly suggests that we have 
dedicated and redundant subpersonal systems devoted to this important 
task. See the papers in Young (1998) for representative work. Still, 
we can make a distinction between recognizing a set of familiar facial 
features (identifying a face as Vivienne's, say) and observing the 
features of a face seen for the first time.
5 Our identifications of those familiar to us are dynamic, of 
course. I could discover upon meeting Vivienne that she has dyed her 
hair. If I were to meet her again next week I would have different 
beliefs about her hair color to aid in picking her out from the crowd.
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saying chat if I did not have at least some notion of who I 
was looking for I could not succeed in recognizing anyone.
Does it make sense for one to ascribe a property to 
oneself in this manner? We can imagine cases in which it 
does. Consider once again Groucho's dilemma. Recall that 
in "Duck Soup" he finds himself faced with ambiguous 
perceptual cues suggesting that what he sees before him may 
be a reflection of himself or may be another person 
imitating his actions and dress. He attempts to resolve 
the dilemma by performing experiments that involve acting 
in particular ways and noting the reactions of his 
conspecific. In the film, Groucho eventually does succeed 
in determining that his putative "reflection" is in fact 
another (Harpo, as it turns out) attempting to fool him. 
Though amazingly adept at aping Groucho, Harpo fails to 
mimic his movements completely--Groucho notices the
incongruities, and Harpo's ruse is discovered.®
What incongruities does Groucho notice? Shoemaker 
claims that Groucho's recognition (either that he is in 
front of a mirror or that he is in front of an imitator) 
depends upon his ability to self-ascribe certain
® To be more precise, the famous "mirror" scene ends--to great 
comic effect--when Groucho sees Chico (also dressed like Groucho) 
stumble into Harpo. Perhaps Harpo could have successfully fooled 
Groucho into thinking that the mirror had not been broken after all.
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psychological states and properties, including what he 
would express as "I am moving in the ways I see that man 
moving" (1996, p. 211). It's important for Shoemaker that 
this belief involve the first-person pronoun or its mental 
analogue. Its extensional equivalent, in this case,
"Groucho is moving in the ways Groucho sees that man 
moving" leaves open the possibility that Groucho fails to 
believe that he, himself is Groucho. Perhaps he can notice 
that the movements of the unidentified individual in front 
of him do not completely match his own without harboring 
many beliefs about who he is, but it seems that Groucho 
can't be mistaken as to whether he, himself is moving in 
such-and-such a way.
Could Groucho's beliefs about his movements 
themselves depend upon his recognizing some unidentified 
moving thing as himself?7 He must have some basis for 
wondering whether what he sees moving is indeed himself, 
some set of properties he believes true of both he, himself 
and the unidentified individual that could support an 
identifying inference. In the case at hand these 
properties are largely observational: Groucho sees that
they both sport similar glasses, eyebrows, and mustaches,
7 I'm assuming for the moment that no question arises for Groucho 
as to how mirrors work.
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and that they wear identical nightgowns and caps. And the 
evidence regarding Harpo's movements is also observational.
Could he find himself in a similar situation in which 
he is presented with an unidentified individual that is in 
fact himself but does not involve a mirror? Here again, it 
seems that he might. He might not be sure, for example, 
that the limb he sees moving is in fact his own. He might 
even wonder whether the body he experiences in certain ways 
belongs to him.
How could he extricate himself from such a peculiar 
predicament and come to believe what he would express as 
"This body is my body" or "This arm is my arm"?8 seems
that he must believe that some presented individual is {G:,
...Gn} and that he, himself shares many or most of those 
properties. In the odd case we're imagining, these 
properties will include psychological self-ascriptions such 
as "I'm intending to move in this way" that may then
overlap with observations about bodily movements.̂  For one 
to identify a particular body as one's own one must already
® He need not pick out his body demonstratively. He could do so 
descriptively--e.g., "the body wearing the nightgown and cap currently 
moving ... is mine." I defer to the demonstrative case for the sake of 
brevity.
® Interestingly (an anticipating somewhat), we can frame the 
traditional interactionism problem for the dualist in a different way.
We see that the dualist also faces an identification problem as well-- 
that is, how one could identify a body as (contingently) one’s own in 
virtue of possessing information about completely unrelated properties.
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have certain beliefs about one's psychological states and 
properties that one can then use to compare with candidate 
behavioral consequences of those states and properties.
What about the next step? Could Groucho be called 
upon to recognize a presented unidentified self with 
certain psychological properties as himself? Shoemaker 
argues that if he could we have no hope of avoiding vicious 
regress. For Groucho to come to believe that he is, e.g., 
angry on the basis of first observing that some 
unidentified self is angry and then concluding that he is 
identical with that self, it seems that he must already 
possess some identifying beliefs about which properties he 
currently possesses. If those identifying beliefs 
themselves resulted from identifying some self that 
possesses them as oneself, one would need still further 
identifying beliefs to identify oneself in that way. And
so on.10 Hence, Shoemaker concludes that the regress must 
end with certain psychological self-ascriptions that do not 
rely upon any self-identification whatsoever--and hence are 
IEM--or it must not end at all.
Shoemaker gives versions of this argument in 1968, 1986, 1996. 
He frames the argument in terms of self-knowledge instead of self­
belief, but in light of the previous chapter, the issue is independent 
of the epistemic statues of identifying beliefs.
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Indeed, self-misidentification seems to require that 
one self-ascribe properties that are IEM. Intuitively, any 
conclusion that Groucho draws regarding the identity of the 
"image" before him hinges upon his already possessing 
certain beliefs about himself. We can imagine him 
expressing the incorrect conclusion (in this case) that the 
"image" he sees before him is in fact his own as "I see 
myself in the mirror" or "That’s me." Roughly speaking, it 
appears that one must take certain beliefs about oneself 
for granted before one can identify or misidentify oneself 
in various ways. And Shoemaker gives us a way of 
understanding this appearance in terms of certain beliefs 
about one's psychological states and properties that can 
anchor an identification of a presented individual as 
oneself.
According to Shoemaker, then, Wittgenstein was indeed 
correct to hold that not all first-person self-ascriptions 
are unique with regard to identification. Since Shoemaker 
thinks that one's body is only contingently one's own,11 
the self-ascription of bodily properties is subject to 
misidentification. Those such as "I am raising my arm" 
rely upon other self-ascriptions such as "my body's arm 
goes up when I raise it." Self-identification at the
He says as much in his TLS review of Cassam (1997)
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psychological level cannot occur without pain of regress,
however. Accordingly, it makes no sense to ask oneself
"Someone is raising her arm, but is it I who is raising her
arm?" when one is conscious of someone's arm being raised,
for then one is conscious of oneself as raising one's arm.
Shoemaker concludes that awareness of oneself as an object
can play no role
in explaining my introspective knowledge 
that I am hungry, angry, or alarmed. This 
comes out in the fact that there is no 
possibility here of a misidentification; if 
I have my usual access to my hunger, there 
is no room for the thought "Someone is 
hungry all right, but is it me [sic]?"
(1996, p. 211).
It's important to note just what kind of question 
Shoemaker thinks is being asked. He argues that the 
regress must end with self-ascriptions based upon 
introspective awareness, and so the question should be 
filled out as "Someone is introspecting that he is hungry, 
but is it I?" Hence, the question does not seem to be a 
who question--one that can be answered by appeal to the 
battery of commonsense self-specifying beliefs as NP would 
have it. Instead, the question asks whether one can be 
mistaken as to whether oneself, whoever one is, is 
introspecting a particular mental state or property. If
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that question always makes sense, regress appears 
unavoidable.
S3. Evans: Proprioception, Bodily Sel£-Ascriptions, and
ZEN
Shoemaker takes the regress argument to show that at least 
some psychological self-ascriptions must be IEM. 
Accordingly, questions of the form "Someone is F, but is it 
I who is F" prove nonsensical only for certain 
psychological states and properties that one is aware of 
via introspection. Since it yields self-ascriptions that 
are IEM, introspection cannot be a form of perceptual 
awareness or awareness of oneself as an object. As a 
result, questions of body ownership can arise, and hence no 
self-ascriptions of bodily properties can be IEM.
Gareth Evans (1982) also believes that self- 
identification must give out before one's ability to self- 
ascribe certain properties on pain of regress. He agrees 
with Shoemaker that if one always self-ascribed properties 
with thoughts and assertions of the form the $ is F for any 
self-designating description <t>, we would fall into regress, 
one that precludes any explanation of how one comes to 
believe that oneself is F. A gap always remains, Evans 
argues, between grasping that the 0 is F and grasping that 
I am F, for no description <t> guarantees that in grasping
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that the $ is F one thereby realizes what one would express 
as "I am F" (1982, pp. 255-256). Hence, if one explained 
one's grasp that the <t> is F is a self-ascription in virtue 
of another description ^--that the ¥ is identical with the 
<t>, e.g.--one would then need to explain one's grasp that 'P 
is self-designating or describing. And so on.
Unlike Shoemaker, however, Evans bristles at the idea 
of explaining the peculiar features of nonaccidental self- 
ascriptions in Cartesian-friendly terms such as mental 
state self-intimation. If we do conclude that the class of 
nonaccidental self-ascriptions is exhausted by those based 
upon introspective self-awareness, we risk succumbing to 
the impression that "in thinking of oneself self­
consciously, one is paradigmatically thinking about oneself 
as the bearer of mental properties, or as a mind--so that 
our ’I ’-thoughts leave it open, as a possibility, that we 
are perhaps nothing but a mind" (p. 217, emphasis his).
Consequently, Evans contends that many nonaccidental 
self-ascriptions rest upon certain ways one has of gaining 
information about oneself as a physical thing located 
within the physical world. Self-ascriptions funded by 
information regarding the state of one's body and one's 
position in the world--when received in the normal way--are 
IEM. For, according to Evans, the theoretical necessity of
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IEM self-ascriptions demonstrates that particular sorts of 
information one receives about oneself impact one's self- 
ascriptions "directly and immediately" (1982, p. 224) .
That is, self-ascriptions are IEM because self-conscious 
thought demands that a subject "be disposed to have such 
thinking controlled by information which may become 
available to him in each of the relevant ways" (p. 216).
And one's nonaccidental self-ascriptions are also sensitive 
to information about one's body when gained in particular 
ways.12 Questions of the form "Someone has his legs 
crossed, but is it I?" will likewise be nonsensical in 
certain cases.
Evans believes that two types of information can give 
rise to bodily self-ascriptions that are IEM. The first he 
describes as "a general capacity to perceive our own 
bodies" from, as it were, the inside (1982, p. 220). This 
capacity consists of various monitoring systems such as 
somatic proprioception, one's sense of balance, kinesthetic 
feedback, etc. Such systems provide a stream of 
information regarding the state of one's body, the position
12 in direct contrast to Shoemaker, Evans holds that 
nonaccidental self-ascriptions are manifested in action (like the 
information Groucho used to recognize his mirror reflection), but not 
in terms of getting an object (one's body) to act. In his words, "I do 
not move myself; I myself move* (1982, p. 207).
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of limbs, skin and joint tension, vestibular feedback 
during motion, e t c . 13 Evans writes:
There just does not appear to be a gap 
between the subject's having information (or 
appearing to have information), in the 
appropriate way, that the property of being 
F is instantiated, and his having 
information (or appearing to have 
information) that he is F; for him to have, 
or to appear to have, the information that 
the property is instantiated just is for it
to appear to him that he is F. (p. 221)14
To receive proprioceptive information regarding limb 
position is to receive information regarding the position 
of one's own limbs. Hence, asking oneself "Someone's arm 
is raised, but is it I" does not make sense when the first 
clause expresses information gained about one’s body 
through proprioception.
This claim seems particularly vulnerable to 
innumerable counterexamples. We could imagine, for 
example, that another's arm is linked to one's 
somatosensory system in such a way that one receives 
feedback "from the inside" about its movement and position.
For a more extensive list of the informational systems that 
constitute somatic proprioception, see the general introduction to 
Bermudez, Marcel, and Eilan (1995), pp. 13-15. There they also 
distinguish between proprioceptive information and proprioceptive 
awareness. They characterize informational states as subpersonal and 
only states of awareness as representational in the way that interests 
us here. Accordingly, in talking of proprioception I mean 
representational states resulting from processing by the proprioceptive 
system.
14 Here Evans is using a bit of shorthand. When saying that a 
subject has information that "he is F" he means "he, himself is F."
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Isn't this a relatively compelling case in which it would 
make sense to ask "Someone is raising his arm, but is it
I  ? "
Evans anticipates this type of objection, and he 
believes that he can disarm it. Like Shoemaker, Evans 
frames IEM in terms of what one knows and the 
presuppositions for that knowledge. He claims that a 
subject who self-ascribes what she would express as "I am 
raising my arm" on the basis of information gained via a 
deviant somatosensory causal chain does not in fact possess 
knowledge about the position of any arm. IEM self- 
ascriptions of bodily properties rely upon the 
presupposition that the relevant information results from 
the normal functioning of one's senses. If that 
presupposition is violated, a subject who believes that her 
arm is raised has a false belief and hence does not know 
what she self-ascribes.
Interestingly, Evans does agree that error is 
possible. The question "Someone's arm is raised, but is it 
I?" does make sense if the subject is aware that she is 
connected to another's arm in a deviant way. The 
prevailing assumption in standard cases that the senses are 
functioning normally can indeed be called into question.
And if one is told that one's senses are not functioning
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normally, one cannot trust the information gained in that 
way. But even in deviant cases we imagine that one 
receives feedback, for example, as if one's own arm is 
raising. It does not show, argues Evans, that in the 
normal case one assumes that the subject reported on by 
proprioception is identical with oneself. It at most shows 
that finding oneself in the position of questioning whether 
in proprioceiving an arm raising it is one's own is to 
assume that one's senses are not functioning normally.
The second way of gaining information about oneself 
that funds bodily self-ascriptions that are IEM, according 
to Evans, "has an importance in our thought about ourselves 
which it is difficult to exaggerate" (p. 222). We seem 
able to locate ourselves in the world simply in virtue of 
perceiving the objects around us without also perceiving 
ourselves. To take one of Evans's examples, I can come to 
believe that I am in front of a house by merely perceiving 
a house (p. 232). Nothing more "on the side of awareness" 
is called for (p. 231).
Though apparently "we only have to be aware of some 
state of the world in order to be in a position to make an 
assertion about ourselves" (p. 231), Evans cautions that we 
should not be mislead, as Hume was, by this fact. My self- 
ascription that I am in front of a house based upon this
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form of perceptual awareness brings to bear my concept of
. . . is in front of a house. To possess that concept, my
abilities to apply it must accord with what Evans calls the
"Generality Constraint":
If we hold that the subject’s understanding 
of 'Fa' and his understanding of 'Gb' are 
structured, we are committed to the view 
that the subject will also be able to 
understand the sentences ’Fb' and 'Ga' . And 
we are committed, in addition, to holding 
that there is a common explanation for the 
subject's understanding of 'Fa' and 'Ga', 
and a common explanation for his 
understanding of 'Fa' and 'Fb'. (1982, p.
101)
The Generality Constraint imposes requirements of 
substitutivity on both the subject concept ('Idea' in 
Evans's terminology) and the predicate concept. The 
cognitive abilities required to token states with 
conceptual content themselves enable the tokener to 
decompose and to generate new contents based upon her 
conceptual lexicon. Generality dictates, for example, that 
if one can entertain the conceptualized thoughts that 
elephants are large and that airplanes are shiny, one will 
ipso facto be able to think that airplanes are large and 
that elephants are shiny. One will also be equipped to
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draw related generalizations and inferences regardless of 
the proximity of elephants and airplanes.̂
The applicability of the Generality Constraint to 
first-person self-ascriptions is rather straightforward.
To possess a concept of a particular property such as ... i s
i n  front of a house, I must be able to apply that concept to a
host of objects and individuals other than myself. If I 
also possess the concept of car, I can token the thought 
that I would express as "The car is in front of the house."
To grasp the concept is to understand that it applies to
physical things spatially located within the world, and to 
apply it to oneself is to grasp that oneself is also a 
substantial and persisting self. Hence, Evans writes:
No judgment will have the content of a 
psychological self-ascription, unless the 
judger can be regarded as ascribing to 
himself a property which he can conceive as 
being satisfied by a being not necessarily 
himself--a state of affairs which he will 
have to conceive as involving a persisting 
subject of experience. (p. 232)
The notion of an ascribing, perceiving subject is bound up 
with the idea of its being located within an objective, 
spatially ordered world.
15 See, e.g.. Hurley (1998).
16 Evans is here taking up Strawson's concerns regarding singular 
thought and the preconditions for thinking about objects.
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Since one's thoughts about oneself are also 
dispositionally sensitive to information of this type,
Evans argues that self-ascriptions based on this 
information are likewise IEM. As in the case of a deviant 
proprioceptive link, Evans contends that one cannot know 
the spatial location and orientation of an object when 
known about in this way without knowing which object one 
has knowledge of. If one was receiving information about 
the world from the normal operation of one's senses, then, 
for example, the question "Someone is in front of a house, 
but is it I?" is nonsensical. And if one has reason to 
think that one's senses are not functioning normally--that 
one's visual experiences are the result of powerful 
hallucinogens, e.g.--then error may be possible. But this 
again shows only that one has switched assumptions and not 
that one needs to identify some physical object located in 
front of a house as oneself in the normal case.
Moreover, if one did need to identify which object 
was in front of a house when one perceives only the house, 
Evans contends that it's no longer at all clear how one 
could ever make sense of one's being located somewhere in 
the world. His remarks as to why he thinks this are
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incomplete,I7 but perhaps we can make sense of his point as 
a regress worry similar to Shoemaker's. If perceptual 
awareness cannot provide information that settles the 
question of self-location and self-identification, what 
could? To bridge the gap between thinking that the thing 
located in such-and-such a place is F and thinking that I 
am F, I would need to identify myself as the thing located 
in such-and-such a place. To do that I would need to 
believe that I had properties in common with some 
particular physical thing located in a spatially extended 
world in virtue of which I could conclude that I am that 
thing. The only relevant properties I could share with 
some spatially located individual are spatially locating 
ones. Hence, it seems that if a subject had no capacity to 
self-ascribe properties that placed her within an objective 
spatial order in a way that was IEM, she could never locate 
herself within the world.
-̂7 John McDowell, the editor of Evans's Varieties of Reference, 
gestures towards Evans's reasoning for this conclusion in the appendix 
to Chapter 7, but it's obvious from his remarks that Evans had not
completely worked through this issue.
Evans might also frame this argument in terms of the concepts 
one must be able to grasp and to apply to oneself. That is, to grasp 
the concept of ... is i n  f r o n t  o f  a  h o u s e  I must be capable of applying it 
to objects possessing physical and spatial properties. To extend the
applicability of such a concept to myself, I would have to grasp that I
am a physical person like any other. But that is what grasping the 
concept was supposed to provide.
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Overall, then, the types of information that a 
subject's self-ascriptions are sensitive to combined with 
her conceptual repertoire require that at least certain 
self-ascriptions of bodily properties be IEM. As a result, 
Evans concludes that "[o]ur thoughts about ourselves are in 
no way hospitable to Cartesianism" since they involve both 
mental and physical aspects of oneself with equal intimacy, 
immediacy, and cognitive importance (p. 256). If every way 
of gaining information about oneself depended upon 
identification, no explanation of first-person self­
ascription, including self-locating beliefs, could be 
given.
Though Evans's view provides us with a powerful way 
to resist Cartesian temptations that can easily influence 
explanations of nonaccidental self-ascriptions, it is not 
without deep problems. First, Evans contends that self- 
specifying information derived from both proprioception and 
perception do not involve an identification assumption but 
rather an assumption that one’s senses are functioning 
normally. The obvious difficulty here is the threat of 
circularity. If by normal functioning Evans means that 
when working in that way the senses give rise to self- 
ascriptions that are IEM, he cannot, of course, explain IEM 
in terms of the normal functioning of the senses.
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Perhaps normal functioning and IEM need not be 
interdefined. We could instead understand "normal" as the 
senses functioning in a way that accords with their
evolutionary d e s i g n . 19 This response does disarm any 
immediate circularity in his construal of normal function. 
But avoiding circularity in this way simply passes it on. 
Evans would still need to motivate in a non-question- 
begging way the claim that the evolutionarily selected 
function of the senses is to provide self-conscious self- 
specifying information as opposed to information that in 
fact happens to be about oneself.
In any event, notice that even the deviant cases that 
Evans considers are not necessarily those in which one's 
senses fail to function normally. The abnormality lies not 
in the sensing but in the range of things sensed. Indeed 
for one to proprioceive the raising of another's arm one's 
proprioceptive sense must be functioning normally. (We 
shall return to this point below.) And as we saw in the 
previous chapter, Shoemaker holds that a false self- 
ascription can be IEM, and this makes intuitive sense. My 
false belief that I would express as "I hear a woodpecker 
in the distance" seems no less direct and immediate "from 
the inside" than if I had actually heard a woodpecker
I thank Michael Levin for pressing this point.
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instead of gunshots. Given his strong reliance upon 
epistemological conditions, however, Evans cannot agree. 
Hence, claiming that one cannot possess knowledge of any 
individual when receiving sensory information in abnormal
conditions risks misplacing the phenomenon.20
Perhaps more importantly, Evans characterizes
nonaccidental self-ascriptions in terms of their
dispositional sensitivity to certain forms of information
about oneself. However, a dispositional account of self-
ascription seems ill-suited to explain occurrent thoughts
about oneself. For if a subject lacked the relevant sort
of information, she should be unable to ascribe properties
to herself in the relevant way.
Consider the following thought experiment given by
Anscombe (197 5) :
And now imagine that I get into a state of 
'sensory deprivation'. Sight is cut off, 
and I am locally anaesthetized everywhere, 
perhaps floating in a tank of tepid water; I 
am unable to speak, or to touch any part of 
my body with another. Now I tell myself, "I 
won't let this happen again!" If the object 
I meant by 'I' is this body, this human 
being, then in these circumstances it won’t 
be present to my senses; and how else can it 
be 'present to' me? But have I lost what I 
mean by 'I'? Is that not present to me? Am 
I reduced to, as it were, 'referring in
20 pryor (1999) makes a similar point regarding Evans's treatment 
of quasi-memory. That is, his claim that one does not have knowledge 
in such cases seems unmotivated.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 6 0
absence'? I have not lost my 'self- 
consciousness '; nor can what I mean by 'I' 
be an object no longer present to me. (p.
152)
Though Evans agrees with Anscombe that a sensory-deprived 
subject would still be able to self-ascribe properties 
nonaccidentally, he believes that a subject need not have 
any occurrent information about herself to know which 
object she is dispositionally related to. It is enough 
that the subject is still dispositionally related to one 
object and one object alone. Her thoughts about herself 
would indeed be controlled by sensory and bodily awareness 
were there any.21
In Anscombe's case, however, one's senses are ex 
hypothesi functioning normally, but one receives no sensory 
information at all. Far from being a outlandish 
philosophical fantasy, sensory deprivation tanks are now 
available for home purchase.22 If one's limbs are not 
allowed to touch, it is reasonable to assume that one will 
not be able to specify their location. Assuming also that 
one is well-fed, not suffering internal injury before
21 Indeed, Evans explicitly offers (p. 216 n21) that 
characterizing one's ability to think about oneself in terms of the 
dispositional sensitivity of one's nonaccidental self-ascriptions to 
sensory information circumvents Anscombe's argument.
22 a  simple search of the World Wide Web will fetch a host of 
links to manufacturers. My favorite is the cleverly named "Think Tank 
International," available on line at http://www.thinktank.com.sg/.
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stepping into the tank, etc., somatic proprioception will 
be of little use in locating oneself. And if one can 
nonaccidentally self-ascribe properties without being able 
to locate oneself at a particular moment, no source of 
sensory information is necessary for one to think about 
oneself in the relevant way.
Hence, it's not clear how merely possessing a 
disposition to have one's thinking controlled by the 
relevant information can bear the necessary philosophical 
weight. After all, how can a dormant disposition serve to 
ground occurrent first-person thought? How can we be 
assured that one has not lost track of the physical object 
that is in fact oneself? Hence, if one cannot succeed in 
locating oneself spatially yet one can still 
unproblematically think the thought that one would express 
as "I won't let this happen again,” then a dispositional 
view like Evans's cannot be c o r r e c t . 23
Evans risks begging another q u e s t i o n . 24 He claims 
that our conception of ourselves as spatially located
23 O'Brien 1995 has a detailed and fairly clear statement of this 
objection to Evans.
24 Jerry Fodor (2003) makes a similar claim of circularity in 
explaining concept possession in terms of what one knows about what 
falls under its extension or what inferences it participates in. A 
related circularity objection haunts what Evans calls Russell's 
Principle, or the principle that for one to think of an object one must 
have a "discriminating conception of that object--a conception which 
would enable the subject to distinguish that object from all other
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persisting selves falls out of the fact that our thoughts 
about ourselves conform to the Generality Constraint. But 
it's difficult to see how merely grasping the concept of 
... is in f r o n t of a h o u s e and its combinability with the 
subject concepts one possesses entails that one can 
properly apply it to oneself. One would need the further 
belief that one is the kind of thing that can be in front 
of a house--viz., a physical thing that can be spatially 
located. If a subject must know what falls under a 
concept's extension to possess it, then Generality ceases 
to be explanatory. For if possessing a concept with 
implications for self-location demands that one know what 
falls under its extension, then one would already have to 
know that one is a persisting, spatially located thing 
before one could apply it to oneself in a way that was not 
arbitrary.
S4. Bermudez: Nonconceptual Bodily Self-Ascriptions and
IBM
Evans's attempt to argue that certain self-ascriptions of
bodily properties must also be IEM proves well motivated in
its flight from Cartesianism, but it also proves decisively
things" (p. 65). Whereas the Generality Constraint enjoys fairly wide 
acceptance, many have taken issue with Russell's Principle for reasons 
irrelevant to our present concerns. One could perhaps loosen that 
restriction on self-thought while remaining faithful to Evans's general 
position. Bermudez's approach to be discussed later could be viewed in 
this way.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 6 3
fraught with difficulties. But he is not alone in thinking 
that certain self-ascriptions of bodily properties are like 
certain psychological self-ascriptions in the types of 
error they are subject to and immune from.
In The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Jose Luis 
Bermudez follows Evans in pursuing the conclusion that 
certain bodily self-ascriptions are IEM. His strategy 
differs from that adopted by Evans, however, in that he 
tries to motivate the theoretical necessity of states with 
nonconceptual content that are IEM and therefore count as 
nonaccidental self-ascriptions of a sort. This approach 
has many benefits. It avoids, at least prima facie, 
begging questions concerning concept possession. In 
addition, Bermudez does not give a dispositional account of 
nonaccidental self-ascription, which also avoids objections 
raised against such views in the previous section.
Moreover, extending the range of types or forms of content 
that can be correctly characterized as genuinely 
nonaccidental offers a way of dispelling the mystery of how 
human psychology eventually comes to be shot through with 
the richer, conceptual forms of self-consciousness 
exemplified in the nonaccidental self-ascriptions of 
various properties.
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For this strategy to succeed, however, Bermudez must 
provide plausible criteria that a state with nonconceptual 
content must satisfy to be considered nonaccidental. Thus 
far we have focused on various attempts to explain the 
uniqueness of nonaccidental self-ascriptions in terms of 
their immunity to a certain sort of error. Accordingly, if 
we hold both conceptual and nonconceptual states to the 
same theoretical standards, the challenge lies in extending 
the applicability of IEM to states with nonconceptual 
content where talk of error is not yet clear. We now turn 
to Bermudez's attempt to do just that.
Elucidating exactly what nonconceptual content in 
general amounts to is a difficult task. Bermudez himself 
believes that establishing the existence of states with 
autonomous nonconceptual content disarms the circularity in 
a certain explanation of nonaccidental first-person 
thought, one he terms the paradox of s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s .25 
This paradox roughly amounts to the circularity that 
results from analyzing self-consciousness solely in terms 
of a subject's mastery of the first-person pronoun. Such 
mastery requires that a subject know--or at least believe--
25 By self-consciousness Bermudez means possessing states with 
nonaccidental first-person content, or content that is both IEM and has 
immediate implications for action. I will use 'self-consciousness' and 
'nonaccidental first-person thought', and 'nonaccidental self- 
ascriptions' interchangeably when discussing his work.
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that she, herself is the tokener of the speech act. But 
spelling out what it is for a subject to believe that "she, 
herself" is such-and-such involves reference to the type of 
thought that we want to explain.
It’s not clear, however, that Bermudez's concern 
achieves the status of paradox. And circularity doesn’t 
seem inevitable. Perhaps a better way of casting the 
problem--as we have done throughout--is in terms of how 
nonaccidental self-ascriptions, whether in thought or in 
language, differ from their accidental correlates. This in 
effect denies that we have two disparate things--first- 
person thoughts and their expressions--that can be 
viciously interdefined.26
Nevertheless, attributing nonconceptual 
representational states to creatures lacking linguistic 
abilities makes sound theoretical sense. Certain 
intentional systems--including non-linguistic animals and 
pre-linguistic infants--arguably lack concepts. Still, 
Bermudez contends that plausible explanations of the 
behavior of any intentional system require ascribing 
representational states to it because no law-like relation 
holds between its sensory input and behavioral output.
26 Bermudez no doubt formulates his problem in the way he does 
because of his beliefs about the possession conditions for concepts.
We will come to this a bit further below.
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Differences in behavior in the face of the same sensory 
input indicate that a creature's behavior is a function of 
a complex group of states, some of which differ from those 
present on a previous occasion (a past predator can become 
prey, e.g.), or perhaps misrepresent a current state of the 
world or its body.
Proponents of nonconceptual content also like to draw 
attention to the richness of perceptual e x p e r i e n c e .27 one 
seems able to represent more properties than one can 
describe, and this suggests that the range of one's 
representational states exceeds one's conceptual
repertoire.28 i can discriminate two subtly differing 
shades of green when seeing them side by side yet fail to 
distinguish them when they are presented in succession.
And my thoughts about either shade are severely limited in 
their absence. My perceptual experiences represent the two 
colors, but those representations cannot support inferences 
or participate in contents in the absence of the properties 
represented.
Broadly speaking, any state that supports generality 
will be conceptual. Accordingly, states with nonconceptual
27 See, e.g., Peacocke’s argument that "an experience is not 
restricted in its range of possible contents to those points or ranges 
picked out by concepts ... possessed by the perceiver" (1992, p. 68).
2® This is not universally accepted, however. See McDowell 
(1994) .
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content, though representational, must then be 
holophrastic, lacking the necessary structural features to 
make them productive and systematic in a way that respects 
the Generality Constraint. Could such states qualify as 
primitive forms of self-consciousness? Bermudez suggests 
that to be considered forms of primitive self- 
consciousness, they must meet the requirements for any 
representational state to be self-conscious--namely, they 
must have immediate implications for action, and they must 
be nonaccidentally about oneself (1998, pp. 147-148). 
Skipping the former for present purposes, thoughts are 
nonaccidentally about oneself, Bermudez and many others 
argue, because they are IEM.
Like Evans, Bermudez characterizes IEM in terms of
the various ways creatures have of obtaining information
about themselves. Unlike Evans, however, he agrees that
talk of knowledge per se is ill-suited to capture the
special status of nonaccidental self-ascriptions that
Shoemaker intends to regiment. He writes:
The category of first-person contents being 
picked out is not defined by its subject 
matter or by any points of grammar. What 
demarcates the class of judgments and 
beliefs that are immune to error through 
misidentification is the evidence base from 
which they are derived, or the information 
on which they are based.... (p. 6)
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What matters is the connection between particular evidence 
bases that serve as sources of self-awareness and the 
representational states that those sources support. Not 
all evidence bases support states that are IEM, and not all 
contents that are so immune are true.
Bermudez offers a fairly straightforward argument in
favor of nonconceptual contents that are IEM resulting from
information obtained about the state of one's body via
certain sensory channels. Once again, consider states
resulting from somatic proprioception. These are
representational states because they, like any other
representational state, are causally sensitive to sensory
input and mediate behavioral output. Moreover, somatic
proprioception does seem to provide the right kind of
evidence base, for it apparently "cannot give rise to
thoughts that are accidentally about oneself" (1998, p.
148). Bermudez continues:
One of the distinctive features of somatic 
proprioception is that it is subserved by 
information channels that do not yield 
information about anybody's bodily 
properties except my own (just as 
introspection does not yield information 
about anybody's psychological properties 
except my own). It follows from the simple 
fact that I somatically proprioceive 
particular bodily properties and introspect 
particular psychological properties that 
those bodily and psychological properties 
are my own. (1998, p. 149)
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I cannot somatically proprioceive that someone's legs are 
crossed, for example, without thereby proprioceiving that 
my legs are crossed. And since somatic proprioception is 
an evidence base for contents where the identification of 
the subject cannot be in doubt--even for creatures lacking 
any conceptual resources whatsoever--Bermudez concludes 
that nonconceptual states of proprioceptive awareness are 
IEM.
Focusing just on the particular bodily properties 
reported on by proprioception, what are we to make of the 
claim that one cannot be mistaken about which body 
instantiates certain properties when one is aware of them 
via proprioception? This question is related to another.
To qualify as representational--that is, to be considered 
contents at all--proprioceptive states must allow for the 
possibility of misrepresentation. Accordingly, we should 
consider how can nonconceptual states funded by 
proprioception misrepresent.
States with conceptual content can, roughly speaking, 
"who" or "what" misrepresent--they can misrepresent the 
subject of the state ("who") or the presence of a property 
("what"), or presumably both.29 a state that is IEM
I limit the discussion to singular thoughts to avoid 
peripheral complications. Relations can also be misrepresented as can
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cannot, obviously, who-misrepresent. Misidentification 
involves misrepresenting the subject of a state, and 
immunity as Shoemaker and Bermudez imagine it can be 
thought of as a guarantee against self-representational 
accidents. As we saw above, however, predicative accidents 
can still occur, which means that such states can 
nevertheless what-misrepresent. When I express my false 
belief that I have heard a woodpecker in the distance, I 
nevertheless succeed in representing myself as the subject 
of the belief and apparently could not fail to do so. And 
since states with conceptual content can both misrepresent 
and be IEM, no questions arise as to their representational 
status.
Immunity for nonconceptual contents comes at a high 
price, however. For a state to be representational and IEM 
it must be possible for it to what-misrepresent without 
who-misrepresenting. To have what- without who- 
misrepresentation requires the subject to token a state 
that successfully represents that subject but erroneously 
ascribes a property to it. States with conceptual content 
have an internal structure that permits subject and 
property representations to succeed and to fail
the objects related. However, given our preoccupation with immunity to 
error through misidentification, our primary interest lies in the 
possibilities for subject misrepresentation.
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independently. But states with nonconceptual content lack 
the internal structure requisite for a distinction between 
what-misrepresentation and who-misrepresentation. For 
these states to misrepresent at all simply is for them to 
misidentify. And denying that nonconceptual states can 
who-misrepresent thus amounts to denying that 
representational errors of any sort are possible. Hence, 
endorsing immunity to error through misidentification at 
this primitive level precludes misrepresentation, which 
apparently serves to disqualify proprioceptive states--or 
any nonconceptual states purportedly so immune--from being 
representational.
Unlike those who discuss IEM judgments, it is not at 
all clear that proponents of nonaccidental nonconceptual 
content have the philosophical machinery to relieve this 
tension. Evans, for example, does not fall into a similar 
predicament, for his nonaccidental bodily self-ascriptions 
possess a conceptual structure that localizes--as 
Shoemaker's condition in its long form indicates--the 
immunity to error through misidentification relative to the 
first person pronoun. Misrepresentation can still occur 
with regard to the predicate position, e.g. where the body 
is, and hence immunity to misidentification and 
misrepresentation can co-exist in the same thought or
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judgment. Creatures lacking conceptual resources, in 
contrast, do not have the first-person pronoun or its 
mental analogue at their disposal. Without conceptually 
structured thoughts, it seems that these types of subjects 
cannot possess contents that are both representational and 
immune to error through misidentification, for they have 
nothing that that immunity could be relative to.
Or do they? Bermudez argues that "protobeliefs", or 
nonconceptual belief analogs, may be ascribed to non­
language-using creatures whose behavior requires 
intentional explanations (1998, pp. 117-119). As he 
presents them, perceptual protobeliefs^O are nearly as rich 
as their conceptual correlates. They can embody 
"nonextensional modes of presentation" in terms of 
Gibsonian affordances, or the directly perceived 
possibilities for action and reaction afforded an organism 
by its environment, such as a location's potential for 
shelter or nourishment (pp. 121-122). And protobeliefs are 
somewhat compositional, though they do not allow for the 
global recombinability necessary to satisfy the Generality 
Constraint (p. 93). So structured, perceptual protobeliefs 
support primitive inference and the limited generation of
Bermudez also briefly discusses instrumental protobeliefs (p. 
118), but our discussion can safely ignore them. Bermudez draws this 
bit of his theoretical apparatus from Peacocke (1992).
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further new nonconceptual contents from a set of others. 
Accordingly, perceptual protobeliefs so construed-- 
including contents based on somatic proprioception--seem 
capable of supporting something like a discrete subject 
representation that could serve as the locus of IEM as well 
as a predicative component that could misrepresent a 
property of the world or body.
One certainly becomes puzzled at this point, however. 
If nonconceptual contents based upon somatic proprioception 
can support both a component immune to misidentification 
and a component vulnerable to misrepresentation, then what 
are we to make of the original motivation for maintaining a 
clear conceptual/nonconceptual distinction with regard to 
contents? Indeed, it seems warranted to think of the 
constituents of protobeliefs as "protoconcepts". Much like 
concepts, protoconcepts could be defined in terms of their 
inferential role, in terms of the protopropositions or 
protobeliefs in which it participates. As the analogy 
deepens between concepts and protoconcepts, we have reason 
to conclude that creatures lacking language do possess 
conceptual abilities of some sort, however limited or 
nascent.
Bermudez himself would no doubt resist this approach 
since it seems to run afoul of what he calls the the
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Priority Principle, or the principle that conceptual 
abilities require linguistic abilities. Priority was 
initially important because it "allows us to make a very 
clear distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual 
modes of content-bearing representation" (1998, p. 43), and 
hence provides us with a means of explaining, for example, 
how conceptual forms of self-consciousness can arise over 
the course of normal human psychological maturation. Yet, 
given that protobeliefs are in some measure compositional 
and fund limited inference--indeed are constituted by 
protoconcepts--it is no longer clear how we can maintain a 
sharp distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual 
contents. And the distinction quickly loses its 
explanatory force.
Still, perhaps the protoconcept/concept analogy runs
fairly shallow, for even if non-language-using creatures
possessed a range of protoconcepts defined in terms of
protoconceptual roles, they do not have an explicit grasp
of these roles. Such creatures are instead merely
sensitive to the truth of inferential transitions.
Bermudez writes:
Certainly, it is possible to be justified 
(or warranted) in making a certain 
inferential transition without being able to 
provide a justification (or warrant) for 
that inferential transition. It is a
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familiar epistemological point, after all, 
that there is a difference between being 
justified in holding a belief and justifying 
that belief. What does not seem to be true 
is that one can be justified in making an 
inferential transition even if one is not 
capable of providing any justifications at 
all for any inferential transitions. But 
providing justifications is a 
paradigmatically linguistic activity.
Providing justifications is a matter of 
identifying and articulating the reasons for 
a given classification, inference, or 
judgment. It is because prelinguistic 
creatures are in principle incapable of 
providing such justifications that the 
priority thesis is true. Mere sensitivity 
to the truth of inferential transitions 
involving a given concept is not enough for 
possession of that concept. Rational 
sensitivity is required, and rational 
sensitivity comes only with language mastery 
(p. 71).
For Bermudez, then, concept possession is a fairly advanced 
skill based upon an ability to identify and to provide 
reasons for beliefs, and limited inferential ability--even 
an ability to make inferences that one is justified in
making--does not indicate concept possession.31
This seems a bit too stringent, however. Being able 
to give reasons as reasons is a function of possessing the 
concepts of justification, belief, and reason, among 
others. Imposing the further requirement on inferential 
ability that one recognize that one is in fact giving
Hurley (1998) and Peacocke (1992) accept similar strong 
normative and epistemological constraints on concept possession and 
deployment.
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reasons may disqualify attributing conceptual abilities 
where we normally would be comfortable doing so.32 To take 
an example Bermudez himself gives (p. 70), the children in 
Susan Carey's experiments who concluded that a worm was 
more likely to have a spleen than a toy mechanical monkey 
are probably not in position to identify their reasons for 
this conclusion as reasons and to provide justification for 
their inferences as justification. Still, he wants to 
credit these 4-year olds with possessing the concepts human 
b e i n g, living an i m a l, internal organs, and the inferential 
relations between them.
We thus arrive at the conclusion that for a state to 
be IEM as well as representational it must consist of 
conceptually structured content. The structural features 
of a state that bring it into line with the Generality 
Constraint also underwrite its ability to be about oneself 
in a way that is IEM. Accordingly, states with 
nonconceptual content cannot satisfy this condition, 
regardless of evidence base. For a nonconceptual state to 
be IEM is for it to be totally immune to representational
32 Circularity no doubt also arises here as it did for Evans. 
The more a subject has to know about what falls under a concept's 
extension in order to possess it, the closer one comes to begging 
questions about possession conditions and what cognitive implications 
concept possession requires.
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error. With no possibility of misrepresentation, however, 
such states cannot be considered representational at all.
S5. Errors of Bodily Identification
In the previous two sections we considered arguments in 
favor of the view that certain bodily self-ascriptions are 
also IEM. The proposals put forward by both Evans and 
Bermudez run into largely internal theoretical 
difficulties. In the next section, I want to consider some 
empirical work that suggests in a more general way that 
misidentification remains a possibility when ascribing 
bodily properties, including limb possession. This work, 
taken together with the results of the previous two 
sections, indicates that bodily self-ascriptions cannot be 
IEM--even when one's senses are functioning normally.
Recall that in discussing Evans we considered a 
thought experiment in which one could be connected to 
another's limb via a deviant causal chain in such a way 
that one’s proprioceptive information could not be trusted.
However, such cases actually do seem to a r i s e . 33 Oliver 
Sacks (1985) famously tells of a patient who threw himself 
out of bed after failing to recognize that the leg he
The recent movie Being John Malkovic cleverly employed this 
possibility of body switching to great dramatic and comic effect.
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encountered under his covers was his own. As Sacks 
recounts it, the man found, "as he put it, 'someone's leg’ 
in the bed--a severed human leg, a horrible thing!" 
Concluding that the nurses had played a macabre joke on 
him, he attempted to throw it out of bed. But, "when he 
threw it out of bed, he somehow came after it--and now it 
was attached to him." When told that the mysterious leg 
was his own, the patient was dumbfounded. Assuring Sacks 
that he wasn't kidding, he confessed that "a man should 
know his own body, what's his and what's not--but this leg, 
this thing ... doesn't feel right, doesn't feel real--and 
it doesn't look part of me” (pp. 53-54, emphasis in 
original). One could, it seems, find oneself in the 
awkward position of needing to identify which limb or even 
which body was indeed one’s own.
Evans could object, of course, that Sacks's patient 
suffered from a rather extreme form of abnormal sensory 
function; hence, it provides little insight into the normal 
case of bodily self-ascription. Perhaps, but 
misidentification of limbs appears possible even with 
"normal" subjects. One receives information about one’s 
body from several modalities, including proprioception, 
touch, and vision. Misidentification of one’s limbs can 
apparently result when separate modalities deliver
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conflicting self-specifying information. Botvinick and 
Cohen (1998), for example, found that normal subjects could 
be made to experience tactile sensations as within an 
artificial limb. Subjects were seated at a table with 
their left arm visually obscured by a screen. A lifelike 
rubber arm and hand was then placed directly in front of 
subjects, and they were asked to fix their eyes on the 
artificial hand. Botvinick and Cohen then stroked the 
artificial hand and the subjects' actual hidden hand as 
simultaneously as possible for approximately ten minutes.
Subjects' responses to an open-ended questionnaire 
about their experience were quite interesting. Subjects 
reported experiencing the feel of the brush on the 
artificial hand "as if the rubber hand had sensed the 
touch" (p. 756). In a follow up test, subjects were 
subjected to an identical artificial-hand condition as 
before. This time, both prior to and following stimulation 
with the brush, subjects were asked to close their eyes and 
draw their right index finger along an edge beneath the 
examination table until they believed it was directly below 
the index finger of their left hand. Botvinick and Cohen 
found that subjects who had reported experiencing the 
illusion tended to be off in their judgments of finger 
alignment rightward towards the artificial hand, with "the
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magnitude of this displacement varying significantly in 
proportion to the reported duration of the illusion" (p.
756) .
How are we to explain this strange reaction to the 
artificial limb? Botvinick and Cohen conclude that 
"intermodal matching can be sufficient for self- 
attribution" (p. 756). That is, subjects experienced the 
tickling sensation as within the rubber arm due to a 
correlation between proprioceptive and tactile information 
from the brush stroke on their actual hand and visual 
information of the activity performed on the artificial 
hand. In usual circumstances, correlations holding between 
visual, tactile, and proprioceptive stimulation suffice to 
locate experiences and to fund accurate self-ascriptions of 
limb ownership. Unsurprisingly, those subjects in control 
groups who received brush stimulation on their hidden arm 
that did not correlate temporally with visual input 
regarding the artificial arm reported only minor experience 
of the illusion and did not show reach displacement towards 
the rubber hand.
Similar results were obtained in a study conducted by 
van den Bos and Jeannerod (2002) in which the goal was to 
discover how the visual position of one's hand influenced 
one's recognition of it. Each of their subjects was seated
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opposite an experimenter, and both subject and experimenter 
extended their right hand in a loose fist. The subject’s 
hand was obscured by an LCD screen that displayed the two 
hands in one of four rotations. A subject's hand could 
appear in its normal position at the bottom of the screen 
(0s); at the right of the screen (-90a); at the left of the 
screen (90s); or opposite them at the top of the screen 
(180a). The subject then responded to instructions 
appearing at the bottom of the screen directing her to 
extend her index finger, her thumb, or do nothing at all. 
When the subject was instructed to extend a digit, the 
experimenter either performed the same movement or its 
alternative. She was then asked whether the arrow on the 
screen pointed to the position where her hand had been.
Movement also mattered to successful recognition. 
Subjects misidentified the experiment's hand as their own 
with significant frequency when both made the same movement 
(either thumb-thumb or finger-finger). And correct 
attributions of ownership were most difficult for subjects 
in the no movement condition. This is to be expected--both 
the subject and the experimenter wore identical gloves, and 
the subject had no other information upon which to base an 
identification besides visual position.
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Visual position also played a role in limb 
recognition. Subjects successfully identified their hands 
most often when they were presented at 0a rotation or how 
they would normally appear. Trials involving 90® rotation 
precipitated slightly more errors than -90® trials, but 
mistakes of attribution were most common in the 180® 
rotation condition. As we might expect, error rates did 
not differ significantly in the different movement 
conditions regardless of rotation. When subject and 
experimenter made the same movement, however, the 180® 
rotation condition resulted in the highest number of 
attribution errors. Interestingly, subjects tended to err 
on the side of self-attribution, attributing the 
experimenter's hand to themselves more often than vice 
versa.
Like Botvinick and Cohen, van den Bos and Jeannerod 
account for their data in terms of the perceptual cues a 
subject has available to her to recognize a limb as her 
own. In Botvinick and Cohen, subjects could appeal to 
correlations between tactile and visual stimuli to 
determine limb ownership. In van den Bos and Jeannerod, 
subjects (depending upon the case) apparently relied upon 
correlations between proprioceptive and visual stimuli.
Just as in the previous study, their data suggest that
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subjects base attributions of limb ownership on cross-modal 
correlations. These correlations are no doubt powerful 
tools of self-recognition--when subjects' movements 
differed from the experimenters, they rarely erred in their 
limb attributions regardless of rotation. Nevertheless, 
these tools do not guarantee successful limb attribution in 
all cases.
Studies such as these strongly suggest that even when 
one's senses--both interoceptive and exteroceptive--are 
functioning normally, bodily misidentification remains a 
possibility. We're obviously quite sensitive to 
correlations between proprioceptive, visual, and tactile
stimuli.34 still, information from these sources does 
apparently leave room for mistakes of limb ownership, 
especially when separate modalities support conflicting 
ownership attributions. Self-ascriptions of bodily 
properties based on the kind of information singled out by 
Evans and Bermudez--including ascriptions of limb 
ownership--are not, therefore, IEM.
34 And sensitive to it at quite an early age. Work by Bahrick 
and Watson (1985) suggests that infants as young as five months are 
sensitive to correlations between their own bodily motion and its 
visible consequences. See also Bahrick, Moss, and Fadil (1996).
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S6. NP and Bodily Self-Aacriptiona: The Body Image
The work by Botvinick and Cohen and van den Bos and 
Jeannerod suggest that normal subjects can indeed 
misidentify which limb is their own when sensory 
information from different modalities conflicts or 
underdetermines ownership. But perhaps the most 
interesting result was that subjects who misidentified a 
rubber hand or the hand of an experimenter as their own did 
not incorrectly guess which limb was theirs. Subjects did 
not report feeling a sensation in some limb or other and 
then conclude on the basis of visual information that the 
rubber limb was the limb in which the stimulation was 
sensed. Instead, eight out of ten participants in the 
Botvinick and Cohen study who reported experiencing the 
stimuli in the artificial hand, for example, also reported 
"experiencing the rubber hand as belonging to themselves"
(p. 756, emphasis added). They offered such comments as "I 
found myself looking at the dummy hand thinking it was 
actually my own" (p. 756).
Subjects were compelled to view it as their own 
despite their awareness that the limb they saw being 
stroked was in fact artificial. As Descartes himself 
observes:
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Nature also teaches me, by these sensations 
of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I am 
not merely present in my body as a sailor is 
present in a ship, but that I am very 
closely joined and, as it were, intermingled 
with it, so that I and the body form a unit.
(1984, p. 56)
We cannot, therefore, rest content with the conclusion that 
bodily self-ascriptions are not IEM. We still must explain 
why they seem nonaccidental to the ascribing subject even 
when they go awry.
We can find the basis for such an explanation by 
looking more closely at the conditions which lead to 
ownership judgments. Interestingly, subjects did not 
report outlandish ownership experiences. Again, in 
Botvinick and Cohen, no subjects agreed with the 
description "It seemed as if I might have more than one 
left hand or arm" (p. 756). And in replicating the 
Botvinick and Cohen study, Pavani, Spence, and Driver 
(2000) obtained similar ownership experiences only when a 
subject saw the artificial hands aligned with her body as 
her own arms normally would be. When the hands were 
visually incompatible with her normal body orientation-- 
when the subject could see where the surrogate limbs ended 
opposite the fingers, e.g.--her feeling of limb ownership 
dissipated despite receiving identical stimuli. Fame et 
al. (2000) report quite similar results. The sense of
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ownership a subject felt towards an artificial limb seemed 
to be "tightly bound to the spatial orientation of the 
rubber hand" as indicated by vision (p. 2358).35 instead 
of experiencing their arms as floating in space or as out 
of alignment with their body, subjects no longer 
experienced a sense of ownership towards the artificial 
limbs at all.
Larger scale ownership effects also seem possible 
under certain conditions. Cole et al (2000) describe an 
interesting experience had by those (both normal and 
impaired) who directed a robot at Johnson Space Center in 
Houston. Users control the robot's arms via sensors placed 
along their own limbs that convey their movement and 
position, and they also wear a helmet that provides video 
feedback from cameras situated in the robot's "head". Once 
acclimated to the set up, users report being "in" the 
robot, so much so that one of the article's authors worried 
that if he dropped a wrench held in the robot hand it would 
land on his leg. He felt as if the robot arms were located
35 as with Botvinick and Cohen, subjects of Fame et al. were 
aware that they were seeing artificial limbs. They write: "... it is
important to emphasize that, in our study, the visually compatible and 
incompatible arrangements of the rubber hand were both completely 
incongruent with respect to the real position of the patient's right 
hand. In both cases, this hand was located behind the patient's back" 
(p. 2358).
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directly above his legs where his arms normally would be 
found.3 6
These studies suggest that a subject's sense of body 
and limb ownership depends heavily upon correlations and 
contingencies between various sensory modalities, primarily 
touch, proprioception, and vision. But they further 
suggest that the sense of body ownership relies in large 
part upon one's beliefs about body organization, including 
normal limb distribution. Together, they form what Fame 
et al. call a "peripersonal space" or what other 
psychologists and philosophers have called a "body
image."37 As commonly defined by psychologists, one’s body 
image is "a mental construct or representation, or a set of 
beliefs about the body" (Gallagher 1995, p. 226). This 
image includes one's conscious perceptual experience of 
one's body, one's conceptual understanding of bodies in 
general (including accepted folk psychological and
36 in "Where Am I?" Dennett (1981) offers a similar thought 
experiment in which his brain is removed (and backed up by computer) 
and his body becomes, as it were, the robot. He devises the experiment 
in which his personhood is sufficiently dispersed to call into question 
intuitions about the source of one's sense of self and the sense that 
one is a single unified self. Though we should note that even Dennett 
himself acknowledges that his scenario tests the bounds of 
believability.
37 Body image shouldn't be confused with the related by different 
notion of body schema. The term "body schema" is usually the name 
given to a set of subpersonal processes that regulate body posture and 
movement.
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scientific conceptions), and one's emotional stance towards 
one's body.3 8
We experience bodily sensations such as itches, 
tickles, and pains as located, but the experienced location 
is sensitive to our beliefs about how our limbs are 
normally distributed. Subjects who participated in the 
Botvinick and Cohen study experienced the tickling 
sensation of the brush--they experienced themselves being 
tickled--but under certain conditions they experienced 
their sensations as immediate and directly in the 
artificial limb. They did not report first experiencing a 
disembodied or ambiguously located tickling followed by an
attempt to locate it.39 The experience of oneself being 
tickled and being tickled in a particular location seems 
intimately tied, and the experienced location is sensitive 
to our beliefs about how our bodies are organized in terms 
of their continuity and their spatial distribution.
NP provides an explanation of this remarkable 
empirical data. Self-ascriptions of bodily properties and 
of limb ownership are subject to errors of
3® I have the sense that the body image notion as it is used in 
the literature is a relatively loose one. It's most often invoked in 
discussions of eating disorders such as anorexia nervosa to explain the 
difference between how one's body looks to one's owner (fat) and how it 
actually is (emaciated).
39 Cf. Brewer (1995).
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misidentification, but even when one misattributes a limb 
to oneself one experiences the limb as one's own in virtue 
of experiencing a sensation immediately and directly in it. 
No doubt our self-ascriptions of properties and limb 
ownership based upon tactile stimuli, proprioception, and 
vision are largely correct. If not, the correlations and 
contingencies between various sensory modalities could not 
give rise to a fairly stable body image and a strong sense 
of body ownership. But since such self-ascriptions rely 
upon a body image composed largely of a battery of self- 
specifying beliefs, no doubt the body image can involve 
conflicts and falsehoods. We believe that our arms project 
from our shoulders in a certain way, and we discount any 
limb that looks otherwise.
At first blush results from the van den Bos and 
Jeannerod study seem at odds with the explanation just 
given. After all, subjects were able to identify which 
hand was theirs in all rotations when they were asked to 
move either their finger or their thumb and that movement 
differed from the experimenter's. Even when their hands 
appeared perpendicular to--and detached from--their bodies, 
subjects had little difficulty indicating which hand was 
theirs. If attributions of limb ownership were dependent 
upon a body image in which one' s hands and arms are
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connected to one's shoulders, why shouldn't errors arise 
more often in this condition?
This incongruity with NP is only apparent, however. 
First, given the ubiquity of television, movies, and home 
video cameras, the subjects who participated in the study 
were no doubt familiar with video images of themselves and 
how those images can appear disconnected temporally and 
spatially from their physical bodies. More importantly, 
though, errors in ownership attribution increased 
significantly when subjects and the experimenter made the 
same movement. Moreover, in the same movement condition, 
the degree of rotation did matter for error frequency. 
Mistakes were made most often when the subject's hand was 
rotated 180°, which means that the experimenter's hand was 
displayed at 0’ or where the subject's hand would normally 
be. This suggests that when the subject could not uniquely 
determine which hand was hers by comparing her intention to 
move and the resulting movement, she relied upon beliefs 
about where her hand would normally appear visually.
The power of belief to affect ascriptions of limb 
ownership can be quite striking. Bottini et al. (2002)
report the puzzling case of F.B., a 77-year-old female 
stroke victim. She suffered a right subcoritcal hemorrhage 
that resulted in a host of left-sided deficits: hemiplegia
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(paralysis of her left side), hemianaestheisa (numbness), 
and hemianopia (loss of the left half of her visual field). 
She also exhibited anosognosia, or a denial of her 
deficits. Unsurprisingly, F.B. did not report receiving 
any tactile stimulation in her left hand and when asked to 
touch her left hand she could not locate it, instead 
randomly exploring the right side of her peripersonal space 
(p. 249). F.B. displayed only one arresting delusion: She
believed that her own left hand belonged to her niece.
This delusion of ownership had remarkable 
consequences for her reports of touches delivered to that 
hand. Bottini et al. tested her reaction to left-hand 
touches in three conditions. She was told prior to the 
trial that the experimenter would touch (1) her right hand,
(2) her left hand, or (3) her niece's hand. F.B. was 
blindfolded so that she could not see which hand was being 
touched, and she was instructed to respond "Yes" when she 
felt the touch or "No” when she did not. Trials were 
randomized across the three conditions, and Bottini et al. 
also included "catch trials," ones in which F.B. was told 
that a touch was forthcoming but no touch was delivered.
As expected, F.B. reported touches to her right hand with 
perfect accuracy, and she denied feeling any touch 
delivered to her left hand in condition (2).
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However, when told that the experiment was going to 
touch her niece's hand and instead touched her own left 
hand, F.B. reported feeling the touch with a degree of
accuracy much greater than chance. ^  Following the
experiment, Bottini et al. asked F.B. to explain how she
could feel touch in someone else's hand. After eluding the
question a bit, she eventually replied, "'Yes, I know, it
is strange'" (p. 251). Bottini et al. describe her full
response as follows:
her absent-minded niece would always forget 
her hand on the patient's bed while leaving 
the hospital, so that F.B. used to take care 
of it until the niece came back for a visit.
(p. 251)
Bottini el al. offer a slightly different 
explanation. They attribute F.B.'s responses in condition
(3) to a combination of residual tactile sensory pathways 
and beliefs about ownership. She could consciously feel 
touches only when "she delusively referred them to someone 
else’s body image," and in such cases "the disrupted 
representation of one side of the body is replaced by a 
preserved image" like that of her niece (p. 252). 
Accordingly, they conclude that somatosensory stimulation 
is not sufficient for a sense of limb ownership; it also
40 According to the table in Bottini et al. (2002), her accuracy 
in condition (3) across sets of trials was 70%, 70%, 100%, 80% correct 
(p. 251) .
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"depends on a more abstract/higher level body image" (p.
252) .
By this point, we have reason to agree with their 
conclusion. Their steps toward that conclusion, however, 
need revisiting, particularly regarding the various senses 
of ownership involved. By justifying her responses in 
terms of her niece's forgetfulness, F.B. may have been 
merely rationalizing what she recognized as strange 
experiences. But in any case if a sense of ownership 
depends upon possessing a body image, then in referring her 
conscious left-sided touches "to someone else’s body image" 
as Bottini et al. conclude should preclude her feeling a 
sense of ownership toward them. Instead, she should report 
that her niece felt the touch in the niece's left hand.
The sense of ownership here is split--F.B. "owns” the 
experience (experiences herself as being touched) but she 
also recognizes that her niece owns the hand. Still, we 
should note that she did not experience the sensation as 
within, e.g., one of the experimenter's hands. It seems 
important that F.B's niece is forgetful and that F.B. 
thinks she must "take care of" the hand until her niece 
returns. Perhaps, then, in taking care of it she treats 
her niece's normal functioning hand as if it were her own, 
which could entail noting the experiences it undergoes.
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This last peculiar case offers, at best, limited 
support in favor of NP's explanation of one's sense of body 
and limb ownership--or perhaps any proposal for that
matter.41 What makes the case especially odd is that her 
ownership of the experience seems parasitic upon her not 
owning the hand in which it is experienced in an important 
sense. And thus far, only F.B. has exhibited this 
perplexing behavior, and one case is not a sufficiently 
sturdy base upon which to erect theory. Nevertheless,
F.B.'s results, when combined with those discussed above, 
illustrate the powerful contribution of the body image to 
one's conscious sense of body ownership. As a result, 
attributions of ownership can indeed go wrong, which means 
that such self-ascriptions are not in fact I EM.
17. Conclusion
We began this chapter with Shoemaker's regress argument in 
favor of the conclusion that certain self-ascriptions are 
IEM. For those who find this argument compelling, the 
regress begins with reflections on the preconditions for
41 Bottini et al. (2002) really only whet one's appetite for 
details. One can’t help but wonder how F.B. would respond to a host of 
other questions. When asked to point to her niece's hand, would she 
point to her own? When her niece was present and she saw her niece's 
(actual) hand being touched, would she also report feeling a touch?
Did these results occur only when she believed her niece's hand was 
going to be touched or would beliefs about another's hand also suffice?
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self-recognition. Once initiated, Shoemaker argues, it 
must end with self-ascriptions based upon introspection, 
and hence only certain psychological self-ascriptions are 
I EM and nonaccidental. Evans and Bermudez put forward 
views intending to show that bodily self-ascriptions can 
also be IEM when based upon certain types of sensory 
information about one's body. However, we saw that even 
apart from the theoretical difficulties particular to each 
view, empirical study of these information channels suggest 
that errors of misidentification can indeed occur even when 
they function normally.
We then turned to NP for a more inclusive account of 
the data. The proper functioning of the senses contributes 
to an overall body image consisting of a set of beliefs and 
attitudes that together constitute a sense of ownership.
NP nicely accommodates the notion of body image as a subset 
of one’s battery of self-specifying beliefs that serve to 
identify for the subject which body belongs to her and to 
ground her sense of body ownership. The body image, 
combined with cross-modal correlations in sensory input, 
gives rise to a powerful sense of limb ownership. To feel 
a sensation in a limb is for one to seem to feel it in 
one’s own limb, but mistakes about whether the limb in
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question is one's own can nevertheless arise. Bodily self­
ascriptions at best seem nonaccidental.
Where does this leave us? Evans fears that if bodily 
self-ascriptions fail to be IEM, our nonaccidental thoughts 
about ourselves would be hospitable to Cartesianism. The 
fear does not seem misplaced. If introspective self­
ascriptions are the only ones that can stop the regress of 
identification, then we do seem to have a fertile ground of 
difference between mind and body in which Cartesianism can 
take root. Moreover, as we saw at the outset, Shoemaker 
contends that self-ascriptions of bodily properties involve 
identifying, for example, which body responds to my 
intentions to move. This tempts one to think that one 
can't be wrong about whether oneself is intending such-and-
such, but one can be wrong about which body is one's own.42
Disagreeing with Evans and Bermudez does not mean 
agreeing with Shoemaker and endorsing Cartesianism, 
however. Accordingly, in the next chapter we turn to 
psychological self-ascriptions based on introspection. As 
we go forward, we should keep in mind the lessons learned
42 it's worth noting that van den Bos and Jeannerod describe 
their results as demonstrating that one often recognizes oneself in 
virtue of "the matching of one's intentions and the bodily effects of 
self-generated actions" (p. 178). That is, they assume that subjects 
are aware of their own intentions and that errors result from 
mismatching those intentions with the bodily effects of others or other 
things.
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in accounting for the errors one can commit when self- 
ascribing bodily properties and limbs and the accompanying 
sense of body and limb ownership. One’s sense of ownership 
may seem immediate and direct, but this appearance does not 
mean that self-misidentification is impossible. Bermudez 
was right insofar as the bodily properties reported on by 
proprioception seem to be one's own, but even in the normal 
case they can also seem to be instantiated within a limb 
that does not belong to oneself. How things seem does not 
settle the matter as to how things are, but any 
satisfactory account of self-ascription must speak to both. 
We saw that NP was able to explain how things are with 
regard to bodily self-ascriptions without misplacing their 
seeming to be IEM. The challenge ahead is to do 
demonstrate that it can do the same in answering the 
Misconception Problem, the Amnesia Objection, and the 
Asymmetry Problem introduced in Chapter II. We now turn to 
that final task.
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Chapter V. Miaidentifying the First Person
"My intention was always to get away from myself, 
though I knew perfectly well that I was using 
myself. Call it a little game between 'I' and 
’m e '."
--Marcel Duchamp, explaining 
readymades^
SI. Introduction
We arrived at the end of Chapter IV with a success and a 
difficulty. The success was an explanatory one: NP
provided a means of accounting for both the appearance of 
IEM with regard to a certain class of bodily self­
ascriptions and the actual errors one is subject to even 
when one's senses function normally. Proposals that 
attempt to extend the class of IEM self-ascriptions to 
those involving bodily states and properties, like those 
offered by Evans and Bermudez, at best can do only the 
former. Such proposals take how things seem to us to 
settle the question as to the way things are, but doing so 
precludes an explanation of a range of compelling empirical 
data regarding the fragility of one's sense of bodily 
ownership.
The difficulty, however, falls out of this 
explanatory success. As we saw in previous chapters, NP
1 Quoted in Tomkins (1996, pp. 159-160) .
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excels at accounting for errors of self-misidentification, 
and since bodily self-ascriptions are in fact subject to 
such errors, one might protest that no significant progress 
has been made. Indeed, the discussion of bodily ownership 
seems to push one towards a Cartesian conclusion--namely 
that mistakes of ownership can occur because owners are in 
some important sense separate and therefore separable from 
what they own.
Accordingly, Shoemaker's neo-Cartesian explanation of 
these mistakes acquires a much stronger pull. For him even 
those errors of misidentification possible with bodily 
self-ascriptions require that one already possess 
identifying beliefs about one's psychological states and 
their behavioral implications, beliefs that are themselves 
not based upon self-identification of any sort. Moreover, 
one might be tempted to think, as Shoemaker does, that one 
can be aware of one's psychological states in a way that 
gives rise to IEM self-ascriptions, whereas one has no such 
awareness of one's bodily states and properties.
We can frame the puzzle in a slightly different way 
that more directly confronts NP. We found in Chapter IV 
that to ascribe a property F to a familiar individual a by 
identifying some presented b as a seems to require that one 
already possess beliefs about the properties that a
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instantiates, properties that overlap at least in part with 
the properties one believes b to possess. Regress 
threatens, however, if we further hold that one ascribes to 
a what one takes to be its identifying properties on the 
basis of further beliefs about some individual c. One's 
battery of self-specifying belief may open up the 
possibility of misidentification because of its 
identificatory role, but those beliefs themselves 
apparently cannot be based upon self-identification.
Hence, in explaining the features of bodily self- 
ascriptions, NP hasn't fully addressed the relationship 
between one's battery of self-specifying beliefs and the 
self-ascriptions that draw upon it. As a result, its 
success seems hollow at best.
Though for these reasons we may be quite tempted to 
endorse Shoemaker's view that self-ascriptions of 
introspected psychological states and properties must be 
IEM, I believe it to be mistaken. Just as one appeared to 
be directly aware of certain bodily properties as one's 
own, we will find that an appearance/reality distinction 
exists with regard to psychological self-ascriptions based 
upon introspective awareness. For empirical work strongly 
suggests that, appearances to the contrary, we have no such 
direct and unmediated access to our mental lives. To
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motivate that claim, in §2 I consider the importance of 
consciousness to certain types of self-ascription--not 
often considered in discussions of IEM--and how our mental 
lives seem to us even apart from how they actually are.
From the point of view of consciousness it does seem to us 
that one can't be mistaken whether oneself is in a 
particular mental state when one introspects. But this 
appearance results not from some special introspective 
access to our mental lives but is instead an artifact of 
consciousness, a result of conscious interpretation.
Though proponents of IEM could object that a vestige of 
immunity remains in that one still can't be mistaken about 
who introspects a particular state or property, we see in 
§3 that self-interpretation extends to interpreting the 
introspecting and ascribing subject as well. Under NP the 
identified self is, as it were, constituted by that 
battery. The self of accidental and nonaccidental self­
ascriptions alike can be thought of, in Dennett's parlance, 
as a center of narrative gravity. Ultimately, the 
intuitions regarding the apparent need for IEM self- 
ascriptions can be traced back to how our conscious lives 
appear to us.
Giving proper place to consciousness and the role of 
self-interpretation in introspective self-ascriptions, in
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§4 I review the development of the dialectic demonstrating 
that NP provides a satisfactory, comprehensive account of 
self-ascription in light of our original concerns. With 
the full proposal in hand, I turn in §5 to the Amnesia 
objection and to the Misconception Problem. Finally, in §6 
I explain away the Asymmetry Problem in terms of the 
richness of one’s nonconscious battery of self-specifying 
beliefs. Nonaccidental self-ascriptions, canonically 
expressed with the first-person pronoun, do not therefore 
differ in kind from accidental ones. As a result, self- 
misidentification always remains a possibility, even when 
self-ascribing psychological states and properties. I 
conclude in §7 with a few outstanding questions and some 
avenues of further research.
S2. Consciousness, Introspection, and 
Sel£-Xnterpretation
As we saw in Chapter III, Shoemaker argues that what makes 
a particular self-ascriptions IEM is the way in which one
is aware of the property or state ascribed (1968, p. 565).2 
One does, after all, self-ascribe properties and states in 
a variety of ways, and on occasion we even become aware of 
our own mental states fairly indirectly. A close friend or
 ̂And according to Evans and Bermudez, the importance lies in the 
evidence base or type of information funding a particular self- 
ascription.
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spouse can bring one's anger to one's attention before one 
realizes it oneself, for example. But this type of 
psychological self-awareness doesn't rule out errors of 
self-identification. IEM is supposed to capture something 
unique about certain self-ascriptions that distinguishes 
them in kind from those made on the basis of third-person 
information. Accordingly, for Shoemaker, a self-ascription 
is IEM in virtue of one's being introspectively aware of 
the mental states and properties ascribed.
As we saw in Chapter III, Shoemaker argues that 
mental states are self-intimating, which is to say that "it 
is of the essence of many kinds of mental states and 
phenomena to reveal themselves to introspection" (1996, p. 
242). Recall also that Shoemaker explains introspective 
access in functional and conceptual terms. If a creature 
believes that g--and assuming that it has a similarly 
expressive conceptual repertoire and a level of rationality 
rivaling ours--it will behave as if it were aware of its 
believing that jo in the same way that we are 
introspectively aware of our own states. One's 
introspective self-ascriptions are therefore caused by the 
states they ascribe to oneself, and this causal relation is 
constitutive of first-person introspective access. And 
because such introspective self-ascriptions involve no
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self-identification component, self-misidentification 
cannot occur.3
To this point we have said little about how state 
consciousness figures in IEM self-ascriptions. Although he 
rarely discusses IEM in these terms, it's clear that 
Shoemaker believes that a particular state or property must 
be conscious for its self-ascription to be IEM. To take 
one representative remark, Shoemaker contends that "if I 
have my usual access to my hunger," then the question 
"Someone is hungry but is it I who is hungry" makes no 
sense (1996, p. 211, emphasis added). By "usual access" 
Shoemaker means one’s apparent direct and unmediated access 
to one's hunger--or as we might commonly say, how we 
usually feel when we report our hunger. When one 
introspects a mental states or property, it becomes 
conscious, where, according to Shoemaker, "a mental 
entity’s being conscious involves its revealing its 
existence and nature to its possessor in an immediate way” 
(1996, p. 224). The claim is that when my hunger is
3 As we noted above. Shoemaker believes that one's mental states 
and one's beliefs about them are not, in fact, distinct. Instead, 
their relation is one of core realizer to total realizer. But as we 
also noted above (and will note again shortly), introspective 
ascriptions can be distinct from the states ascribed in that one can be 
in the state without being directly and immediately aware of it and one 
can be introspectively conscious of oneself as in a state that one is 
in fact not in.
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conscious I can't be mistaken about whether it is I who is 
hungry, whoever I may be.
For a mental state to be conscious one must be aware
of it in a direct and unmediated way, and according to
Shoemaker all IEM self-ascriptions result from this type of
self-awareness. Therefore, all IEM self-ascriptions must
be conscious. Still, we must mark the difference between
states that are conscious and those that are
intrespectively conscious. Rosenthal (2000) draws this
distinction in the following way:
When we introspect a state, we are conscious 
of it in a way that seems attentive, 
focused, deliberate, and reflective. When a 
state is conscious but not introspectively 
conscious, by contrast, we are conscious of 
it in a way that is relatively fleeting, 
diffuse, casual, and inattentive.
Introspective and nonintrospective 
consciousness do not seem to differ in any 
other ways. There is no other 
phenomenological difference, and no 
theoretical reason to posit any additional 
difference. (p. 208)
The two differ, then, in the disparate ways in which one 
can be conscious of the same state.
No doubt this is an important respect in which the 
two differ, but we should note another. Intuitively, when 
one is introspectively conscious of one's mental states, 
one seems not only aware of the state introspected in a 
direct and unmediated way, but one also seems to be
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similarly aware of oneself as its bearer. And this 
difference impacts the speech acts one performs about 
oneself. We often express our conscious states with speech 
acts that do not involve the first-person pronoun or any 
self-designating expression, whereas introspective self­
ascriptions report our conscious states. These reports-- 
usually of the form "I am F" or "I believe that p," for
some sensory state F or for some intentional state p4--are 
themselves expressions of conscious states. The property 
or state is conscious in both cases, but in introspective 
consciousness one is also conscious of one's being in that 
conscious state.5
As Rosenthal (2003) notes, this intuitive awareness 
we have of ourselves in introspection seems rather thin.
One seems to be aware of oneself as the bearer of the 
introspected conscious mental state, present only in the
4 Here again I intend the remark to cover all propositional 
attitudes.
5 Rosenthal (2003) does note something like this difference. 
"Introspective consciousness occurs," he writes, "when we are not only 
conscious of [our mental] states, but also conscious that we are" (p. 
332) .
Hume's famous remark regarding the elusiveness of the 
introspected self may spring to mind at this point as well. After all, 
he claims that when he "looks inward" he observes at most a parade of 
perceptions but no perceiver (1978, p. 252). But as we saw in Chapter 
III, Hume's mistake lies in taking the word 'introspection' literally 
and adopting a perceptual model of introspective self-awareness. When 
we introspect, we don't cast an "inner eye" upon a mental landscape and 
ascribe properties to whatever subject we "see" lurking there. 
Nevertheless, introspective self-ascriptions do express our intuitive 
awareness of not only a particular mental state but of the bearer of 
that state.
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act of thinking. And this apparent direct and sparse 
awareness of oneself no doubt gives rise to the impression 
that the introspecting subject cannot misidentify the 
individual whose states and properties are introspected. 
While Bermudez's claim may have been misleading with regard 
to proprioception, it certainly does seem that 
"introspection does not yield information about anybody's 
psychological properties except my own" (1998, p. 149).
From the point of view of consciousness, the state 
introspected and the introspecting subject are inseparable.
Though weak self-intimation would indeed explain why 
certain self-ascriptions are IEM, we found in Chapter III 
that it does not survive scrutiny. A self-blind creature-- 
one that completely lacks characteristically first-person 
or introspective access to her own states--cannot be ruled 
out on conceptual grounds. Indeed, most of our intentional 
states are probably not conscious, and the fascinating 
phenomenon of blindsight also suggests that one can be in 
mental states with qualitative character without those
states being conscious.® Hence, we can be in states 
without being introspectively conscious of them.
6 See Chapter III, §5. Studies involving masked priming also 
suggest that sensory states or states with qualitative character can be 
nonconscious. In these studies subjects are shown stimuli for only a 
few milliseconds. They report seeing nothing, which indicates that 
they did not consciously see the stimuli. Nevertheless, subsequent
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More important for present purposes, however, 
empirical work in psychology strongly suggests that one can 
mistakenly believe that one is introspectively conscious of 
a particular mental state that one could not be in. That 
is, one can self-ascribe mental states and properties on 
the basis of one's apparent direct and unmediated awareness 
of them yet not be in those states. For example, one can 
apparently be mistaken as to one's conscious qualitative 
states. Rosenthal (2000) cites the example of apprehensive 
dental patients. During dental work on a tooth that has 
been anesthetized or lacks a nerve altogether, certain 
patients will nevertheless report feeling pain in that 
tooth. One possible explanation, and the one that 
Rosenthal favors, is that the fear such patients have about 
the procedure and its expected painfulness causes them to 
misconstrue vibrations resulting from the drill as 
sensations of pain. Once the patient has been given this 
explanation (and reminded of her tooth's numbness), it 
seems subjectively to her that she is fearful and that the 
drill is causing her tooth to vibrate, but she no longer 
experiences pain. Nevertheless, it still seems to her that
behavior such as word choice and completion is affected by what was 
flashed before them. For representative work of this sort, see Marcel 
(1983a) and (1983b).
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she was originally in pain, despite later realizing its 
unlikely source.
We make similar and arguably more frequent mistakes 
about our intentional states. Perhaps the most famous 
source of support for this claim (one briefly mentioned in 
Chapter III) is due to Nisbett and Wilson (1977). In one 
of the many studies they discuss, subjects were told that 
they were participating in a consumer survey. They were 
asked to examine articles of clothing--four different 
nightgowns in one trial and four identical pairs of nylon 
stockings in another--and rank them according to quality. 
Subjects were then asked for their reasons behind their 
rankings. Interestingly, though all four pairs of 
stockings were in fact identical, subjects overwhelming 
tended to favor the right-most pair. No subject justified 
her choice in terms of article position, however, and when 
subjects were asked directly whether position had an effect 
on their choice, "virtually all subjects denied it, usually 
with a worried glance at the interviewer suggesting that 
they felt either that they had misunderstood the question 
or were dealing with a madman" (p. 244).
Nisbett and Wilson explain their results in terms 
unfavorable to introspection as a special form of self-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 1 0
awareness.̂  As the title of their paper indicates, 
subjects often seem to "tell more than they can know" about 
their own mental states and processes. Instead of 
introspecting what states and processes actually led to 
their choices, Nisbett and Wilson suggest that when asked, 
subjects:
did something that may have felt like 
introspection but which in fact may have 
been only a simple judgment of the extent to 
which input was a representative or 
plausible case of output. (p. 249)
Instead of accurate self-reporting, what we call 
introspection is actually a process in which we often 
confabulate reasons for what we do based upon widely held 
theories about the causal relations between intention and 
action. Those confabulated reasons can seem, from the 
point of view of consciousness, to be the ones we are 
directly and immediately aware of having.
Subjects can also mistakenly have the sense that they 
consciously willed a particular action when in fact they 
did not. Wegner (2002) argues that one's experience of 
oneself as a causal agent arises not from introspective 
access to one’s intentions to act but rather from
7 The clothing trial was but one of many they conducted, and they 
also discuss a fair amount of similar work in this seminal paper. This 
type of research has also continued apace. For a more recent survey 
and extension of this work, see Wilson, Hodges, and LaFleur (1995).
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inferences regarding the priority, consistency, and 
exclusivity of the thought responsible for the action (p.
69). Though it may seem that a conscious thought about an 
action causes it, Wegner suggests that the thought and the 
action itself may have a common, nonconscious cause. 
Accordingly, in simply taking into account one's conscious 
sense of will "it would be impossible to tell in any given 
case whether your thought was causing your action, or 
something else was causing both of them” (2003, p. 65).
Under this picture, it should be possible to fool 
subjects into experiencing themselves as consciously 
willing an action by manipulating their beliefs about their 
own thoughts. This indeed seems possible. Wegner and 
Wheatley (1999) conducted what they called the "I Spy 
study" (p. 74), which focused upon the role of an 
individual's belief about the priority of her intention to 
act in her experience of will. Each participant in the 
study arrived at the lab at the same time as a 
"confederate" posing as another test subject. The two were 
seated facing each other, with both hands placed on top of 
a modified computer mouse (much like the planchette of a 
Ouija board, the inspiration for the paradigm). Together, 
subject and confederate were asked to move the pointer
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around a computer screen that showed a photo of about fifty 
small objects.
Subjects were told that the study's aim was to 
investigate individuals' feelings of intention. The 
subject and confederate were told to stop moving the mouse 
every thirty seconds and then rate each stop according to 
the degree in which it resulted from their own intentions 
to stop it. The scale ranged from 0% ("I allowed the stop 
to happen") to 100% ("I intended to make the stop"). 
Participants were also told by the experimenter that they 
would wear headphones during the experiment and that each 
3 0-second interval would be punctuated by 10 seconds of 
music indicating that they should stop moving the mouse.
Both subject and confederate were told that they would be 
fed different soundtracks including a different word each 
trial and that any words they heard were only intended to 
distract them. (To complete the ruse, the experimenter 
even played a bit of the tape for each and asked them what 
word they heard--the confederate always reported hearing a 
different word than the actual subject.) Once the trials 
began, however, subjects heard a word priming them to 
choose an object in the picture while the confederate heard 
specific instructions about what movements to make with the 
mouse and when.
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Interestingly, the timing of the confederate's 
movements greatly affected the subject's rating of the 
stop. In most of the trials, the confederate heard no word 
and simply let the subject stop the mouse. In four 
"forced-stop" trials, however, the confederate heard 
instructions to move the pointer to an object on the screen 
corresponding to the word heard by the subject, along with 
a countdown to stopping the movement. Wegner and Wheatley 
varied the time between the heard word and the 
confederate's causing the pointer to stop on the 
corresponding picture so that the subject heard the word 
either 30 seconds before, 5 seconds before, 1 second 
before, or 1 second after the stop. Subjects rated their 
intention to stop the mouse as most effective in the 1- 
second trials and only slightly less so in the 5-second 
trials. In contrast, subjects experienced little personal 
intention in both the 30-second and 1-second-after trials.
In fact, the mean percentage reported on the unforced stops 
(where subjects had total control of when and where to 
stop) was roughly the same as that for the 1- and 5-second 
forced-stop trials (Wegner 2000, p. 78).
Much like Nisbett and Wilson, Wegner (and Wegner and 
Wheatley) explains the results as an artifact of beliefs 
about mental causation. We believe that intentions can
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only cause actions if they immediately precede them. The 
notable thing is that subjects experienced themselves as 
intending to stop the mouse even when they were not the 
cause of it and so did not have the requisite intentional 
state to do so. "Apparently, the experience of will can be 
created by the manipulation of thought and action in accord 
with the principle of priority," writes Wegner, "and this 
experience can occur even when the person's thought cannot 
have created the action" (2000, p. 78). Beliefs about our 
states and their relation to actions can themselves give 
rise to the subjective experience of willing something to 
occur even when we are not in those states.8
Perhaps the most extreme and puzzling illustration of 
introspective error is the delusion of thought insertion.
C. D. Frith (1992) offers a striking example of the 
phenomenon as recounted by a schizophrenic patient:
Thoughts are put into my mind like "Kill 
God". It's just like my mind working, but 
it isn't. They come from this chap, Chris.
They're his thoughts. (p. 66)
Mellor (1970) provides an additional example but with
inserted emotions:
The patient experiences feelings which do 
not seem to be his own. The feelings are 
attributed to some external source and are
® For an overview of this study and others relevant to 
consistency and exclusivity, see Wegner (2003) .
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imposed upon him. A 23-year-old female 
patient reported: "I cry, tears roll down
my cheeks and I look unhappy, but inside I 
have a cold anger because they are using me 
in this way, and it is not me who is 
unhappy, but they are projecting unhappiness 
into my brain. ... You have no idea how 
terrible it is to laugh and to look happy 
and to know that it is not you. (p. 17)
Certain subjects suffering from schizophrenia report 
episodes in which they experience a particular thought or 
feeling as occurring within their own stream of 
consciousness but view it, quite literally, as authored by 
another.
It's difficult to take such subjects at their word 
regarding how their mental lives actually are--no doubt the 
"inserted" episodes do not in fact have external tokeners. 
But it's equally difficult to explain their sincere 
(dis)avowals in terms of direct and unmediated access to 
their own states. If they did have such access, these 
alien states should subjectively seem like anything but 
alien, not only states that they possess but states that 
they authored as well.
Though much work remains to provide a satisfactory 
and comprehensive explanation of thought insertion,
Stephens and Graham (2000) offer the promising beginnings 
of one not based upon introspection as traditionally 
conceived. Without delving too deeply into the
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peculiarities of their view, they contend that a subject 
experiencing thought insertion "will not accept as 
agentically her own thoughts whose occurrence she finds 
inexplicable by reference to her conception or self- 
referential description of her intentional states" (2000, 
p. 170). That is, a subject denies that she thinks a 
particular thought that she is directly and immediately 
aware of because she does not believe that she is the kind 
of person who would think such a thought. Using Frith’s
example (and simplifying a bit),9 the troubled subject who 
finds the thought "Kill God" "popping" into her mind, 
doesn't see herself as one who would likely commit deicide. 
Since the thought nevertheless seems intelligible, she 
seizes upon an alternative explanation in which an 
"external" agent has authored it and has forced it into her 
mind.10
9 Frith's own explanation of schizophrenic delusions is similar
to that of Stephens and Graham in that he attempts to provide a
fundamental account of both auditory hallucinations and delusions of 
thought in which agency plays a central role. For him, these 
afflictions result from a breakdown in the metarepresentational systems 
that monitor our intentions to act. Stephens and Graham find Frith’s 
account incomplete in that it fails to account for why a subject takes 
a particular thought to be the result of some external force and 
therefore cannot maintain the clinical distinction between thought 
influence and thought insertion (2000, pp. 141-42).
Stephens and Graham expressly offer that they do not want to
be bound to any particular account of why a subject might view a 
thought as repugnant given her psychological self-conception, for 
"perhaps on some occasions a person fails to find an intentional 
explanation for a given thought because there isn't one" (2000, p.
170) .
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Milder examples of this type of introspective anomaly
can be found outside the clinic as well. Recovering from
injuries sustained while hiking, Oliver Sacks catches
himself reacting with unexpected intensity to watching a
team practice rugby:
I was surprised and appalled at the spasm of 
hate in myself. ... I looked at them with 
the virulent envy, the mean rancor, the 
poisonous spite of the invalid; and then I 
turned away; I could bear them no longer.
Nor could I bear my own feelings, the 
revealed ugliness in me. I consoled myself 
by saying, "This isn't me--the real me--but 
my sickness which is speaking." (1984, pp.
176-7)
Sacks's vivid account has much in common with those 
suffering from thought insertion.H He does admit that the 
"poisonous spite” that visited him revealed something about 
himself. But the thoughts and experiences that Sacks is 
aware of in a direct and unmediated way seem so out of 
character that he feels forced to find consolation in 
denying ownership of them. It proves easier to think of 
them as not his own reaction to his current state but as 
the product of a surrogate "speaker"--his injured state 
itself.
H  In fact, Maher has consistently argued (1974, 1988a, 1988b, 
and 1999, e.g.) that reports by subjects suffering from delusions such 
as thought insertion are trying to make sense of experiences like 
Sacks’s only more extreme. That is, the source of the delusion lies 
not in irrational interpretation but sincere interpretation of 
extremely anomalous experiences that differ only in degree from our 
own.
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How should we make sense of this distinction at the
level of introspective consciousness between how our mental
lives can appear to us and how they really are? In light
of empirical work and more common experiences like that
discussed above, Dennett suggests an alternative to the
traditional view of introspection as special self-access:
We postulate all these apparent activities 
and mental processes [as captured in folk- 
psychology] in order to make sense of the 
behavior we observe--in order, in fact, to 
make as much sense as possible of the 
behavior, especially when the behavior we 
observe is our own. Philosophers of mind 
used to go out of their way to insist that 
one’s access to one's own case in such 
matters is quite unlike one's access to 
others', but as we learn more about various 
forms of psychopathology and even the 
foibles of apparently normal people (see 
Nisbett and Wilson 1977), it becomes more 
plausible to suppose that although there are 
still some small comers of unchallenged 
privilege, some matters about which our 
authority is invincible, each of us is in 
most regards a sort of inveterate auto­
psychologist, effortless inventing 
intentional interpretations of our own 
actions in an inseparable mix of 
confabulation, retrospective self­
justification, and (on occasion, no doubt) 
good theorizing. The striking cases of 
confabulation by subjects under hypnosis or 
suffering from various well-documented brain 
disorders (Korsakoff's syndrome, split 
brains, various "agnosias") raise the 
prospect that such virtuoso displays of 
utterly unsupported self-interpretation are 
not manifestations of a skill suddenly 
learned in response to trauma, but of a 
normal way unmasked... (Dennett, 1987, p.
91)
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Instead of viewing introspection as a kind of direct access 
to the mental states and properties that we actually have, 
we should consider it a form of self-interpretation 
masquerading as a special form of privilege.
Rosenthal agrees. Like Dennett, he argues that we 
have reason to believe that introspection amounts to self- 
interpretation, even when our introspective self­
ascriptions of mental states prove correct. However, he 
stresses that subjects nevertheless take themselves to have 
introspected the confabulated states, and it seems to them 
from the point of view of consciousness that they are 
directly and immediately aware of themselves as being in 
those states:
People interpret themselves in the light of 
their situation and past experience, and 
some of these self-interpretations have to 
do with what mental states they are in. As 
long as one remains unaware of whatever 
inference and motivation leads to these 
self-interpretations about one's mental 
states, the self-interpretations will seem, 
from a first-person point of view, to be 
spontaneous and unmediated. They will seem 
to arise from just asking oneself what 
mental states one is in, from a deliberate 
decision to focus on the states in question 
by casting one's mental eye inward. But it 
is likely that such introspective awareness 
results in substantial measure from desires 
to see ourselves in a certain light.
Introspection is often, if not always, a 
process of conscious self-interpretation.
(2002, p. 224)
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However directly and immediately our awareness of own 
states might subjectively seem, experimental and folk 
psychology teach us that we have no such awareness.
In the absence of such special awareness, self- 
interpretation amounts to explaining or predicting our own 
behavior in much the same way as we explain and predict the 
behavior or others. To provide satisfactory explanations 
and to make successful predictions we adopt an interpretive 
strategy that Dennett (1987, 1991) calls the "intentional 
stance." We have a wide range of strategies at our 
disposal to predict and to explain the behavior of a 
particular individual or system. We can explain chemical 
reactions or the interactions of bodies in space, for 
example, by taking the physical stance toward them--that 
is, by subsuming those particulars under physical theories 
that deliver predictions and postdictions in light of 
initial conditions. Despite its descriptive power, not all 
individuals or systems can be easily explained from this 
stance. For certain systems, we choose to adopt what 
Dennett calls the "design stance," or the strategy where 
one predicts future behavior by considering how an 
individual was designed to behave (1987, pp. 16-17).
Whereas the physical stance trades in subatomic 
particles, forces, and the laws that govern them, the
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design stance operates on a more familiar level of 
abstraction. We can easily manipulate fairly complex 
machines like telephones and automobiles without knowing 
much if anything about how they actually work, let alone 
their molecular makeup. We can effortlessly predict the 
outcome of pressing a certain sequence of numbers on a 
telephone by relying upon assumptions about how the device 
is designed to fulfill its communicative function--e.g ., 
that it is connected in a suitable way to other similar 
devices, that a reliable relation exists between a sequence 
of numbers and the ringing phone in one's mother's house, 
that one speaks into one end of the handset and listens to 
the other. Those who repair phones no doubt understand 
them better, but they do so by having a more thorough grasp 
of their design.
We can greatly increase our predictive power
regarding intentional systems like ourselves by adopting
the intentional stance, a predictive strategy based upon
the ascription of beliefs and desires to the individual in
question. Dennett instructs us in adopting the intentional
stance as follows:
first you decide to treat the object whose 
behavior is to be predicted as a rational 
agent; then you figure out what beliefs that 
agent ought to have, given its place in the 
world and its purpose. Then you figure out
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what desires it ought to have, on the same 
considerations, and finally you predict that 
this rational agent will act to further its 
goals in the light of its beliefs. A little 
practical reasoning from the chosen set of 
beliefs and desires will in many--but not 
all--instances yield a decision about what 
the agent ought to do; that is what you 
predict the agent will do. (1987, p. 17)
Dennett further argues that we employ this strategy so 
often and with such success that we take it for granted. 
Our expectations of our coevals are so often met that the 
occasional inappropriate utterance or unpredictable
behavior stands out in stark relief.12
We also adopt the intentional stance towards 
ourselves, ascribing to ourselves various beliefs, desires 
and their interactions. As a result our own behavior can 
flout expectations we may have of ourselves. No doubt 
Sacks would normally deny that he is capable of such a 
virulent reaction to such a harmless scene, and his
The lion's share of the discussion surrounding Dennett's 
proposal concerns whether endorsing the intentional stance commits one 
to instrumentalism about mental states. If we (or some other creature) 
could come to predict our behavior as effectively from the physical 
stance, one argument goes, does that mean that we, like simple chemical 
compounds, don't really have beliefs and desires? (See, e.g., Dennett, 
1987, pp. 25-6.) Dennett's handling of this objection hasn't helped 
matters much, for he wants to "place [his] view on the knife-edge 
between the intolerable extremes of simple realism and simple 
relativism" (1987, p. 38). This edge affords little room to balance, 
for he argues that the patterns of behavior are real, but they can only 
be discerned and explained at a particular level of abstraction. We 
can remain safely neutral on this issue, however, for one could 
construe the success of that predictive strategy as Stephens and Graham 
do--namely, as solid theorizing about our actual "underlying, 
relatively more persistent intentional states" (2000, p. 161).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 2 3
surprise results from observing a certain "ugliness" 
befitting a sickness and not his "real" self.
Anomalies prove fairly rare, however, and our own 
experiences and behavior usually confirm our predictions.
As a result, we find ourselves drawn to the picture of 
introspection as something like direct inner perception. 
Dennett nicely unravels this intuition by comparing it to 
Hume's diagnosis of our intuitions about the necessary 
connection between causes and their effects. Though it 
appears to us that we expect particular effects given 
particular causes because we have observed a necessary 
connection between causes and their effects, Hume observed 
that this picture gets things backwards. Since effects are 
logically distinct from any cause, our expectations of 
necessary connection must instead be borne of habit, the 
result of observing constant conjunction between two 
events. As a result, we find ourselves drawing inferences 
from cause to effect and so are taken in by the illusion 
that a necessary connection grounds that inference. 
Similarly, Dennett argues that "we find ourselves wanting 
to say all these things about what is going on in us; this 
gives rise to theories we hold about how we come to be able 
to do this--for instance, the notorious but homespun theory
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that we 'perceive' these goings on with our 'inner eye'
..." (1978, p. 166-7).
The above observations concerning introspection and 
our intuitions about it square nicely with NP. For 
according to it, when we ascribe a mental state or property 
we draw upon a rich battery of self-specifying beliefs.
This battery provides the basis for explanations of our 
past and expectations of our future behavior.
Introspection thus amounts to a type of informed, conscious 
self-interpretation. The battery constitutes a kind of 
predictive theory about ourselves that takes as its 
evidence base one's collective behavior, both verbal and 
non-verbal. Accordingly, introspective self-ascriptions do 
not express a special kind of access to one's mental life 
but rather amount to explanations of one's behavior in 
light of the battery of self-identifying beliefs one 
possesses. When we find ourselves behaving in a way that 
runs counter to the ways in which we identify ourselves, we 
face falsified predictions about our own behavior, and more 
often than not (though not always as Sacks's example 
suggests) we revise the battery to explain why we did or 
said what we did.
Only an account that no longer places stock in 
introspective privilege can accommodate the confabulations
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and surprises not uncommon to our mental lives that 
empirical research reveals. These considerations show 
that, appearances to the contrary, we have no special self- 
access of the requisite sort that those like Shoemaker 
appeal to to explain IEM. Consequently, a comprehensive 
theory of self-ascription has no room for this notion.
S3. Who's Interpreting Whom: Self-Interpretation, Self-
Identification, and unity of Self
We have seen that introspective self-ascriptions do involve 
self-identification in that they amount to explanations of 
behavior in light of the battery of self-identifying 
beliefs. Still, proponents of IEM would no doubt object 
that we have not quite earned the dramatic conclusion of 
the previous section. Shoemaker introduces IEM as a 
technical notion to make sense of the theoretical need for 
self-ascriptions that must not, on pain of regress, involve 
self-identification. By explaining the relation between 
the battery of self-specifying beliefs and self-ascription 
as one between theory and the predictions and explanations 
it yields, we remain open to the charge that we still have 
not completely disarmed the regress of identification.
The charge can be sharpened in the following way. It 
can’t, as it were, be interpretation all the way down. 
Characterizing introspection in terms of identification and
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interpretation seems to presuppose an individual that is 
both the subject and object of the interpretation. After 
all, doesn't interpretation require someone to interpret 
and someone to be interpreted? One may identify oneself 
via a battery of self-specifying beliefs, but can't one 
still argue that a vestige of IEM exists in that a question 
can’t arise as to whether oneself is both interpreter and 
individual interpreted? Can one interpret another as 
oneself? If so, doesn't the regress motivating IEM self- 
ascriptions still loom menacingly? Who's adopting the 
stance toward herself? Who's interpreting whom?
It's difficult not to be gripped by these questions 
even at this point in the overall discussion, and this 
illustrates the persistence and power of our intuitions 
about self-ascribing states and properties. Nevertheless, 
intuition does not always prove a reliable guide to facts 
of the matter. The empirical evidence adduced in the 
previous section also suggests that the self-interpretation 
constitutive of introspective consciousness not only leads 
to self-ascriptions regarding what mental states we have 
but also whether oneself is the subject who has them. The 
self is a product of the battery--a fictional posit useful 
for making larger sense of our behaviors and experiences-- 
and not the precondition for possessing it. Once again,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 2 7
the appearance of a substantive self to which properties 
are ascribed is an artifact of consciousness.
Consider the claim motivating IEM. Certain self­
ascriptions are not subject to errors of misidentification 
because one can be aware of the property or state ascribed 
in a way that ineluctably makes one aware of the possessor 
of that property or state. For me to be introspectively 
aware that p is believed is to be aware that I believe that 
p. But, appearances notwithstanding, if we actually have 
no such direct and immediate access to our psychological 
states, why should we think that we have direct and 
immediate awareness of the possessor of those states? If 
we confabulate the ascription, why can't we confabulate the 
ascriber?
The suggestion certainly sounds a bit like a joke. 
What could it mean to confabulate the ascriber--for one to 
confabulate oneself? If anything at all is obvious to me, 
it's that I am no fiction.
In one sense, selves certainly are real. We, like 
all creatures, make a functional distinction between self 
and world. Our biological boundaries are lines of defense, 
keeping out many would-be invaders and sequestering and 
protecting the invaluable elements that sustain us. These 
biological boundaries are not hard and fast, however.
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Ruminants, much like us, rely upon bacteria to help break 
down ingested plants for digestion, spiders build webs, 
birds build nests, hermit crabs seek out and occupy 
discarded shells. And at times, our own systems can turn 
against our own normally welcome organs and cells to form 
tumors.13
Dennett (1991, 1992) argues that as language users we
have our own unique way of building upon our biological
boundaries. Instead of spinning webs or appropriating
shells, we appropriate words and weave them "like
spiderwebs into self-protective strings of narrative"
(1991, p. 417). And we do it in such a way that promotes
self creation:
These strings or streams of narrative issue 
forth as if from a single source--not just 
in the obvious physical sense of flowing 
from just one mouth, or one pencil or pen, 
but in a more subtle sense: their effect on
any audience is to encourage them to (try 
to) posit a unified agent whose words they 
are, about whom they are: in short, to
posit a center of narrative gravity. (1991, 
p. 418)
Just as billions of independent cells coalesce to form the 
biological self, countless narrative "cells" clump together
^  As Dennett (1990, p. 414) notes, these biological boundaries 
have psychological repercussions as well. In fact, to quote Miller 
(1997), "[d]isgust rules mark the boundaries of self; the relaxing of 
them marks privilege, intimacy, duty, and caring" (p. xi). Indeed, he 
devotes his fascinating and extensive work to mapping the topography of 
disgust largely in terms of our reactions to biological border 
crossings.
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to constitute narrative selves. The resulting centers of 
narrative gravity are thus useful fictions for organizing a 
complex pattern of behavior, including the self-ascriptions 
and self-interpretations that we are prone to make.
Dennett argues that we're not only masterful pattern 
generators, but we’re accomplished pattern trackers as 
well. And it's good that we are, since we put these 
fictional posits to great use in keeping track of and 
preserving our minimal biological selves. Hungry creatures 
must avoid eating themselves, and they must also avoid 
enemies and pursue sustenance and mates. This requires 
that one be sensitive to which behavior is one's own--and 
which is not.
Our means of determining which behavior is our own is 
not foolproof. As we saw in the case of bodily self- 
ascriptions, the self-specifying information that one 
receives may not be sufficient to settle questions of body 
ownership, and one must resort to hypotheses about which 
limb is one's own. On these occasions, Dennett argues that 
we must perform "experiments" in which we "do something and 
look to see what moves" (1991, p. 428). Groucho stands 
before the mirror unsure if what he sees is another or a 
reflection of himself; to arrive at a conclusion, he moves 
in certain ways and observes the results. Moreover,
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Dennett contends that we apply the same strategy to 
identify "our own internal states, tendencies, decisions, 
strengths, and weaknesses" (p. 428). For such internal 
states, we experiment by constantly telling stories, 
forever checking and revising them to maximize consistency 
and inclusiveness among a set of narrative strands.
The pattern of behavior to be brought under a single 
narrative may be quite complex and puzzling, and this 
picture of identifying strategies entails the possibility 
of radical mistakes of identification. Indeed, this 
arguably occurs. As we saw in the case of thought 
insertion, a subject concludes that she did not author 
certain thoughts of which she is introspectively aware. In 
narrative terms, the center of narrative gravity that 
organizes most of the narrative strands that make up her 
autobiography stands at odds with the thought in question. 
Given how she identifies herself, this thought seems wildly 
out of character with that identification, so much so that 
the posited self responsible for her past behaviors simply 
could not have been the same self that produced it. Being 
a contentful state, it must have some author; hence she 
preserves her narrative boundary by assigning that thought 
to another and contriving a story of insertion to account
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for how she came to be aware of it in a direct and 
unmediated way.
Conflicts in narrative need not be limited to 
particular thoughts, however. Subjects who suffer from 
dissociative identity disorder (DID) seem to have more than 
one self in the same physical body. In these cases, the 
patterns of speech and behavior admit of no clean 
integration, and no single agent appears responsible for 
producing all of them. In fact, bits of behavior may 
cluster together in ways that encourages positing different 
selves for different clusters. DID patients often present 
rather distinct patterns of behavior or "alters"--one may 
be male and prone to fits of rage, another may talk like a 
vulnerable young girl, and yet another may be daring and 
disposed to recklessness, each perhaps calling "himself" or 
"herself" by different names. When we encounter these 
subjects, we can't help but think that distinct 
personalities are in fact taking turns inhabiting and 
controlling their bodies. Under the narrative picture-- 
and, by extension, NP--this results from the way selves are 
identified and posited. Such radical ranges of behavior 
simply offer no one identification of a single self. The 
best predictive and explanatory theory calls for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 3 2
attributing particular bits of behavior to separate 
selves.
Dennett does give us a way of understanding how we 
create selves to interpret patterns of behavior. But one 
could object that his explanation merely passes the regress 
problem on to a different level. Suppose that he is 
correct in thinking that we do find ourselves "engaged in 
all sorts of behavior" that we then attempt to make
cohesive and coherent by positing a narrative center. Can
I still be wrong about which narrative is my narrative?
Why do I attempt to reconcile just these bits of verbal and 
nonverbal behavior? Mustn't there also be a reconciler?
Dennett relegates his dismissal of this question to a 
footnote:
And how do we know that we are doing 
something? Where do we get the initial bit
of self-knowledge we use for this leverage?
This has seemed to be an utterly fundamental 
question to some philosophers (Castarieda 
1967, 1968; Lewis 1979; Perry 1979), and has 
generated a literature of surpassing 
intricacy. If this is a substantial 
philosophical problem, there must be 
something wrong with the 'trivial' answer 
(but I can't see what): We get our basic,
original self-knowledge the same way the
^  Of course, my discussion of DID only scratches the surface of 
this fascinating phenomenon. For an interesting and informative 
exploration of the subject, including several case studies, see Hacking 
(1995). See also Dennett (1991), Humphrey and Dennett (1989/1998), and 
Wegner (2002). Wegner likens it to the phenomenon of spirit possession 
and advances a view quite similar to Dennett's. He argues that we 
construct virtual selves which are, as the term suggests, not real.
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lobster does; we're just wired that way 
(1991, p. 428, n2).
This answer hardly satisfies, however. Our respect for our 
biological boundaries may indeed be due in large part to
our " w i r i n g " , 1 5  it’s unclear how the claim survives the
analogical leap to the narrative self. Wiring is itself a 
general term standing for complex biological processes that 
arise out of the physical connection and interaction of 
various independent cells. Narrative "cells" share no 
physical connection, of course, which means that the 
analogous organizing principle for narrative selves remains 
mysterious. If the suggestion is instead that we are 
simply wired to take certain strings of verbal behavior as 
our own, then the narrative self begins to seem much more 
like nonfiction than fiction.
Still, we can build on Dennett's provocative idea and 
in so doing perhaps put the nagging regress worry to rest. 
The ascriptive regress does not terminate with the 
ascribing self but instead with ascription. For certain 
bits of ascriptive behavior produced by minded and 
language-producing creatures in effect posit certain 
ascribers for those very acts. Robert Nozick (1981)
The studies regarding body ownership discussed in the previous 
chapter, however, suggest that this "wiring" doesn't by itself 
determine one's sense of one's biological boundaries. Self-identifying 
beliefs play a crucial role as well.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
provides an interesting story about how this might work.
He argues that we can make sense of the view that no 
ascribing self exists before an act of nonaccidental self­
ascription, that the "I is delineated, is synthesized 
around the act of reflexive self-referring" (p. 87). Take 
a self-ascription of the form that one would express as "I 
am F. " The first-person pronoun and its mental analogue 
function as devices of reflexive self-reference that in 
effect automatically refer to the entity that tokens them. 
Accordingly, we can recast them as "The doer of this very 
act is F." In other words, Nozick suggests that we take 
Lichtenberg's response to Descartes quite seriously--the 
self is not revealed in thinking "I am a thinking thing" as 
Descartes would have it; instead, the grammar or form of 
the act itself creates a self by positing a thinker as its 
doer.
How could reflexive self-reference synthesize a self 
Nozick argues that reflexive self-reference in general 
requires no appeal to anything special or mysterious. Take 
a series of ascriptive acts Ai, ..., An, some of which are 
acts of classification, acts "bringing together things to 
constitute demarcated entities" (p. 88)--e.g., the thought 
one would express as "Bill, Dennis, and Tom make up the 
committee." Now consider a further act of unification and
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synthesis A0 that classifies and demarcates an entity 
according to Ai, . . . , A„ along with Ao. The act A0 
classifies all these A-acts--including Ao itself--as "parts 
or components or things arising from the same entity E" (p. 
89) . A0 posits an entity of which it is a part, and since 
we've described this possibility without invoking first- 
person considerations, no further mystery remains. 
Ascriptive acts involving the first-person pronoun or its 
mental analogue are merely further instances of reflexive 
self-reference amenable to this more basic explanation.
Still, we could construe E as the preexisting entity
that was the doer of Ao, but Nozick asks us to take the
possibility of self-synthesis as literally as we can:
Can we say (afterwards) that what did A0 was 
the entity E which Ao itself synthesized?
Can the rabbit be pulled out of the rabbit?
It is some such theory as this that Fichte 
presents; he speaks of the self as positing 
itself, also of the self as positing itself 
as positing itself. ... A0 seems to be an act 
of positing the self which, since it 
reflexively refers to that very act as 
included within the entity E, posits itself 
as positing itself, synthesizes itself as 
synthesizing itself. (p. 89)
The act of self-ascribing unity in a reflexive way thus 
creates the ascribing self, what Nozick calls (with 
characteristic wit and flare) a "Fichtetious object" (p.
89) .
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Nozick is less clear about how these individual acts 
of synthesis can give rise to the intuitive unity that we 
associate with selves as we experience them "from the 
inside." After all, any particular act of reflexive self­
reference synthesizes a rather circumscribed object and by 
itself does not dictate that any particular set of such 
acts synthesize a single, unified self. Nozick suggests 
that while any reflexive self-referential act only creates 
a doer for the very act in question, it sets a precedent 
for future acts. Precedent doesn't necessitate unity, but 
it does provide a sort of momentum towards unity, much like 
an accreting snowball rolling down a hill.1  ̂ Moreover, 
Nozick argues, much like Dennett, that the self continually 
rewrites its own history, synthesizing itself so as "to 
include past entities, including past selves which were 
synthesized" (p. 91). Ultimately, however, Nozick 
effectively abandons the unity question by begging it. He 
effectively packs unity into the act of synthesis itself, 
concluding that "[t]he I synthesizes itself as having the 
identity through time of a unified whole" (p. 104).
Though he presents a clever and interesting proposal, 
Nozick eventually loses faith in it, for it ultimately
We will return to this suggestion and to the question of 
apparent unity of selves as they appear in Rosenthal (2003) below.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 3 7
seems to him "too much like a bit of philosophical 
chicanery, too much froth and too little substance" (p.
114). He finds his synthesized self too insubstantial to 
bear the necessary philosophical weight. Given his 
expectations, it's no wonder. He offers the synthesis view 
as a way to vindicate our intuitions about the puzzling 
aspects of what he broadly calls "the essence of selves," 
such as the intuition that a self "stands in a peculiarly 
intimate relationship to itself," is "conscious of itself 
as itself" (p. 71), and has special knowledge of itself 
that can yield self-ascriptions that are IEM (p. 90). Not 
only must an act of reflexive self-reference synthesize a 
self, Nozick demands that it must synthesize a self that 
knows that it refers to itself in this particular way (p.
90). He also wants it to provide at least the basis for a 
projectible self-conception and the basis of self-care.
It's natural that Nozick's view should seem vaporous to 
him--the questions that he wants his proposal to put to 
rest can only be suitably answered by a "weighty" proposal.
Still, Nozick's proposal does provide a useful way of 
characterizing the distinction proponents of IEM want to 
capture between nonaccidental and accidental self- 
ascriptions. Non-accidental self-ascriptions are those 
that involve the first-person pronoun, a device of
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reflexive self-reference. Such self-ascriptions are 
therefore less subject to ascriptive accidents because only 
acts of self-reflexive reference themselves posit an 
ascriber of those very acts. Proper names and definite 
descriptions make no such reflexive reference to their 
tokeners; they refer in virtue of semantic features 
independent of their tokenings. Unlike self-reflexive 
contents, names can be empty and descriptions can go 
unsatisfied. As a result, ascriptive accidents are more 
likely to occur.
Moreover, by this point we can see that Nozick's 
desiderata for a theory of self-ascription no longer remain 
so desirable. We simply do not have a special sort of 
awareness of or access to ourselves that needs explaining 
in terms of a substantial self. Instead, we need an 
explanation of the appearance of these phenomenon, and an 
approach like Nozick's can provide a way of understanding 
this appearance. But such an approach seems dramatically 
atomistic, and our introspective conscious experience of 
ourselves is of a unified, persisting, and substantial 
self. How can we reconcile the two?
Though he devotes his paper "Unity of Conscious and 
the Self" (2003) to explaining the appearance of conscious 
unity in terms friendly to his higher-order thought (HOT)
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model of consciousness, Rosenthal's approach to the 
question of the sense of unity we have with regard to our 
mental lives has much to teach us about our own 
reconciliation challenge. For it seems to one, from the 
point of view of consciousness, that all the self- 
ascriptions that one would normally express with the first- 
person pronoun refer to the same, single individual. It 
seems to us that the subject who thought that she was 
hungry, e.g., later thinks that she had goulash for lunch. 
For any conscious state that one is in, it seems to one 
that it participates in a single stream of consciousness, 
the train of thought of one individual.
To better understand his strategy, we first need at 
least a general understanding of the HOT model of state 
consciousness.I7 According to this model, an intentional 
or sensory state is conscious just in case one has an 
assertoric thought about it to the effect that oneself is 
in that state. In other words, for one to be in a 
conscious state is for one to be conscious of oneself as
being in it in a suitable way.18 If one is in a particular
17 See Rosenthal (1986b) and (1993) and others reprinted in 
Rosenthal (forthcoming 2004) for representative discussions of his HOT 
model.
Rosenthal spells out the qualifier "suitable way" in terms of 
two caveats about HOTs: they must not arise from any conscious
inference and they must represent the states they are about as being
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mental state but is in no way aware of being in that state, 
it will not seem to one from the point of view of 
consciousness that one is in that state, and hence that 
state will not be conscious.
Unity becomes a pressing issue for the HOT model 
since prima facie it offers a fairly atomistic picture of 
state consciousness. If each conscious state is conscious 
in virtue of an accompanying HOT that makes one conscious 
of it as being present, the question arises as to how 
possessing several distinct HOTs can give rise to a single, 
unified sense of consciousness. After all, even if each 
particular HOT represents an individual as being conscious 
of herself as being in a particular mental state, why think 
that any two HOTs ascribe states to the same individual?
According to Rosenthal, each HOT "characterizes the 
self to which it assigns its target solely as the bearer of 
that target state and, by implication, as the individual
that thinks the HOT itself" (2003, p. 3 0 ) . Though this
present. The former captures the direct and immediate way we seem 
conscious of our conscious states and the latter is needed to insure 
that having a higher-order thought about a state makes one conscious of 
it.
The "by implication" qualifier is quite important. HOTs can't 
literally be about themselves or all HOTs would be conscious. Since 
HOTs typically aren’t conscious, they must refer to themselves only "by 
implication." Rosenthal argues that HOTs should not be understood as 
token reflexives but rather, following Kaplan (1989), as involving a 
mental analogue of 'I ' tantamount to a function from contexts to 
contents. Just as the first-person pronoun refers to whoever expresses
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sparse characterization of the bearer of conscious states
does little to unify one's conscious mental states, much
like Nozick Rosenthal contends that it does just as little
to splinter it:
Nothing in that characterization implies 
that this bearer is the same from one HOT to
the next. But there is also nothing to
distinguish one such bearer from any other.
And our seeming to be aware in a direct and 
unmediated way of the self each HOT refers 
to tilts things towards apparent unity.
Since we seem to be directly aware of the 
self in each case, it seems subjectively as 
though there is a single self to which all 
one's HOTs refer, a single bearer for all 
our conscious states, (p. 332)
One as it were assumes that one is directly and immediately 
conscious of the same self on each occasion, and that one's 
conscious thoughts about that self and their expression all 
have the same referent--barring reason to think otherwise.
We make a similar conservative assumption about the 
referents of proper names. Rosenthal observes that "we 
take distinct tokens of a proper name all to refer to the 
same individual unless something indicates otherwise. . . '
(p. 335). I assume, for example, that all my uses of the 
name 'Sigmund Freud' refer only to Sigmund Freud. The 
assumption can prove false--I could discover that no single 
individual wrote the works or gave the lectures usually
a speech act in which it participates, the mental analogue of ’I’ 
refers to the thinker of the thought in which it figures.
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attributed to Freud. Barring strong evidence to the 
contrary, however, we consider both our own uses of the 
first-person pronoun and proper names to be referentially 
constant and consistent.
Nevertheless, Rosenthal agrees that we "identify the
individual a first-person thought refers to by appeal to
some heterogeneous battery of contingent properties" (2003,
p. 345), and this way of identifying ourselves still seems
at odds with the way we are conscious of ourselves. For he
argues that a modicum of IEM does persist with regard to
consciousness. Though one can always be mistaken about who
is conscious of being F, Rosenthal contends that mistakes
"arguably cannot occur" (p. 340) concerning whether oneself
is the individual who is conscious of himself as being F.
This is unsurprising given his HOT model. For a state to
be conscious--a state of pain, e.g.--simply is for one to
be conscious of oneself as being in that state. That is,
the HOT in virtue of which the pain is 
conscious in effect represents it as 
belonging to the individual that thinks that 
HOT. So there is no way to go wrong about 
whether it's I that I think is in pain. I 
am conscious of an individual both as being 
in pain and, in effect, as the one that's 
conscious of being in pain, and I use the 
mental analogue of 'I' to refer to that 
individual. (p. 346)
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For a pain to be conscious is for one to have a HOT to the 
effect that oneself is in pain.
The IEM this affords, argues Rosenthal, does not 
conflict with the battery proposal. This "thin" immunity 
only applies to the way in which one's HOTs represent 
oneself and therefore the way in which one is conscious of 
oneself. The battery of self-specifying beliefs gives one 
a way of filling out and distinguishing that conscious self 
from others. New HOTs add to the battery by enriching the 
descriptions one has of oneself as a conscious subject.
And the unity assumption gives rise to the sense we have 
that the loose battery of contingent properties picks out a 
single self.
'Thin', of course, is a relative term, and in the end 
Rosenthal's thin immunity resembles Shoemaker's "thicker" 
version in many respects. Rosenthal argues that, unlike 
Shoemaker, the immunity he favors applies even in 
nonconscious cases. If one were to see a mirror reflection 
of oneself limping, one might conclude that one is in a 
nonconscious state of pain. But Shoemaker might well draw 
the same c o n c l u s i o n . 20 <po recognize that it is oneself who 
one sees limping in the mirror, Shoemaker argues that one
Though he would not agree to the possibility of nonconscious 
pains. See (1996), pp. 226-9. That point of contention is irrelevant 
in this case.
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must have IEM beliefs about oneself that can fund conscious 
self-identification. Whereas the ascription of pain itself 
in the mirror case might be open to error--as was Groucho1s 
conclusion regarding Harpo's ruse--IEM applies at the more 
fundamental level of determining whether oneself is 
reflected in the mirror. Accordingly, the immunity 
Rosenthal endorses becomes "thick" very quickly, for it 
seems that all conscious ascriptions of states and 
properties--whether the state ascribed is conscious or 
nonconscious--require that one possess beliefs about 
oneself that are IEM.
The HOT model also has its own form of self- 
intimation. Recall that Shoemaker argues that our 
functional organization is such that if one is in a certain 
mental state one will be caused to believe that one is in 
that state. Hence, one cannot have the conscious belief 
that p without also having the belief that one believes 
that p. Similarly, according to the HOT model, a state is 
conscious if and only if one is conscious of oneself as 
being in that state in the appropriate way. The 
"appropriate way" dictates that the HOT in virtue of which 
a state is conscious must be a first-person thought. As a 
result, even when a state is conscious but not 
introspectively conscious, one must have the first-person
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belief that oneself is in that state. HOTs need not be 
conscious--and usually aren't, argues Rosenthal. 
Nevertheless, his "thin" immunity--like Shoemaker's-- 
results from the intimate connection between any conscious 
mental state and the IEM self-ascription of the belief that 
one is in that state.
We should note, however, that Rosenthal's form of 
self-intimation is only analogous to Shoemaker's.
According to the HOT model, consciousness is not an 
intrinsic property of mental states, and the apparent 
direct access to our states characteristic of consciousness 
results not from causal relations between a mental state 
and its self-ascription but from HOTs that involve no 
conscious inference. HOTs may indeed be caused by their 
targets, but Rosenthal contends that HOTs can arise in many 
different ways. Thus the model leaves room for one to 
become conscious of another's states, say, if one could 
token HOTs targeting those states that did not rely upon 
conscious inference. In this counterintuitive case, one 
would have a HOT to the effect that "the thinker of this 
very HOT is in state S" where 'S' picks out the state of 
another. If the other individual in question were indeed 
in state S, then it does seem that one would be correct 
about the state ascribed but mistaken about the identity of
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the ascriber--a result clearly proscribed by Shoemaker's 
thicker IEM.21
Still, Shoemaker could argue that this anomalous 
example instead evinces the inexorable thickness of IEM.
For Rosenthal agrees that when a mental state is conscious 
one cannot be wrong about whether it is oneself who is 
representing himself as being in that state. So even when 
one has a noninferential HOT targeting the mental state of 
another--and it therefore seems to one subjectively that 
that state is conscious--one ascribes the state to oneself. 
Hence, Shoemaker might describe the situation differently: 
One's ascription of the other's state is IEM (in the thick 
sense) but false because one is not in fact in that state. 
One has not misidentified oneself but instead was mistaken 
about which state one was in. Hence, it seems that little 
separates thick from thin versions of IEM.22
This paragraph draws upon. Rosenthal's updated and expanded 
(2003) available on the World Wide Web at 
http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/unity-rev.pdf.
22 Shoemaker might also argue that if another's states could be 
conscious for one, then it's no longer clear whether two distinct 
subjects remain. This response flirts with begging the question, 
however, for he could not appeal to the premise of weak self-intimation 
to help draw boundaries for distinct minds. Nevertheless, a response 
of this kind does seem warranted, for if one could truly be conscious 
of another's states in the characteristic way that one is conscious of 
one’s own conscious states, one would, in an important sense, be in 
that state. The HOT responsible for that outcome would then correctly 
describe oneself. In other words, the individual who was the thinker 
of that HOT would indeed be the individual who was in the state 
ascribed by it.
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Moreover, under Rosenthal's picture it's unclear what 
the battery of self-identifying beliefs actually 
contributes to one's overall sense of mental unity. He 
does agree that identifying oneself amounts to "saying who 
it is that one is talking or thinking about when one talks 
or thinks about oneself" (p. 335). And he also agrees that 
one appeals to a battery of diverse and contingent 
properties to identify oneself. However, Rosenthal claims 
that the battery serves a reference-fixing role as well.
He writes:
For any new first-person thought, the 
reference that thought makes to oneself is 
secured by appeal to what other, prior 
first-person thoughts have referred to, and 
this process gradually enlarges the stock of 
self-identifying thoughts available to 
secure such reference. (p. 335)
But assigning the battery a reference-fixing role conflicts 
with the Kaplan model Rosenthal favors. According to 
Kaplan (1989), the first-person pronoun is tantamount to a 
function from context to contents. The referent of a token 
of 'I' is determined by its context of utterance (or mental 
tokening) apart from any ability one might have to identify 
or to pick out the tokener--reference and identification 
can come apart. If the battery did secure the reference of 
the first-person pronoun, mistaken beliefs about oneself
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could result in one's tokens of 'I' referring to someone 
else altogether.
Of course we need not endorse the HOT model of 
consciousness or follow Rosenthal's construal of the 
battery to the letter. One crucial lesson to draw from it, 
however, is that how things seem from the point of view of 
introspective consciousness may differ radically from how 
things actually are. When self-ascriptions are 
introspectively conscious, subjectively it seems to us that 
we are aware of a robust, unified ascribing subject in a 
direct and unmediated way. The appearance does need to be 
explained, but it need not preclude us from giving an 
account of self-ascription and the ascribing subject in 
terms friendly to NP. Indeed, the direct and unmediated 
way in which one is aware of introspected mental states and 
properties encourages the sense that they all belong to the 
same individual.
Together, the work of Dennett, Nozick, and Rosenthal 
suggests a slightly different unity proposal that draws 
much more heavily upon the battery of identifying beliefs.
Not only are we skillful self novelists,23 we are also 
accomplished literary critics. Questions do arise as to 
the authorship of certain narratives, and once authorship
23 i draw the "novelist* reference from Dennett (1988).
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is agreed upon, the characteristics of that narrative form 
the basis of a profile that can then aid in identifying 
still other narratives as by that same author. Academic 
industries have sprung up around whether Shakespeare was 
indeed the author of all the plays commonly attributed to 
him (or if in fact they can be attributed to a single 
author), and certain Edgar Allen Poe scholars have devoted 
their lives to determining which of many unsigned columns,
reviews, and stories were produced by Poe himself.24
On occasion, author and authorship can only be 
determined together. In the interpretation accompanying 
David Rosenberg's translation of The Book of j , for 
example, Harold Bloom argues that a strand of narrative 
running through the books of Genesis, Exodus, and Numbers 
were written by a single, brilliant author whom scholars 
call, simply, J. His strategy is to construct as sharp a 
picture as possible of J (including her sex) on the basis 
of her extant writings. To make his case, however, Bloom 
has to redress what he describes as the "long, sad, 
enterprise of revising, censoring, and mutilating J" (p.
24 x know a particularly tenacious Poe scholar who even in his 
retirement is determined to produce the definitive collected works of 
Poe. Interestingly, he was always quick to offer that though he 
respected Poe's literary gifts (especially his penchant for coining new 
words), he wouldn't care to have him as a friend. The point being that 
by studying his writing (and the many writings about him), this scholar 
has come to have a fairly rich battery of identifying beliefs about Poe 
as an author and as a person.
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22), which means that he must also argue that certain 
fragments of narrative currently assigned to a variety of 
authors are in fact the work of J. His main tool for doing 
so is his sensitivity to authorial voice, a product of his 
"experience over half a century as a reader" (p. 21).
In priming the reader for his case, Bloom connects 
his exercise with more familiar attempts at understanding 
any author:
This J is my fiction, most biblical scholars 
will insist, but then each of us carries 
about a Shakespeare of a Tolstoy or a Freud 
who is our fiction also. As we read any 
literary work, we necessarily create a 
fiction or a metaphor of its author. That 
author is perhaps our myth, but the 
experience of literature partly depends upon 
that myth. (1990, p. 19)
In reading a text, we construct a picture of the author-- 
her literary strengths and weaknesses, favorite themes, 
habits of mind, expressive powers, etc. To read a 
narrative is ultimately inseparable from "reading" its 
author, and to determine the boundaries of a narrative or 
text we must draw upon the character and qualities of 
putative authors.
This complementary process is not merely an academic 
exercise. Consider once again Sacks's surprise at his own 
reaction. His experience of venomous spite itself says 
something about the individual responsible for it--perhaps
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that he can be petty, envious, and mean. Sacks shifts 
authorship of this experience to his sickness because he 
does not believe that he is the type of person who could 
produce such a reaction. The experience speaks volumes 
about its author, and Sacks finds that its authorial voice 
sounds nothing like the one common to the more staid, 
avuncular thoughts and experiences normally constituting 
his conscious experience. And if (or when) he does admit 
that it was not his sickness "talking" but rather himself, 
he will be more likely to own up to similar experiences in 
the future. Assigning authorship to a narrative strand 
amounts to admitting to something about the author, even if 
it is oneself.
The above remarks form just the foundation of a more 
complicated proposal, for the ways in which we identify 
ourselves are due to a host of sources, including the ways 
in which others identify and describe u s . 25 still, the 
authorship analogy helps to explain how self-ascription 
draws upon self-identification without assuming a unified, 
substantive, ascribing self. The battery actively gives 
rise to a sense of unity by providing a constantly 
enriching base for interpreting the introspecting subject 
as well as the states introspected. Conscious self-
25 See, e.g., Neisser (1988).
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reflexive self-ascriptions both create and characterize an 
ascriber, and new conscious thoughts and behaviors that do 
not conflict with that characterization are incorporated 
into the battery by default. The battery thus identifies a 
subject as a rich text would its author. And the richer 
the battery becomes, the more successful the identification 
of new bits of narrative behavior.
S4. The Not-So-Na£ve-Proposal: A Review
We began in Chapter II with the puzzling relationship 
between self-identification and self-ascription. Intuition 
dictates that certain self-ascriptions involve no self- 
identification whatsoever. We found proof of the power of 
this intuition in the way in which Chisholm, Wittgenstein, 
and Anscombe assume--explicitly or implicitly--that certain 
sorts of ascriptive error are simply impossible. In 
Wittgenstein's terms, no room for error exists when one 
self-ascribes properties in a particular way with the 
first-person pronoun.
Any sufficient account of self-ascription, however, 
also needs to explain what we called accidental self- 
ascriptions, or those that do intuitively seem open to 
self-misidentification. Canonically, these are self­
ascriptions that one would express with self-designating
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terms other than the first-person pronoun such as proper 
names, descriptions, and demonstratives. Misidentification 
results when one is both disposed to assent to what one 
would express as "a is F" for some self-designating 
expression 'a' and disposed to deny what one would express 
as "I am a ."
Initially, it appeared that accounts such as 
Chisholm's that excel at explaining nonaccidental self­
ascription had little to say about accidental self­
ascription. Similarly, accounts like the broad formulation 
of NP that take accidental cases as the model for all self- 
ascriptions seem incapable of capturing our intuitions 
about nonaccidental ones--particularly first-person 
ascriptions of mental states and properties. The strengths 
of one approach highlights the weaknesses of its 
competitor, and vice versa.
Shoemaker provides a much more compelling and 
comprehensive account similar to Chisholm's in terms of 
certain self-ascriptions being IEM. He offers a way to 
understand both accidental and nonaccidental self- 
ascriptions in terms of the way in which one is aware of 
the property or state ascribed. First-person self­
ascriptions based upon introspective awareness are 
nonaccidental because one is aware of the relevant state or
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property in a way that is direct and unmediated. One 
doesn't first observe some individual as, e.g., believing 
that g and then identify that individual as oneself. 
According to Shoemaker, one's mental states are self- 
intimating, and to believe that g is functionally 
inseparable from the introspective belief one believes that 
p. In contrast, accidental self-ascriptions are funded by 
types of awareness that are indirect and mediated. When 
one observes a reflection in a mirror, for example, one 
sees that some presented individual is F, but a question 
can arise as to which individual is the one that is F, 
including whether that individual is in fact oneself. One 
must identify that individual by drawing upon antecedent 
beliefs about oneself or another, and since identification 
is involved, misidentification (of oneself or another) 
cannot be precluded.
In Shoemaker’s most powerful argument in support of 
his account, he contends that at least some self- 
ascriptions must be nonaccidental, for otherwise we would 
be unable to explain how we are able to ascribe properties 
to ourselves and to others even in accidental cases. If 
all self-ascription did depend upon identification--and 
hence were subject to misidentification--we would fall into 
a vicious regress. Identifying some presented individual b
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
255
as some familiar individual a requires that one already 
possess beliefs about the properties of a that overlap in 
some significant measure with the observed properties of b. 
If one's antecedent beliefs about a themselves depended 
upon identification, then one must possess antecedent 
beliefs about the properties of some other familiar 
individual c that overlap with the observed properties of 
a, and so on indefinitely. We can halt this regress only 
by positing self-ascriptions that do not depend upon 
ascribing any property to oneself and hence are immune to 
error through misidentification relative to the first- 
person pronoun. Indeed self-misidentification is possible, 
Shoemaker argues, because we have beliefs about ourselves 
that are IEM and mistakenly conclude that some presented 
individual instantiates those properties we ascribe without 
first identifying ourselves.
We further observed that Shoemaker's account survives 
challenges from within the ranks of those who endorse IEM. 
Evans and Bermudez argue that certain bodily self- 
ascriptions are likewise IEM, but empirical investigations 
into our sense of bodily ownership and the ways in which it 
can be disrupted indicate otherwise. Though it may appear 
that we are aware of our bodily properties and limbs in a 
direct and unmediated way, mistakes in attributions of
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ownership can arise. Corporeal beliefs about one's body 
such as its size, appearance, limb orientation and number, 
make up one's body image, and by manipulating these beliefs 
one can be fooled into self-attributing prosthetic limbs or 
the limbs of another. As a result, however it might appear 
"from the inside," bodily self-ascriptions are not in fact 
IEM.
This counterintuitive result provides a model for 
reconsidering Shoemaker’s version of IEM self-ascriptions 
based upon introspective self-awareness. Here again we 
observed, with the help of empirical research, that though 
it seems that one is aware of one's own mental states and 
properties in a way that is direct and unmediated, we in 
fact do not have such access. The strong intuition that we 
cannot make mistakes of self-identification when 
introspecting results from certain self-ascriptions being 
introspectively conscious. But mistakes can arise even in 
these cases, for one can consciously believe oneself to be 
in certain states that one is not in fact in. The point of 
view of consciousness is not, as it turns out, a privileged 
perch from which we witness our own mental lives. IEM 
proves to be nothing more than a figment of introspective 
consciousness.
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NP, in contrast, accommodates both the intuitions we 
have about self-ascriptions and the errors to which such 
thoughts and expressions about ourselves are open. It maps 
the intuitive difference between nonaccidental and 
accidental self-ascriptions not in terms of the 
impossibility of self-misidentification but instead in 
terms of the amount of self-specifying information brought 
to bear when ascribing states or properties and the form of 
the self-ascription. According to NP each of us possesses 
a battery of self-specifying beliefs, and nonaccidental 
self-ascriptions--those canonically made with the first- 
person pronoun--are less likely to involve ascriptive 
errors because one draws upon the full range of one's 
beliefs about oneself. Introspection is better thought of 
as conscious interpretation, the application of a 
predictive and explanatory strategy useful for making sense 
of our behavior and experiences. This richness of belief, 
combined with how the ascribing subject appears from the 
point of view of introspective consciousness, gives rise to 
the intuition that one cannot misidentify the subject of 
first-person self-ascriptions.
NP also puts to rest Shoemaker's regress worries 
without invoking a special form of self-access. 
Interpretation often involves interpreting not only which
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state one has but whether it is oneself who has it. 
Accordingly, the self to which we ascribe properties 
accidentally and nonaccidentally is a narrative self, the 
theoretical posit specified by one's battery of self- 
identifying belief. This narrative self arises out of 
individual narrative ascriptive strands, some of which are 
self-reflexive and therefore themselves posit an ascriber 
for that very act. These minimal posits set a kind of 
precedent for the identity of the ascribing subject, 
providing the precedent for a narrative self and 
contributing to a growing sense of conscious unity.
NP has the remarkable consequence--one that many will 
find hard to accept--that first-person misidentification 
remains a possibility even with introspectively conscious 
self-ascriptions. Arguably this does happen in instances 
of thought insertion. We identify ourselves as particular 
sorts of thinkers and doers, and when thoughts and actions 
that we are aware of in a direct and unmediated way run 
counter to that identification we can go so far as to 
misidentify the ascriber by attributing those thoughts and 
actions to another. For one to misidentify oneself is to 
deny that oneself is the referent of a particular 
expression that is in fact self-designating. One is 
introspectively conscious of a property or state when it
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seems to one that one is aware of it in a way that is 
direct and unmediated. But that conscious self-ascription 
that one would normally express with the first-person 
pronoun--"I must kill God," e.g.--could dramatically 
conflict with how one identifies oneself. One could, 
therefore, deny that one tokened that very thought--"it1s 
the thought of this chap Chris." But to be a competent 
speaker of English, one must grasp that tokens of the 
first-person pronoun (and its mental analogue) refer to 
their tokeners. One thus in effect denies that oneself is 
the first person posited by the "alien" self-ascription, 
thereby misidentifying oneself.
In the end, then, contrary to our powerful 
intuitions, all self-ascription involves identification in 
some way. Nonaccidental self-ascriptions differ from 
accidental ones in this respect only in degree and not in 
kind. We have no special access to our own mental states 
and properties, and thus we have not been granted immunity 
against errors of self-identification, even in 
introspective cases. However disconcerting the persistent 
possibility of ascriptive error may be, it allows for a 
comprehensive, unified account of self-ascription that 
leaves little room for Cartesianism to take root. As a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 6 0
result, in NP we find a means of demystifying the first 
person.
S5. Answering the Objections: The Misconception Problem
and the Amnesia Problem
Armed with the full version of NP, we are now in a position 
to return to and to answer the three major objections 
raised against NP at the outset. First, let's consider the 
Misconception Problem and the related "Twivienne" puzzle. 
Recall that this problem questioned whether the battery of 
self-specifying beliefs could serve to pick oneself out 
uniquely since one no doubt misidentifies oneself in a host 
of ways. Moreover, the objection goes, we can imagine a 
case in which two subjects--Vivienne and Twivienne--possess 
the same battery of beliefs and hence each identifies 
herself in the same way. NP seems unable to provide a way 
of explaining how Vivienne's self-ascriptions ascribe 
properties to her and not to Twivienne.
NP’s answer to this problem should, by now, be clear. 
First, it confuses reference and identification. One can 
refer to Freud with the name 'Freud' despite having false 
beliefs about him. Similarly, one can refer to oneself 
with names, descriptions, and pronouns even when one has 
mistaken beliefs about oneself. Just as one's beliefs 
about Freud don't determine the reference of one's
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tokenings of the name 'Freud', one's battery of self- 
specifying belief doesn't determine one's reference to 
oneself. Reference is a function of the semantic 
properties of an expression, and identification is a matter 
of beliefs--true or false--one has about particular 
referents. Indeed, instances of misidentification are 
themselves occasions when reference and identification 
diverge.
Does this response in effect exacerbate the Twivienne 
problem? No special difficulty about reference arises, for 
Vivienne and Twivienne will each succeed in referring to 
herself uniquely with her tokens of 'I' or its mental 
analogue. Though it may appear to us as if we have direct 
and unmediated access to a unique self, we simply do not 
have the kind of "special privileged access" that Chisholm 
and Shoemaker would draw upon to settle the dilemma of 
identification confronting Vivienne and Twivienne. If two 
identical subjects like Vivienne and Twivienne did truly 
identify themselves in the same way, the narrative selves 
they posit to explain and to predict their behavior won't 
in fact differ. We must accept that our intuitions about 
identification here simply are not vindicated.26
26 Notice also that according to NP the cottage industry that has 
developed around the problem of reconciling self-knowledge with
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The Amnesia objection, we will recall, questioned the 
necessity of the battery, for if one could still 
nonaccidentally self-ascribe properties after having 
completely lost one's battery of self-specifying belief, 
not all self-ascriptions involve identification. If 
anything, this objection now seems even more dramatic in 
light of our appeal to fictional selves--to lose one's 
battery of belief is, as it happens, to lose oneself.
This objection requires much care to avoid begging 
the important questions. When we conjure up examples of 
amnesiacs to sharpen our intuitions, we tend to envision a 
subject suffering from what we might call "Hollywood 
amnesia," where an individual who has forgotten part or all 
of the catalogue of facts from her past but nevertheless 
continues to speak her native tongue with perfect 
f l u e n c y . in such a case, our amnesiac retains her grasp 
on the first-person pronoun's communicative function to 
refer to its tokener. Accordingly, she will still possess 
the ability to identify herself as a speaker of English and 
to interpret herself as the producer of tokens of the
extemalism struggles with a misconceived problem. One of its 
assumptions--namely that one knows what one believes in a direct and 
privileged way--simply does not survive scrutiny. We in fact do not 
come to believe what we believe in a way that differs from how we come 
to believe what another believes--it only appears to us that we do.
indeed, film characters suffering from this type of amnesia 
often seem to be happier than those around them, as if they had 
literally forgotten all their cares.
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English word 'I'. This also means that she will, upon 
regaining consciousness following the proverbial sharp blow 
to the head, immediately begin spinning a new self. She 
will produce strings of narrative whose spinner will need 
to be identified, and she will be asked questions about her 
identity that require answering. She will also have a host 
of other beliefs to draw upon to fill out this new self-- 
though she may have forgotten the name of her own mother, 
she would presumably still remember, e.g., that a mother is 
one's female parent, and that a parent is one's forebear 
and so must be older than one, that a forebear is ..., and 
so on. If our amnesiac does eventually discover her 
forgotten past, she links the pre- and post-accident selves 
by positing a single unifying narrative center that 
explains the entire range of data.
If, however, her amnesia is so severe that she has 
indeed forgotten how to speak, intuition ceases to be 
instructive. A proponent of NP would indeed be committed 
to the claim that such a subject could not self-ascribe 
properties and states at all. That seems to me to be a 
reasonable conclusion, perhaps the only more reasonable one 
being that we simply do not know what to say in such a 
case. Clearly those who argue that this severe amnesiac 
could still make self-ascriptions cannot simply assert that
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she does so in virtue of retaining a fundamental ability to 
self-ascribe properties without begging the question 
outright.
S6. The Asymmetry Problem
Last, we turn to the Asymmetry Problem. This problem arose 
out of NP's denial of a difference in kind between 
accidental and nonaccidental self-ascriptions.
Nonaccidental self-ascriptions do not seem to be made on 
the basis of evidence whereas accidental self-ascriptions 
and the ascriptions of properties to others do. Indeed, 
this seems to be an obvious feature of self-ascription that 
any adequate theory must respect and explain. NP appears 
to do just the opposite, however, for under it the apparent 
iron-clad security against self-misidentification that 
nonaccidental ascriptions intuitively enjoy results from 
the richness of one's battery of self-identificatory 
beliefs. But this is to say that nonaccidental self­
ascriptions are made on the basis of more evidence than 
accidental ones.
NP does dictate that identificatory evidence plays a 
key role in one's nonaccidental self-ascriptions. But here 
again we need to distinguish how things appear to us and 
how they are. Most beliefs we have about ourselves are
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most likely normally not conscious. When we identify 
others (and on occasion ourselves) for self-ascription we 
often engage in conscious inferences that bring to bear 
beliefs about those individuals. This does not mean, 
however, that self-ascriptions that do not involve 
conscious inference involve no inference whatsoever. As we 
saw in several instances above, empirical research strongly 
suggests that we often make nonconscious inferences about 
limb and thought ownership. Moreover, the stark contrast 
between the evidence brought to bear in the first-person 
and third-person cases oversimplifies the matter. When one 
ascribes pain to a close friend or family member, it 
doesn't usually seem to one that one sees someone in pain 
and then identifies that person as, say, one's brother.
One simply sees that one’s brother is in p a i n . 2 8  n o  doubt 
one has many more identificatory beliefs about one’s 
brother than one's acquaintances, so we should expect--and 
NP accommodates--a similar asymmetry in this case. The 
asymmetry arises because we don't usually consciously 
appeal to the wealth of evidence we have about ourselves 
and those most familiar to us. As a result, questions
28 Cf. Wittgenstein’s remark that one is not of the opinion that 
another has a soul (1970, p. 178). That is, barring special 
circumstances one doesn't consciously arrive at the conclusion that 
someone is a living human being. In the usual case one simply acts 
toward another as if she has a soul.
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regarding whether oneself--or in some cases another--is the 
bearer of the property or state seem out of place.
S7. Conclusion: Avenues of Exploration
Over the course of this extended discussion of 
identification and its role in self-ascription we have 
deepened our understanding of the ways in which we ascribe 
properties to ourselves. Further understanding usually 
begets further questions, however, and this case offers no 
exception. I therefore want to conclude by considering a 
few outstanding questions and avenues of further 
exploration encouraged by the naive proposal of self- 
ascription endorsed and defended here.
We have focused mainly on identification as it 
relates to language users, but studies in comparative 
psychology strongly suggest that creatures other than 
ourselves recognize themselves in ways importantly similar 
to ours. Lobsters may not eat themselves when hungry, but 
chimpanzees seem to exhibit a higher level of self- 
identification. They eventually respond to mirrors with 
what very much seems like spontaneous or unconditioned 
self-exploratory behavior, apparently using their 
reflection to examine parts of their bodies that they 
cannot see directly. Moreover, research by Gordon Gallup
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(197 0) and others shows that when a small mark is 
surreptitiously applied to their foreheads, they touch the 
mark significantly more often in the presence of a mirror 
than in its absence. Are chimpanzees identifying 
themselves? If so, how? What cognitive or narrative 
resources do they bring to bear to identify themselves that 
animals who don't pass the "mark test" lack? Gallup's 
explanation for various species' (including human infants) 
success at mirror self-recognition relies upon some of the 
same premises and assumptions appealed to by Shoemaker to 
argue for IEM. Our understanding of the latter might very 
well extend our understanding of the former.
Much work also needs to be done regarding various 
psychopathologies and self-identification. NP explains 
thought insertion in terms of first-person
misidentification--a subject has an experience so anomalous 
that she interprets it as totally at odds with the way in 
which she identifies herself, ultimately attributing it to 
another. Stephens and Graham (2000) argue that this 
explanation is the best one, but that we also need to 
distinguish between merely having a thought and thinking 
it. That is, these agents lack the appropriate sense of 
agency towards their thoughts while still preserving some 
sense of subjective ownership. As a result, they contend
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that these attributions of subjective ownership remain IEM. 
However, if what we’ve said about NP is correct, the sense 
of subjective ownership is itself a product of 
identification and so attributions of thought ownership are 
also not IEM. We need a better account of the relationship 
between the sense of agency and the sense of subjective 
ownership with regard to thoughts. One could perhaps 
argue, armed with NP, that the sense of subjective 
ownership is dependent in large part upon the sense of 
agency. The success of this strategy remains to be seen.
Similarly, the battery's significance for one's sense 
of bodily ownership needs to be fleshed out in much more 
detail. Participants in this literature often assume that 
states of bodily awareness must either be subpersonal or 
conscious. However, as we have seen, self-specifying 
beliefs need not be conscious, and nonconscious beliefs 
play an important role in dictating the way our bodies 
appear to be ours in a direct and unmediated way. Beliefs 
about agency and oneself as a causal force also no doubt 
contribute to the sense of ownership. The challenge is to 
spell out in detail how the perceptual systems that provide 
self-specifying information relate and inform the ways in 
which we identify ourselves and how those ways give rise to 
a conscious sense of ownership.
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These are formidable but exciting and worthwhile 
challenges to pursue, and I look forward to pursuing them. 
Interestingly, to pursue them is, in a sense, to pursue 
oneself. In her appropriately titled book None to 
Accompany Me, Nadine Gordimer perhaps locates a persistent 
truth when she writes: "Everyone ends up moving alone
towards the self" (1994, p. 306). I can think of no more 
inviting destination.
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